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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, FEBRUARY 14, 1986
PAGE 5
shook the collective consciousness of the American people in a
dramatic and profound manner. It closely compared, experts noted, to
the impact of a presidential assassination. Giving evidence of the
depths of the loss felt, the NEW YORK TIMES on the following day
devoted its entire front page and nine succeeding pages, advertisement
free, to all aspects of the disaster and the U.S. space program in
general.
Perhaps more than anything else, the calamity shook America's pride in
its technological achievements, symbolized above all else in the
national space effort.
The shuttle program in particular had
heretofore been so successful that the public had come to accept the
periodic launches as routine--and relatively risk-free. The experts,
however, always knew there was a potential for disaster, considering
the vast quantity of fuel necessary to launch the DC-9-sized orbiter
into space.
•Third Party• Nuclear Threat Carrying the analysis of the Challenger
disaster further, Norman Cousins, former editor of THE SATURDAY
REVIEW, showed how dangerous the world situation is, considering the
reliance of the two superpowers on computerized high technology in
their multi-megaton nuclear arsenals. But it is his comments about
"third-party complicity" which are especially interesting in view of
the likelihood of a nuclear-armed united Europe in the future. Mr.
Cousins' article appeared in the Feb. 9, 1986, LOS ANGELES TIMES:
r:;e tragedy should remind the world that, despite the most
systematic precautions, accidents are possible when dealing
with high technology.... The space shuttle accident,
therefore, forces us to fix attention on the intricate
chnology basic to the war capability of the United States
d the Soviet Union. Begin with the computerized system for
tecting attacking missiles. During World War II, civilian
spotters stood on hilltops of American coastal cities to
report the sight or sound of airplanes by telephone to a
control station.
These reports would be checked against
information at hand about posted flights.
Unidentified
aircraft would be monitored on a grid from station to station.
At the beginning of the war, military aircraft flew by
propellers at speeds under 400 miles per hour; many of them
under 200 m.p.h.
There was ample time for the tracking
station to check and cross-check all movements in the sky,
with time to alert our own combat aircraft as well as to
activate anti-aircraft equipment.
By the end of the war, however, speeds had increased to the
point where civilian spotters were as useless as Indian smoke
signals against an attacker with cannons.
Radar replaced
human surveillance•••. Then came ballistic missiles, with
speeds measured not in terms of hundreds of miles per hour but
in thousands.
Even enemies on opposite sides of the world
were only two or three hours apart.
As the speed of missiles increased, so did reliance on
technology. By the rnid-1970s, computers were given the job of
analyzing data appearing on radar screens from tracking
stations around the world. The presence of unauthorized or