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lem was to have an international
status under the direction of the
U.N. Trusteeship Council.
But war broke out by the eod
of 1947. The Arabs were armed by
the Britísh. Moscow sided with tbe
Jews.
It
doesn't take very much to see ·
that the Soviet Union saw the op–
portunity to oust a major Western
power from the Middle East, and
perhaps replace Britain in the area
herself.
Soviet policy overestimated its in–
ftuence and penetrability in the
Middle East at that time. Misinter–
pretations of Communist party suc–
cesses and strength in the West
(France, Italy and Greece) up to
May 1947, coupled with Communist
successes in East Europe, gave a dis–
torted picture to Soviet decision
makers. The temptation to grasp an
opportunity to establish a toehold in
the Middle East, at a time when
clear lines were drawn between pro–
British Arabs and the anti- British
Jews, seemed too great to pass up,
even
if it
meant "accepting" Zion–
ism.
Full Soviet support of Jews
in
Palestine to establish and maintain
the state of Israel continued during
1948. Gromyko even opposed the
United States and Britain con–
cerning certain paragraphs not in
lsrael's interest in the truce resolu–
tion brought before the U.N. Secu–
rity Council. One Soviet objection is
particularly significant when viewed
in the context of the historical So–
viet policy barring Russian Jewry
from emigrating to Israel. Gromyko
said, "A resolution [to prevent fur–
ther Jewish immigration to Israel
from other countries] by the Secu–
rity Council would not only fail to
meet the lawful and incontestable
interests of the Jews, but would, on
the contrary, be prejudicial to their
interests aod aggravate their posi–
tion."
A Soviet Miscalculation
Later in 1948, an article appeared
in
Pravda,
the semi-official Soviet
newspaper.
It
informed the world
6
that there would be no immigration
to Israel from Communist countries.
Russian Jewry demonstrated against
this policy during Rosh Hashanah
of that year. And therein lay a criti–
cal miscalculation in Soviet think–
ing. T he Soviets thought that
friendly relationships with Israel
were compatible with the keeping of
three million Russian Jews in Rus–
sia. Obviously, the Russian bear was
not wearing the Star of David.
Progressively, in Soviet eyes,
Israeli neutrality began to waver. As
Russia watched, events carne along
which drew the state of Israel west–
ward.
One of those events was the Tri–
partite Declaration issued by the
United States, Britain and France,
without prior consultation with
Israel or the Arab states.
A critica! section of the Declara–
tion stated a need to "recognize that
the Arab states and Israel all oeed
to maintain a certain leve! of armed
forces for the purpose of assuring
their intemational security and their
legitimate self-defense and to per–
rnít them to play a part in the de–
fense of the area as a whole."
"Defense of the area as a whole,"
but against whom? From the Soviet
way of looking at it, it clearly meant
them. Who else would it refer to,
corníng from the Big Three in the
West?
In reality, the Declaration was
little more than an embargo on
arms sales clothed in fancy rhetoric.
It
disappointed Arabs and lsraelis
because of the amount of arms the
West was willing to supply - "pea–
nuts." Egypt 's Nasser went to Rus–
sia to secure a source of arms after
U.S. Secretary of State Dulles
refused bis request.
Another event carne along that
was to have repercuss ions in
Moscow's Middle Eastern affairs -
the Korean War. Israel was unable
to give military aid to the U.N.
forces or supply manpower against
the North Koreans, but did provide
medica! supplies. She justified her
position by declaring that Israel her–
self had been a victím of aggression
and thereby supported U.N. inter–
vention.
Thus the stand takeo by Israel put
Israel, according to sorne Soviet
publications, on the same side as the
"American aggressors."
Why the Soviets Became
Pro-Arab
By 1950, the Russian bear had
had its nose tweaked by the lsraelis
and was a bit disgruntled. The So–
viets were no longer considered pro–
Israelí, nor yet pro-Arab. But as the
Arabs grew more anti-West, the So–
viet Union carne closer. By 1952,
following the revolution ousting
King Farouk, Egypt's refusal to join
the proposed Middle East Com–
mand, initiated by the three West–
ern powers and Turkey - was
warmly welcomed by Moscow.
The difference between East and
West over the Middle East became
the focal point of Soviet concern
throughout 1952. Toward the end of
the year, thistles were being borne
of the seeds sown in 1948.
Another fissure developed
in
So–
viet-Israelí relations in January
1953, when the so-called Doctor's
Plot was reported in the Soviet
press. AUegedly, Jewish doctors had
conspired to liquidate Russian mili–
tary and governmental leaders by
medical means.
These events coincided with anti–
Israeli articles appearing in
Pravda
and
l zvestia.
They triggered demon–
strations against the Soviet Union in
Israel. On February 9, 1953, the So–
viet Embassy in Tel Aviv was
bombed. Shortly thereafter ,
Moscow severed diplomatic rela–
tions with Israel. lt was a breach
that was never completely mended,
though diplomatic relations were re–
established after the death of Stalin
on March 5.
As favorable Soviet-Israelí rela–
tions were crumbling, a growing de–
gree of anti-Western sentiment
among Arab s tates (primari ly
Egypt) began to emerge. Nasser, for
example, went to Czechoslovakia to
conclude an arms deal. This pleased
Moscow, as did the United States
PLAIN TRUTH May 1974