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defense pact with
Taiwan, did he feel
Peking would ac–
tu_ally try to take
Ta iwan by force?
"Of course," he
replied without hes–
itation. "And they
will move much
quicker than you
might think!"
as it remains in
force, it will con–
tinue to serve tbat
purpose."
Why? A swift
takeover of Tai–
wan, he believed,
would greatly en–
bance Peking's role
as a world power
and give her in–
creased stature in
the eyes of fellow
Communists the
HIGHLY TRAINED
and we/1-equipped, Taiwan's 500,000-man army is pre–
pared to fight to the death in the defense of freedom and democracy.
Without it, war
across the Formosa
Strait is a virtual
certainty. And it
will be a bloody
one: The Taiwa–
nese- determined ,
well-armed, with a
powerful air force–
would put up a
valiant defense.
But how long could
a nation of 16 mil–
lion people with–
stand an enemy of
world over. In addition, Peking
might feel compelled to act before
the KremJin could reach a counter–
balancing rapprochement with Tai–
wan, which the Soviets would
undoubtedly attempt. By estab–
lishing a foothold on the strategic
island, the Soviet Union could cover
the entire southeastern flank of
Communist China.
Despite these considerations, Sec–
retary ofState Vanee has repeatedly
stated that the United States expects
Peking and Taiwan to resolve their
differences peaceably. President
Carter has said that the goal of U.S.
policy is normalization of relations
with Peking as well as a "peaceful
Iife" for the Taiwanese.
The
China News,
an English-lan–
guage newspaper on Taiwan, replies
that Carter must surely know that it
is impossible for the Republic of
China and Communist China to
settle their insurmountable differ–
ences peaceably through negotia–
tions. A T aiwa n gove rnm ent
pamphlet we picked up further as–
serts that "the struggle for China
and the Chinese people is fina l and
to the death."
Taiwan's Foreign Minister Shen
adds:
"1
must reiterate that the gov–
ernment and the people of the Re–
public of Ch in a will in no
circumstances enter into any nego–
tiation with the Chinese Commu–
nists."
The Taiwanese emphasize that no
amount of "hoping for" and "ex–
pressing interest in" a peaceful set-
The
PLAIN TRUTH February 1978
tlement of Chinese differences will
change Peking's determination to
"liberate" Taiwan, by force of arms
ifnecessary.
And tbese are not just the words
of the
Nationa/ist
Chinese. In a
speech delivered in Peking last Au–
gust 12-just ten days before Secre–
tary Vance's visit- Chairman Hua
Kuo-feng declared: "We are deter–
mined to liberate Taiwan. When
and how is China's affair." Commu–
nist China's second-ranking official ,
Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, stated a
montb earlier tbat "as to when and
in what way the Chinese people are
to liberate their sacred territory of
Taiwan is entirely China's interna!
affair, which brooks no interference
from other countries."
In the light of statements such as
these, Taiwan's
China News
noted
recently: "Jimmy Carter has said in
effect that the United States doesn't
have to be anti-Communist any
longer. [We] are compelled to dis–
agree witb President Carter's analy–
sis. If we were to abandon anti–
Communism, we wouldn't survive
for long."
Speaking at the close of the fifth
Sino-American Conference on
Mainland China (June 1976) in
Taipei, Dr. Tsai summed up the sit–
uation witb these words: "The Mu–
tual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of
China has served to preserve peace
in the West Pacific area during the
last twenty years, and there is little
or no reason to doubt that, so long
push for
losses?
850 million should
Peking relentlessly
victory disregarding all
Appeasement?
Many Taiwanese see Washington's
seemingly irrational policy of pur–
suing relations with Peking on Pe–
king's own terms as a policy of
appeasement-a policy whicb will
encourage Communist Chinese ag–
gression in the same way Neville
Chamberlain's appeasement of Hit–
ler encouraged Nazi aggression.
"But there is no need for America
to appease China," wrote veteran
political observer George Will re–
cently. "There is no evidence that
China, if unappeased, will turn its
policy inside out and seek rap–
prochement with the Soviet Union.
Either China needs close relations
with America to counier the Soviet
threat, or it doesn't. lf it does, it
needs those relations more than it
needs to humiliate America over
Taiwan. lf China doesn't need close
relations with America, America
can't purchase close relations witb
China by abasing itself and sacri–
ficing a small natiqn."
In short: What would the U.S. get
out of a formal recognition of Pe–
king that it doesn't already have?
Nothing concrete, as far as most
diplomatic experts can see- only the
expected "benefit" of increased "le–
verage" in the bitter Sino-Soviet dis–
pute, in which nota few say the U.S.
should completely avoid entangle–
ment in the first place.
(Continued on page 44)
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