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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, FEBRUARY 14, 1986
PAGE 7
One leading cause of America's relative decline in power is
the increase in West European and Japanese economic power
since the end of World War II.
Yet the distribution of
military responsibilities in Western Europe and Japan still
reflects the conditions of 40 years ago. Japan, the world's
second-ranking economic power, spends a mere 1 percent of its
GNP on defense and depends completely on the United States for
its security.
Taken as a unit, the economies of NATO's
European members compare favorably to America's, but these
countries devote considerably less of their individual GNPs to
defense. More to the point, a recent Pentagon study indicates
that the U.S. commitment to NATO accounts for some 58 per cent
of America's own defense budget..••.
The United States should complete its historic postwar mission
and devolve to Western Europe and Japan full responsibility
for their� defense. What Washington needs--and what real
conservatives should offer--is a sequel to the Marshall Plan.
This farsighted program helped Europe recover its economic
independence. "Marshall Plan II" would build on the economic
strength of Western Europe and Japan and allow them to become
politically and militarily independent.
To avoid leaving
these countries out in the cold, the United States should set
� firm timetable for� phased, long-term American withdrawal-­
perhaps over 10 years--coupled with an invitation to Western
Europe and Japan to formulate their own postalliance defense
plans. Washington would give them the assistance they needed
to implement these plans.
But when the transition period
ended, U.S. defense commitments would terminate.
Western Europe and Japan unquestionably have the capability to
defend themselves.
Marshall Plan II would give them the
incentive--which they will lack as long as they remain under
J the American umbrella--to transform their resources into real
� ilitary power••.•
. A "Marshall Plan II" is not yet official U.S. policy--but could become
·
'-
so if budgetary restraints force cutbacks of key military programs.
The Common Market's •shadow Currency•
And now, here is a real
"sleeper" issue.
A European "third force" would need, logically,
greater political and economic cohesion, specifically in the realm of
fiscal and monetary affairs.
Just such cohesion is slowly taking
form, as highlighted in an article which appeared in the January-March
1986 issue of BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC REVIEW, a publication of the
University of South Carolina.
It is entitled "Currency Without a
Country" and is subheaded:
"You may not have heard of it, but the
European Currency Unit (ECU) is fast becoming one of the world's most
important currencies. Here's why."
With increasing frequency, United States businessmen and
bankers are encountering, and taking advantage of, one of the
hottest financial innovations of the 1980s:
the European
Currency Unit, or ECO.
In particular, 1985 has seen an
explosive growth in all aspects of financial and commercial
usage of the ECU. United States corporations as diverse as R.
J. Reynolds, GTE, Morgan Guaranty, Walt Disney, and Chrysler