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rejection of an offer to build the As–
wan Dam, which Moscow later ac–
cepted. The overthrow of Middle
East monarchies pleased Moscow
because Communism and monarch–
ies do not mix.
But the prime mover of Soviet
alignment with the Arabs carne,
perhaps not so surprisingly, when
the Egyptians nationalized the Suez
Canal Company on July 26, 1956.
Now it was the Arabs' tum to oust
the British. Moscow was consistent.
She supported the Arabs in their
struggle to oust Britain. Then, with
Israel's launching of Operation Ka–
desh on October 29, against Suez, a
complete turnabout had been
achieved in a nine-year period: the
. Soviet Union was now supporting
the Arabs against Britain and Israel.
The fact that the Soviet Union
changed sides, but not objectives,
clearly shows that Soviet intentions
in the Middle East are not pro-Arab
but geopolítica! in nature.
Opening Suez
If the Soviets were to gain a pre–
ponderant inftuence in the area,
they could conceivably bring pres–
sure to bear on Israel's allies, par–
ticularly the United States, to
revamp Mideast policy. This could
aUow the reopening of the canal. In
this case, most of the world's vital
sea lanes, for trade and military
purposes, would pass through the
very areas dominated and perhaps
controlled by the Soviet navy. This
would, in essence, complete a Rus–
sian ring around Asia, fianking
China.
It
is interesting how the very exis–
tence of Israel has helped the So–
viets attain their present position in
the
Middl~
East. "Such a state
(Israel) in the midst of the Arab
World would be a continuous
source of conflict between the West
and the Arabs, offering Russia sorne
interesting opportunities in an area ,
from which she has been virtually
excluded." (Adam B. Ulan,
Expan–
sion and Coexistence: The History of
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967,
p.
584.)
PLAIN TRUTH May 1974
Russian Frontier on
t he Nile?
Soviet exclusion has not been by
choice. The Middle East is the one
honey tree the Russian bear has
sought for quite sorne time.
In 1848, ex-diplomat Fedor Tiut–
chev wrote a poem titled "Russian
Geography." In this poem, he desig–
nated seven rivers as God-chosen
Russian frontiers. The seven rivers
were the Neva, Volga, Euphrates,
Ganges, Elbe, Danube
and the Nile.
His ideas of a Russian empire
reaching into Egypt were certainly
not new.
Under Catherine the Great (1762-
96), Russia's activities in Egypt were
dictated by its desire to speed the
fall of the Turkish empire (which
extended from Eastem Europe to
the Middle East and included much
of North Africa).
The empress rendered military as–
sistance to the Mameluke Ali-Bey, a
local governor who succeeded in
making Egypt independent ofTurk–
ish rule for a few years. In 1784, it
was rumored that Russia had
agreed to support the independence
of Egypt in the next war with the
Turks. The price was permission to
quarter Russian troops in Alexan–
dria, Rosetta and Damietta - vari–
ous Egyptian cities.
In the following years, severa!
Russian officers visited Egypt. They
were received with great honor as
military advisors by the Egyptian
Beys, who were rebelling against
Turkish rule. The Russian govern–
ment even encouraged the enlist–
ment of Russian peasant youth
in
the military formations of the
Mamelukes, members of the Egyp–
tian military body. As a result, this
militia was already one-quarter
Russian by 1786.
During the same period, a Rus–
sian consul appeared for the first
time on Egyptian soil and hastened
to assume the politicalleadership of
the rebellion. When the Beys were
defeated by the Turkish sultan in
1786, they appealed to the Russian
consul for intercession. The latter
sought to defend them on the
grounds that they were under the
protection ofthe empress ofRussia.
Russia gave direct military advice
to Egypt in the nineteenth century.
Rostislav Fadeev, a retired general,
served as military advisor to the
Khedive (the viceroy of Egypt) in
the years 1875-76. He was even
slated to become the commander
in
chief of the Egyptian army. His
refusal to wear the tunic of an Egyp–
tian officer blocked the plan.
The Kremlin has always recog–
nized both the strategic position and
vulnerability of Egypt. Russia's po–
sition in the nineteenth century was
reflected in the words of czarist For–
eign Affairs Minister Giers: "The
proclaimed principie of Egypt for
the Egyptians is a Utopía. Egypt be–
cause of its geographical position is
of such political importance that its
independence is impossible.
lt
would become a battle field for Eu–
ropean rivalries."
This view is still valid today. Rus–
sian nationalism is just as potent a
force today as in czarist times.
Russia Comes First
An importan! fact to remember in
viewing Soviet diplomacy in the
Middle East: Moscow is first pro–
Soviet Union and then anti-West -
not pro-Arab or anti-Israel. And it
isn't Middle East oil per se that in–
terests the Kremlin. Rather, it is the
West 's need for Middle East oil that
intrigues the Soviet Union. Moscow
wants to somehow control the dis–
persement of Middle East oil to the
West.
What will the future bring in the
Middle East? Will East and West re–
alize in time the futility of hate and
greed and learn to live together
peacefully? The first four lines from
Rudyard Kipling's famous "Bailad
of East and West" may answer the
question:
"Oh, East is East, and West is West,
and never the twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently
at God's great Judgment Seat."
The nations may find themselves
standing before that judgment seat
sooner than we think.
o
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