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M
uch has been made of
the so-called "intran–
sigence" of Men–
achem Begin: The
wo r ld press has
viewed him as the "main obstacle"
to peace. Few men in the free world
have such a reputation for inflex–
ibility. As one major American
newsweekly declared in anticipation
of the results at Camp David:
"lt
will depend in large part on the
stern and cantankerous figure of
Menachem Begin-and on whether
any mixture of pressure and per–
suasion can induce the onetime
guerrilla leader to lessen his intran–
sigeney and make at least sorne
concessions fo r the sake of a sctt le–
ment."
Had Camp David failed, the
Israelí prime minister undoubtcdly
would have been saddled with the
lion's share of the blame. No other
Is raelí leader has been simulta–
neously attacked on so many fronts.
He has been under continua! fire
from Washington. President Carter
previous!y
told a group of congrcss–
men that Mr. Begin "had peace
within his grasp and he let it get
away." Obviously President Sadat
would have preferred to deal with a
more pliant personality like Defense
Minister Ezer Weizman.
Almost from the onset of his ad–
mini s tration , the Israelí in–
telligentsia has been very critica! of
Mr. Begin's hard-line stancc. On the
other hand, he has been far too
moderate for Likud Party exlremists
like Geula Cohen. Labor leaders
havc cast aspersions on Mr. Bcgin's
judgment and his ability to lead. At
one point in time even his sanity
appeared to be questioned.
Such were sorne of the altitudes
that preceded Mr. Begin into Camp
David. However, none of these
viewpoints was ever fully shared by
this observer.
More than ayear ago, on Octobc r
18, 1977,
1
wrote the following re–
port from Tokyo:
" lt
is this writer's opinion ... that
he [Mr. Begin] may stand in a very
unique position to bring about peace
in the Middle East. ...
" His coming to power bears a
striking similarity to General
16
Charles de Gaulle's return to power
at the time that the Algerian ques–
tion almost tore France apart. With
civil war threatening and the bloody
confiict in Algeria accelerating
every day, de Gaulle was asked to
lead the nation once again by those
who were convinced that he would
save Algeria for France and was the
only man who would be able to do
so. But within a very short period of
time it was the same General de
Gaulle who was ablc to extricate
In retrospect, Sadat's epic
journey to Jerusalem (in
November of 1977) must
be viewed as a mos t
important prepara tory
step to Camp David.
France from Algeria and to end the
bloody conflict and bring about the
real postwar recovery of his nation.
Only he had the personal stature to
make the kind of decision that was
required at the time....
"Begin is known to be. among
other things, an ideologue, as well as
a firm believer in lsrael's destiny to
reclaim those lands which it control–
led in biblical times. He has been
described as a 'hawk' and as un–
compromising in his dealings with
the opposition party in Israel and
with any who are inclined to take a
soft line vis-a-vis any of the Arab
nations, particularly with respect to
the return of the occupied territories
commonly referred to as the West
Bank ....
" However, because of his política!
posture in the past, and his genuine
credentials as a hawk, he stands, in
this writer's view, as the one man who
might be able to make the kind of a
deal with the Arab nations that would
bring about a return of much of the
occupied territory in return for the
Arab nations' recognition of Israel as
a state, which recognition alone is the
only real basis for peace in the arca,
notwithstanding Uni ted States guar–
antees of any permanent cease-fire
armistice or peace treaty" ("In Brief,"
The Plain Trwh,
December 1977).
Needless to say, Prime Minister
Begin may eventually en ter history as
the one man who finally brought the
State of Israel an honorable peace
with security.
Why Peace May Now Be Possible
But no reader should view Camp
David as thc only real breakthrough
on the path to peace in the Middle
East. The talks there must not be
viewed as an isolated step forward.
The favorable results would not have
been possible had a whole serie o f
preceding steps not been takcn, not
the lcast of which have been the
efforts of men of goodwill in all thc
countries of that region working bc–
hind the scenes for real peace.
By way of a brief background, at
least four major wars have been
waged since the formation ofmodero
Israel in 1948. The politics of con–
frontation began with the very in–
ception of the State of Israel.
However, it successfully defended it–
self against attacks from small, basi–
cally uncoordinated forces in 1948.
Next carne thc Suez Canal crisis in
1956, fo llowed by the famous Six–
Day War eleven years la ter.
Aside from the thorny question of
the occupied territories emanating
from the Six-Day War, these three
unfortunate conflagrations may be
viewed as local wars. vastly impor–
tan! for the participants, but omc–
what restricted in their effect on the
outside world. No so with the Yom
The
PLAIN TRUTH January 1979