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one country after another in the
eastern Caribbean was stopped in
its tracks.
Of all of the events listed, the
Grenada rescue operation (U.S.
President Ronald Reagan insisted
it was not an invasion) may prove
to be the most significant of all in
the long run.
First of all , the intervention
threw a monkey wrench into com–
munist plans throughout the Carib–
bean-Central American region.
Lifting America out of its post–
Vietnam trauma, Mr. Reagan
secured a quick, decisive military
victory, ending a string of commu–
nist successes around the world.
Moscow and Havana now do not
know where next or whether the
resolute Mr. Reagan might use
U.S. power.
The Grenada campaign, however
well received by the vast majority
of Americans, to say nothing of a
number of Caribbean nations, also
had its impact on Western
Europe.
Europeans Concerned
Individually and privately, Euro–
pean leaders were generally glad to
see the U.S. finally flex its muscles
a bit to get rid of a localized politi–
cal cancer. But publicly, praises
were few and muted.
The Grenada affair carne right in
the midst of the NATO plan to
install intermediate-range nuclear
missiles in Western Europe. The
governments of members West
Germany and the Netherlands face
a stiff challenge from those
opposed to the missile deployment
plan.
For a while, the shooting down
by the Soviets of Korean Air Lines
Flight 007 stifled the antimissile
opposition, much of which is also
anti-American in tone.
However, when U.S. Marines
and Army Rangers descended upon
Grenada without even informing
Great Britain (Grenada is a Com–
monwealth member state), Presi–
dent Reagan was once again por–
trayed as trigger happy, one who
was willing to take dangerous risks
to challenge Soviet ambitions.
Might he not do so in Europe as
well, should war, nuclear war,
threaten to break out? However
remote this linkage between tiny
February 1984
Grenada and nuclear-stalemated
Europe may be, the association was
made.
Trans-Atlantic Rift Grows
The Grenada affair is symbolic of
the slow but inexorable rift devel–
oping between the United States
and its European allies.
Mr. Reagan carne into office in
January 1981 determined to reverse
America's declining position in the
world. At first this was welcomed in
Europe, whose political leaders had
tired of the uncertainty of the pre–
vious administration.
But now many believe Mr. Rea–
gan has gone too far. Strength is one
thing, but a climate of U.S.-Soviet
confrontation- typified by Mr.
Reagan's calling the Soviet Union an
"evil empire"- worries Europeans
who live under the ever-lengthening
shadow of Soviet military might.
American officials counter by say–
ing that this is precisely the point–
that Western Europe has allowed
itselfto become intimidated by Mos–
cow, and is in danger of losing its
independent status.
The missile controversy in Europe
has not ended just because of the
installation of the first few new gen–
eration weapons.
The full complement of Pershing
11 and cruise missiles is not dueto be
in place until four or five years down
the road-plenty of time for political
sparks to fly between a presently
determined United States and an
oftentimes reluctant Europe.
The key nation, of course, is West
Germany, now considered by sorne
analysts to be potentially the weak
link in the NATO alliance.
In a report on West Germany's
widespread antimissile demonstra–
tions last October, Meir Merhav of
the
Jerusalem Post
wrote that "the
political struggle over what is Ger–
many's most vital concern will con–
tinue, and possibly become less
peaceful, even after the first missiles
are stationed. The demonstrations
will not sway the ruling coalition to
deviate from its political course, but
they reveal a wide and growing
breach between the popular mood
and the government's policy."
Demonstrations against the
NATO plan are expected not only
to continue, but to escalate as sub–
sequently more Pershing lis are
installed. A t stake is the very
future of NATO and West Germa–
ny's pivota! role in it.
NATO at the Crossroads
"The history of diplomacy is a sto–
ry of shifting alliances," wrote
Richard J. Barnet ·in an article
about NATO, and specifically
about German-American relations,
in the October 17, 1983 issue of
The New Yorker.
"Nations do not have and cannot
have permanent attachments," Mr.
Barnet continued. "The anarchic
international system is always in
motion.
Times change, and so do
al/ies."
The postwar Atlantic Alliance is
35 years old, a long time for any
alliance to last. The strains and
cracks are showing more than ever
before. Nations in Western Europe
are no longer content to Jet the
United States exert sole leadership
on security matters.
Both in Britain and West Ger–
many, for example, there are calls
for a "dual-key" arrangement for
the new U.S.-made missiles that
are being deployed in Europe.
Under such a dual-key link, the
United States would be unable to
fire the "Euromissiles" without
consent from the host country's
military command personnel.
This is a radical departure from
previous sole U.S. control of small–
er "battlefield" nuclear weapons in
Europe. This move represents a
European desire to insure against
U.S. "recklessness."
The key country, again, is West
Germany. In his analysis entitled
"The 'German Question' Returns,"
in the October 31 issue of
News–
week,
French international rela–
tions expert Pierre Lellouche
observed that what is going on in
West Germany far transcends the
question of the new missiles them–
selves.
The missile controversy in the
key nation in the very heart of
Europe has to do with the age-old
"German question,' ' says Mr. Lel-
louche. He wrote:
·
"If Germany is profoundly dis–
turbed by the Pershings, it is
because they are American weap–
ons placed under the sole control of
the President of the United States.
That situation maintains Germany
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