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in the position of a defeated vassal
state-a vassal state that continues
to pay the price of its tragic mis–
takes of the 1930s by a painful divi–
sion of the German nation between
two blocs dominated by two rival
superpowers. The Pershing missile
palisade symbolizes the perma–
nence of that division, perhaps even
more than the Berlín Wall."
Like it or not, continued Mr.
Lellouche, "the Germans are grad–
ually- and perhaps inevitably–
breaking away from the postwar
institutions that were supposed to
take care of the 'German problem'
once and for all. NATO, wbich was
conceived as a political device to
'anchor' the western part of Ger–
many firmly to the West, as well as
a military alliance agai nst the
Soviets, no longer does the trick.
And the European Community has
failed to channel German national
aspi rations into the 'ersatz Euro–
pean nationalism' its founders envi–
sioned sorne 25 years ago."
The Role of Germany
The "German question," concludes
Mr. Lellouche, is "back on the
table" once again.
lt
is this issue,
rather than the arithmetic of the
missile deployment, that "will be
the more important question facing
both the West- and the Soviet
Union-in the future. Let us not
fool ourselves. The missiles issue
will not 'go away' by the end of the
year.
It
will be with us for many
more months and years to come,
simply because the Euromissi les
battle is not a battle over hardware
but over the fate of Germany, and
with it, over the fate of Europe as a
whole."
In a curious mixture, political
forces on both the Jeft and the right
are intimating that German self–
interest might be better served by
adopting a more independent pos–
ture.
These forces, nevertheless, see
Germany's future radically differ–
ently. Those on the left would like
to see a neutral Germany of limited
ambitions, a peaceful "gr een"
nation dropped out of Europe's
controversies. Their vision is of a
reunified, neutral Germany di–
vorced from both the Western
(NATO) a nd Eastern (Warsaw
Pact) alliances. Circles on the
40
right, however, view Germany as
exerting a more forceful indepen–
dent policy, but one in concert with
like-minded allies in Europe.
Jerusa/em Post
columnist Meir
Merhav says that "the tendency
towards a neutral ism motivated by
German self-interest is seen on the
Jeft. ..." At the same time, Mer–
hav notes, Franz Josef Strauss, on
the right, wants Germany to have a
greater role in the use of the new
nuclear arms.
"He wants Europe to become the
third nuclear superpower," writes
Merhav. "He spoke toa rally called
by his Christian Social Union in
Munich. He intimated in a barely
noticed half-sentence of his address
that this 'would make Germany
independent of the U .S.' "
Jt was Mr. Strauss who, as a
long-time advocate of a strong "Eu–
ropean pillar" within NATO,
shocked Bonn a few months ago
with a sudden suggestion that the
West Germans should be given the
"second key" to the nuclear weap–
ons stationed on their soil.
At the same time Mr. Strauss
was speaking at the promissile rally
in Munich, referred to by journalist
Merhav, French Defense Minister
Charles Hernu, in París, approved
a call by an opposition leader, J ac–
ques Chirac, for more active West
German participation in European
defense.
Mr. Chirac, leader of a neo–
Gaullist party, had said in Bonn
that he expected West Germany to
join France and Britain in develop–
ing a European nuclear deterrent
force in about five years.
The French, still nominal mem–
bers of NATO, realize the alliance
is in danger. Should it dissolve,
they would much prefer to have
West Germany somehow linked
with them, even to the point of
sharing in nuclear matters, than to
see a powerful Germany go its own
way or be pulled eastward.
Grave Soviet Miscalculation?
The long-term Soviet foreign poli–
cy objective regarding Europe is to
detach Western Europe's nations
from their dependence on the
United States, and attach them and
their vital industries and resources
to the Soviet Union.
In his book
Soviet Strategy in
Europe
strategic expert Richard
Pipes writes: "Russian military
power resting on a West European
economic base would give the
U.S.S.R. indisputable world hege–
mony- the sort of thing that Hitler
was dreaming of when, having con–
quered continental Europe, he
attempted to annex it to Soviet
Russia's national resources and
manpower."
However, such a separation of
America from Europe, says Mr.
Pipes, "must not be hurried."
Why? Simply because it carries
such grave risks for the Soviets
themselves. Continues this author:
"Tbe U.S. forces in Western
Europe present no offensive threat to
the Soviet Union. Their ultimate
removal is essential ifthe U.S.S.R. is
to control Western Europe, but their
purely defensive character does not
seriously inhibit Russia's freedom to
maneuver. What the Soviet Union
fears more is a German-French–
English military alliance that might
spring into existence should U.S.
troops withdraw precipitately from
Western Europe.
"The Russians are well aware
that close to the surface of what
appears to be a 'neutralist' Western
Europe there lurk powerful nation–
alist sentiments tbat could easily
assume militant forms. Nor do they
forget that England and France
have nuclear deterrents tbat they
could place at West Germany's dis–
posal.
"Hasty action on their [the
Soviets'] part, therefore, could
cause the emergence on their west–
ern flank of a nuclear threat proba–
bly much greater than that which
they face in the east, from China,
Jet alone from the United States.
As long as the United States is in
control of European defenses, tbis
development is not likely to occur.
Hence Soviet strategy is to burry
slowly."
The Soviets, simply put, are
playing with fire in their attempt to
split the United States from
Europe over the missiles issue!
It is the Soviets, as mucb as any
power, wbo will be responsible for
al lowing what they fear most- the
final end-time resurrection of a
powerful united Europe-spoken
of so often in the pages of
The
Plain Truth- to
emerge. o
The PLAIN TRUTH