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after its occupation of the mainland
in 1949. Peking, moreover, as recent
news dispatches reveal, continues lo
employ política! executions lo deal
with its enemies. Recognizing Pe–
king in the face of its deplorable
human rights record, Taiwanese
feel, would represen! a flagrant be–
trayal of American moral principies
and would be a giant step backward
for the cause of freedom.
Taiwan's Foreign Minister Shen
Chang-huan, in a cable to Nalion–
alist China diplomats in the wake of
Vance's Asia Society speech in June,
declared: "Should the United States
choose to recognize the Chinese
Communists by abandoning the
long-s tanding friendly relations with
the Republic of China, it would not
only seriously damage the rights
and interests of the Republic of
China and jeopardize the security of
the 16 million Chinese on Taiwan,
but would also violale lhe lofty
ideals upon which lhe American na–
tion was built and the moral prin–
cipies emphasized by the Carter
Administration, and lhus erode lhe
credibility of the Uniled States
among the free peoples the world
over. Such a policy would not only
be unhelpful to the cause of world
peace, but may lead to new threats
ofwar."
And it would certainly deal a se–
vere blow to the morale of the
Taiwanese people-to say nothing of
placing a huge damper on lhe Re–
public as an area of safe, sure eco–
nomic investment.
Despite such pleas, many Taiwa–
nese privately feel thal moral argu–
ments of this nature are unlikely to
dissuade President Carter's policy
planners.
Securlty Treaty
In the wake of the original Kiss–
inger-Nixon moves, Japan rather
suddenly severed diplomatic rela–
tions with Taipei and recognized Pe–
king in 1972. Tokyo, however, has
maintained relations with Taipei on
a de facto basis. In fact, it conducts
far more business with Taiwan than
it does with Peking.
President Carler has pointed to
the so-called "Japanese Formula" as
a possible answer to the Taiwan di–
lemma. The fallacy in this thinking,
Taiwanese are quick to point out, is
10
SHIPBUILDING
and textiles are among
Taiwan 's most importani industries.
that Japan has no mutual defense
treaty with Taiwan!
The U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954 obligates America to
intervene on the side of the Nation–
alists sbould Peking launch a Tai–
wan offensive. The pact was
concluded in the aftermath of the
Korean war as part of Washington's
strategy to stabilize the Pacific re–
gion and to provide security for the
free nations of Asia behind the U.S.
defense shield.
The problem now for Washing–
ton, according to Dr. Tsai, an inter–
national lawyer, is that the treaty is
of a permanent nature, containing
no termination date. It can justi–
fiably be terminated- after one
year's notice- only if one of the par-.
ties repeatedly fails to live up to the
terms of the agreement.
The problem again (for Washing–
ton) is tbat Taiwan has been a com–
pletely faithful ally throughout the
24 years of the treaty.
lt
has con–
scientiously fulfilled all its obliga–
tions and responsibilities under the
pact. As a result, the U.S. has no
legal grounds for renouncing the
treaty.
The Taiwanese point out that the
much touted· Shanghai Commu–
nique of 1972, which is not a treaty
and has absolutely no binding legal
status, is seemingly being given pre–
cedence over the U.S.-Taiwan Mu–
tual Defense Treaty, whicb is a
formal legal documenl in accor–
dance with internationallaw.
How to unilaterally invalidate
America's undeniable obligations
poses a difficult problem for Wash–
ington. One proposed solution that
has been suggested is that the U.S.
might simply derecognize Taiwan
and then assert that since Taiwan
"no longer exists," treaties with that
nation a re no longer in force. But
the blatant immorality of such dip–
lomatic sleight of hand was appar–
ently too much even for
Washington's sinologists, and the
idea has reportedly been rejected.
Another approach-more promis–
ing in its prospects for adoption but
equally questionable in its moral
implications- is that of replacing the
defense treaty with a congressional
resolution expressing America's
"deep concern" that the Taiwan
question be settled peacefully. Such
a resolution would be accompanied
by "prívate verbal assurances" from
the Communist Chinese that they
will not use force againsl Taiwan.
The Chinese on Taiwan, however,
are justifiably convinced that a
weak-kneed congressional "resolu–
tion of concern" would be no re–
placement for a defense pact in time
of war. Furthermore, Peking, which
views the Taiwan question as strictly
an "interna! matter" would proba–
bly never give- and certainly would
never bind itself to- any such pro–
mises of nonbelligerence.
lf the United StaleS were to go
back on ils commitment to Taiwan,
Dr. Tsai asked us, how would Amer–
ica's other allies, who are bound to
similar treaties, react? What would
the word of the United States be
worth? What would be the impact
upon Australia and New Zealand
(linked with the U.S. in the ANZUS
pact), Japan, the Philippines, Israel,
and the NATO alliance?
American credibility, Dr. Tsai
warned, could suffer a blow from
which it would never recover- a
credibility loss not only in the eyes
of its allies, but also in those of its
enemies. Does the U .S. have the
strength and the will to keep its
word, he asked?
Jnvaslon?
We then asked Dr. Tsai what we fell
to be the crucial question of the en–
tire discussion: If the United States
decides to push ahead with the rec–
ognilion of Peking and abrogate its
The
PLAIN TRUTH February 1978