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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, FEBRUARY 14, 1986
strange objects would be picked
computers capable of determining
possible attacking missiles or
malfunction was remarkably low.
up by radar and fed into
whether such objects were
planes••.. The rate of
Even so, from 1981 to 1985, more than 100 possible missile
attacks on the United States were flashed on our military
computer screens. Fortunately, we had enough time to check
out these alerts and determine that they were the result of
computer error.
It might take as many as 30 minutes to
discover that a signal was false. But at least we had that
margin of time to prevent buttons from being pressed--to
prevent the loosing of a nuclear attack on the enemy that
would result, in all probability, in a counternuclear attack
on the United States.
Since there is no reason to believe that Soviet computer
technology is superior to our own, it becomes necessary to
recognize that erroneous blips have turned up on Soviet
computer screens.
But America's very success in placing
missile launching platforms close to Soviet borders has
reduced the time available for Soviet experts to check for
possible computer errors.
For example, American Pershing 2
missiles are less than 10 minutes away from major Soviet
targets..•• The fact of Soviet submarines with missile
launchers not far off the coasts of the United States has a
similar effect on American defense strategy•.•.
r::rhaps the most basic flaw of all in the computer alert
I
;�stern is that it doesn't allow for third-party complicity.
The computer can, of course, tell something from the shape and
a great deal from the early location of a radar blip, but not
all blips are picked up at site of origin. After only a few
minutes, the precise source can be something of a guessing
game.
A missile launched _!?Y � submarine, for example,
provides no automatic or certain information about the
identity of the sender. A third party that thinks it is in a
position to profit from a war between two other nations could
conceivably launch its missile at one or the other, thus
setting off a nuclear chain reaction••••
What is most likely..•is that a nuclear war could erupt
without anyone having a clear idea of what went wrong. Human
scientific genius has created the ultimate irrational
situation in which the conditions of life could be shattered
beyond recognition or repair, with the survivors, such� they
�:; e, left to guess how it all started.
•Marshall Plan 11• In light of the reference to the potential third
force threat, it is interesting to note that conservative circles in
the United States are increasingly pushing the idea of having Western
Europe as well as Japan do far more for their own defense, including
nuclear weaponry. An example of such reasoning appeared in the Winter
1985-86 issue of FOREIGN POLICY, in an article entitled nThe Real
� onservative Agenda.n It was written by an American analyst of the
ATO alliance, Christopher Layne.
Here are key excerpts of his
article, in which Layne calls for "Marshall Plan II--the phased
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe":
•