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Kippur War of 1973. As Professor
Walter Laqueur (Chairman of the
Research Council of the Center for
Stratcgic and l nternational Studies
in Washington) observed: "The
fourth Arab- Israeli war was nick–
named 'Operation Spark' by Presi–
dent Sadat.
lt
spa rked off a crisis in
detente, the eclipse, temporary or
permanent, of Western Europe. a
world energy shortage. and it also
opened up a new phase in the
struggle for the Middle Eas t"
(Con–
frontation- The Midd/e East War
and World Politics,
page vii).
T he Yom Ki ppur War was bot h
militarily hurtful and economically
damaging t o b o th s id es. A nd
beyond that. thi s costly conflict had
nearly spilled over into a nuclear
confrontat ion between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Clearly
elfective intcrnational steps had to
be taken to preven! another possibly
fatal outbreak of hostilities in the
Middle East.
Enter Secretary Kissinger
Presiden! Sadat took a big stcp him–
self when he expelled the Soviet
technieal advisers from Egypt in
1972. Then. in the wake of thc Yom
Kippur War. American Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger capi talized
on this eventuality by drawing
Egypt much furthcr into the Ameri–
can camp. Besides th e obviou s
Western concerns surrounding the
price a nd avai lab ility o f Arab o il .
Secrctary Kissinger was particularly
interested in sav ing the Midd le East–
ern area from Soviet domi nation.
A climatc had now been created
for the intcrim peace accord sepa–
rating opposing military forces in
the Sinai. But an cvcn more impor–
tan! event was lo follow.
Success secmed to be halted after
the Sinai disengagemcnt pacts. And
although the lsraelis were very ap–
preciative of the Uni ted Statcs in its
role as intermcdiary. it seemed to
this observer that there was a feeling
that perhaps the United States role
(and that of Mr. Kissinger) had
done much to prevent the Egyptians
from sitt ing down face to face with
the lsraeli s and settling their dilfer–
ences more quickly a nd perhaps
more elfectively.
The
PLAIN TRUTH
January
1979
In August o f 1975. 1 wrote: " Now
is the time for Presiden! Sadat to
boldly take the lead of the Arab
world: to bring hosti lities toan end
with Israel once a nd for all and to
lead aiJ of the Arab nations. rich
and poor a like. into a cooperative
elfort - ultimately even with Israe l–
lO
make the entire Middle East
flourish as it did sorne 2.000 years
ago" ("In Brief.' '
The Plain Truth.
September 1975).
But it was not until November of
Prime Minis ter Begin
may eventually enter
history as the one man
who finally brought the
state of Israel an
honorable peace with
security.
1977 that Anwar Sadat finally took
his bold gamble for peace. In retro–
spect. his epic journey to J erusalem
must be viewed as a most importan!
preparatory step to Camp David.
The Israelí P.M. and the Egyptian
leader were now talking faceto face,
and no longer through a n American
intermediary. And de facto Egyp–
tian recognition of the State of
Israel was now an accomplished
reality. You do not visit someone
unless you recognize his right to
exist.
Such were the vital steps that pre–
ceded President Carter's bold initia–
tive in calling Messrs. Sadat and
Begin to Camp David.
In the Aftermath of Camp David
Negotiations were no t easy at Camp
David. At one point President Sadat
was prepared to abandon further
discussions. And obtaining vital
conccssions from M
r.
Begín took
patient and s kíllful negotiating.
Jimmy Carter must be given every
crcdit for bringing the two Middle
Eastern leaders together and help–
ing th em construct a viable frame–
work for peace.
The road a head will not be an
casy one. There are many knotty
problcms ye t to be resolved. At
sorne point , King Hussein of Jor–
dan the Arab world's perennial
"man in the middle" - must be ac–
tively brought into the negotiating
process. The problem of the West
Bank will never be permanently re–
solved without his full participation.
And. of course. Old J erusalem will
sooner or later have to come into
the foreground of negotiations.
Control of the sacred city is the most
cmotiona l and potentially explosive
issue in Palestine.
And yet. we have to be thankful
for the Camp David accords. Once
good faith has been established be–
tween two former enemies, nothing
is impossible in the long run.
Many observers were vcry con–
cerned about the chemistry at Camp
David. There were fears that a per–
so nality clash between the two
principals would prevent any mean–
ingful progress. Had not the good–
will fostered by Presiden! Sadat's
journcy to Jerusalem al ready been
severcly damaged by demeaning
statements to the press from both
sides?
Clcarly it was expecting too much
for Messrs. Sadat and Begin to get
together again on their own. Sorne–
times, in the spirit of the Sermon on
the Mount , a third party is required
to restore trust and good faith .
Man's normal inclinations tend
toward competition and s trife.
Peoplc do not !ove each other in–
stinctively. Love is an a rt that must
be lcarned.
O
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