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Tragically, the loss of this guarantee
now seems inevitable.
lt
has become increasingly appar–
ent that the Carter Administration
is intent upon eventual full diplo–
matic recognition of the Communist
dictatorship on the Chinese main–
land as the "sole legitimate govern–
ment of Ch ina." However, Peking
has set three requirements which
Washington must meet before such
relations can be established: 1)
Withdrawal of U.S. dip1omatic rec–
ognition from Taiwan. 2) Termina–
tion of the 1954 Mutual Security
Treaty between Washington and
Taipei. 3) Withdrawal of the re–
maining U.S military personnel
from Taiwan. (There are 1, 100
American military left on the is–
land. down from 10,000 in 1972.)
These terms, assert the Chinese
Communists, are not negotiable.
The establishment of diplomatic re–
lations must be on their terms-or
not at all.
In retum for these concessions,
Washington would presumab1y ac–
quire greater leverage against
Moscow in the international garue
of détente, and prevent .Peking from
seeking a reconciliation with the So–
viets-a prospect that sends shud–
ders down the spines of U.S. policy
planners.
But for the Chinese on Taiwan,
the implications could be disastrous.
Historie Change
The cu rrent lines of America's
China policy are a continuation of
the venture launched by President
Richard Nixon in July 1971 , when
he dispatched Henry Kissinger on a
secret mission to Peking, terminat–
ing 20 years of Sino-American hos–
tility. A by-product of that trip was
a series of diplomatic setbacks for
the Nationalist government. In the
same year, Taipei was ousted from
its United Nations seat in favor of
the Peking regime. Moreover, coun–
try
after country began severing re–
lations with free China. Today, only
23 countries have full diplomatic re–
lations with Taiwan, down from
about 70 prior to 1971.
The Kissinger visit paved the way
for President
Ni~on's
historie trip lo
China in February 1972- the first
American president ever to be re–
ceived by a Chinese government.
The PLAIN TRUTH February 1978
TAIWAN'S PREMIER
Chiang Ching–
kuo is the son and political heir of the
late Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
During that "week that changed the
world," Nixon and Chinese Premier
Chou En-lai signed the so-called
"Shanghai Communique," affirm–
ing that there is only one China and
that "Taiwan is a part of China."
The cryptic communique, however,
did not go as far as to say which
government-that in Peking or that
in Taipei-had the rightful claim to
both parts.
A year later, the U.S. and Com–
munist China opened "liaison of–
fices" in each other's capitals. And
although Washington continues to
formally recognize the Nationalist
Chinese government, Taiwan 's
ambassador to the U.S. , James
C. H. Shen, reportedly has more
trouble seeing Carter Administra–
tion officials than does the head of
the Communist Chinese liaison of–
fice.
The death in April ·1975 of Na–
tionalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai–
shek- a longtime friend of th e
U.S.- prompted widespread specu–
lation that Washington might at
long last feel free to change its long–
standing policy toward Taiwan. But
a radical policy change has been
slower in coming than expected.
President Ford's trip to Peking eight
months after. Chiang's death pro–
duced no agreements and no joint
communique was even issued.
In a major speech on Asia before
the Asia Society
in
New York City
last June- in which all mention of
U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan
was omitted-U.S. Secretary ofState
Cyrus Vanee conceded that "prog–
ress (toward full recognition of Pe–
king] may not be easy or
immediately apparent." Yet he af–
firmed that it is nevertheless "a cen–
tral part" of U.S. foreign policy.
Vance's subsequent low-profile visit
to Peking in August brought no
breakthrough in the negotiations,
but sorne "solid advances" were re–
portedly made.
Political observers see the slow
pace of progress as a result of Mr.
Ca rter's reluctance at this time to
confront Congress over yet another
highly controversia! issue (in addi–
tion to the proposed Panama Canal
treaties) which may prove to be an
uphill fight.
The View from Taipei
The fiurry of American diplomatic
activity toward Peking in the past
six years has puzzled many on Tai–
wan. "Why is your country chang–
ing a winning game?" Dr. Tsai
asked us. He assured us that Wash–
ington has little to gain and much to
lose by recognizing Peking and
"derecognizing" the Republic of
China.
Aside from knotty commercial
and legal concerns over the fate of
trade, loans, prívate investment and
the like, the Taiwanese see numer–
ous drawbacks to U.S. recognitlon
of Peking. Most notably, it would be
the first time a nation friendly to the
U.S. would be denied recognition.
The Republic of China has
proveo to be a long-standing and
faithful ally of the United States.
During World War
ll,
Chiang Kai–
shek refused Japan's offer of a sepa–
rate peace and continued to hold at
bay over two million Japanese who
otherwise would have been fighting
Americans in the western Pacific.
During the Vietnam War, Taiwan
made ground facilities available to
the United States.
The Chinese on Taiwan find it
difficult to reconcile the Carter Ad–
ministration's pledge to restore
morality to the conduct of its inter–
national affairs with its plans to
abandon free China and recognize
the Communist regime in Peking- a
" 1984-style" government which, ac–
cording to reliable records, liqui–
dated more than 60 million people
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