Basic HTML Version
PARALYZED
(Continued from page 3)
friends of the people and govern–
ments of Cuba and Nicaragua and
we're not ashamed of it. To the
contrary, it makes us proud to
maintain relations with these
nations," Radio Venceremos said.
"Our war is and will continue to be
national, but ...
we view our plans
in the framework of a regional
conjlict
in which there are interests
of the people of Central America,
the Caribbean and Latin Ameri–
ca."
Many in the U.S. Con–
gress, the news media and
the public- wh ich re–
ceives its information
from skeptical news–
men--do not hold to the
regional approach. A re–
cently released document
from the National Securi–
ty Council confessed of
continued "serious diffi–
culties with U .S. public
and Congressional opio–
ion which jeopardizes an
ability to stay the
course."
Second, in Vietnam,
according to Colonel Har–
ry
G.
Summers, inter–
viewed in the
New York
Times Magazine
of Feb–
ruary 13, 1983, "North
Vietnam was the real
opponent." In chasing
after Vietcong guerrillas
~
·
in South Vietnam, he
reports "we were like a
bull charging the tore–
ador's cape."
"The result," he said,
"was that the army got
caught up in ... search-and-destroy
operations which cost the lives of
many American soldiers, outraged
public opinion and did not deal with
the source of Communist strength–
North Vietnam.... The Commu–
nists controlled the tempo of the
fighting. "
Except for restricted air attacks
the United States never seriously
took the war to the North. Weapons
and matériel flowed into North Viet–
nam and down the Ho Chi Minh
trail into South Vietnam virtually
unimpeded throughout the war.
July
1
August 1983
Similarly today, Cuba remains a
well-armed and fortified sanctuary
supporting the Central American
battle zones.
More Soviet arms poured into
that bastion during the years 1981
and 1982 than at any other time
since the Cuban missile crisis two
decades earlier. And now, since
December 1982, Nicaragua, too, has
been declared "off limits" by tbe
U.S. Congress. Arms will thus con–
tinue to flow from Cuba lo Nicara–
gua and into El Salvador across a
labyrinth of routes similar to the Ho
Chi Minh Trail network.
Finally, in Vietnam, the United
States, despite its enormous invest–
ments of men and matériel, sought
not victory but simply to "bring the
enemy to the bargaining table" for
a negotiated settlement- the ap–
parent aim of U.S. policy in El Sal–
vador today.
The U.S. gave up direct involve–
ment in Vietnam in January 1973.
Then Congress, despite pledges of
support, drastically cut military aid
to South Vietnam- while the Soviet
Union doubled its support. South
Vietnam crumbled in April 1975.
"What followed," reported
former President Richard M. Nix–
on, "was one of the great tragedies
of history. The 'liberators' brought
ruthless tyranny.... There were no
boat people before the communists
took over. Now 110,000 fleeing
their liberators have drowned in the
China Sea. H undreds of thousands
have been tortured and killed in
're-education' camps. In Cambodia
alone
over three mil/ion
have been
murdered and starved to
death...."
Americans thought they could
simply walk away from the chain of
horrors they helped un–
leash in far-off Southeast
Asia by giving up the
fight. They won't be able
to walk away as easily
from a similar upheaval in
Central America.
If
Con–
g ressional critics, contin–
ues
Mr.
Nixon, "oppose
the president's request
[for aid] they can justify
their action by proclaim–
ing that they are prevent–
ing ... another Vietnam.
But they cannot escape
the responsibility for
what happens
therea~
ter...."
Grave Dilemma for U.S.
Former Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, in
an appearance before a
Congressional committee
in 1982, expressed his
conviction that "the
Ame r ican people will
support what is prudent
and necessary, provided
they think we mean what
we mean and that we ' re
going to succeed, and not
flounder as we did in Vietnam."
That is easier said than done,
many observers believe. Tl)e fact
is, the American public and its
representatives, far from being
convinced as to what to do, are
hopelessly divided. The defeat in
Vietnam shattered national unity
on foreign affairs and in addition
stripped the power of the Presi–
dent to act decisively in the face
of perceived threats to national
security.
The United States is caught
between not wanting to intervene
41