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November 1971
lost its two sure outposts in the Med–
iterranean. Since then the Soviets have
been able to obtain Mediterranean naval
bases in certain Arab lands. But as the
recent coup and counter-coup in the
Sudan illustrated, the situation of the
Soviets in the Arab world can be
precarious.
At present al! Mediterranean-bound
Soviet ships must pass through the
Turkish, and hence NATO-controlled,
Bosporus and Dardanelles. These waters
have anti-submarine nets strung across
them, enabling Turkish and NATO
officials to keep a dose watch on Soviet
strength in the Mediterranean.
lf
Yugoslavia were a Warsaw Pact
member, the Soviets could enter the
Mediterranean undetected. The Soviets
could service their ships off the coasts of
Yugoslavia by way of Hungary or Bul–
garia and their dependence on the
Turkish straits would be greatly lessened.
Furthermore, a Kremlin-controlied
Yugoslavia would mean the loss of the
key land link between NATO members
Greece and Turkey and Western
Europe. The Soviets would then be able
to exert strong pressures on those two
nations. It is important to remember
that the attempted Communist take-over
in Greece in the late 1940's was de–
feated partly as a result of Yugoslavia's
expulsion from the Soviet Bloc.
Later, in 1953, Yugoslavia, Greece
and Turkey entered ioto a defense pact.
But if Yugoslavia has beeo a thorn in
the side of the Kremlin strategically, ít
has been ooe even more so ídeologi–
cally. Yugoslavia is the epítome of inde–
pendeot oational Communism, pursuing
its own goals rather than those of
Moscow.
Freedom for the Yugoslav govern–
meot to function iodependently has also
meant more freedoms for the Yugoslav
people. Yugoslavs are free to emigrate
and travel abroad. Western products
and culture abound within the country
aod there is even a relative measure of
política! freedom.
This has made Yugoslavia the model
for the aspirations of independent, lib–
eral-minded communist leaders.
Yugoslavs Would Fight
The Yugoslavs are well aware of the
Brezhoev doctrine by which the Soviets
The
PLAIN TRUTH
claim the right to intervene militarily in
any Communist country in order to
"defend socialism." But unlike the
Czechs, who indicated they would not
resist an armed invasion, President Tito
has made it dear that bis oation would
fight tooth and nail in the event of any
military invasion.
The Yugoslav people have a tradition
of self-defense which most recently
carne to the fore in World War Il. At
that time, undergrouod Partisao fighters
led by Marshal Tito were able to expel
the German aod Italian invaders and in
so doíng made Yugoslavia the only
Axis-occupied country to be liberated by
its own forces. This is a great source of
pride to the Yugoslavs. The Partisaos
are great heroes in Yugoslavia aod they
prornise the Russians the same treatmeot
meted out to the Axis, if a Soviet inva–
sion comes.
To this end the Yugoslavs maintain a
standing army of sorne 200,000 meo.
They are well equipped with modern
weapons, many of American origin.
Behind them are 450,000 reserves and a
huge "home army" numbering sorne
three million, many of whom are speci–
fically trained in guerrilla warfare.
Soviet Subversion
When coofronted with such a threat,
the Kremüo has usually resorted to its
other traditional, and often more effec–
tive weapon, subversion.
This has taken many forms in Yugo–
slavia. But the primary one has been to
attempt to stir up the old rivalries
and antagonisms between Yuglosalvia's
numerous ethnic groups-Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Macedonians, Monteoegrins,
Bosoian Moslems, Albanians and Hun–
garians. The country is in fact divided
into six republics and two autonomous
provinces, mainly along ethnic lines.
The maio rivalry has been between
the largest oationality, the Serbs, aod the
next largest group, the Croats. The
eco–
nomically more advanced and Western–
orieoted Croats have traditionally de–
maoded greater autonomy from the
Serbs who dominate numerically. Sorne
Croats went so far as to side with tbe
Nazis, who set up a puppet state of
Croatia duriog the war.
They wcre led by a group of local
fascists called the Ustache. The Ustache
45
have not disbanded since the war and
are today active among Croatian exiles
in West Germany and other countries.
On the other side of the coin are
hard-lioe Serbian Communists who feel
that only a centralized government of
the Stalinist variety can keep dissident
Croats and others under their control.
Of course, the overwhelming major–
ity of the Yugoslav people fit into nei–
ther category.
This includes President Tito, himself
a Croat, but one who vigorously fought
the Ustache. At the President's behest,
the Yugoslav government recently
adopted a series of coostitutional
amendments which turned the country
into a federation, granting the republics
individual control of virtually every–
thing except defense, foreign affairs,
currency, interna! trade aod interna!
security.
President Tito is convinced this rep–
resents the best bet for holding the
country together once he leaves the
scene.
Playing Both Sides
If
Yugoslavia should split up, the
Soviets might well find themselves with
an excuse, or even better, an
invitation
from one of the protagonists, to come in.
To this end, the Russians have given
tacit support to the hard-line Commu–
nists who carne out against President
Tito's decentralization proposals last
Spring.
At the same time, however, the So–
viets are believed to bave made contact
with Ustache elements in West Ger–
many and elsewhere and offered them
support in their drive for an indepen–
dent Croatia.
We should note that Bulgaria, Rus–
sia's most docile satelüte, continues
to
lay claim to the entire Yugoslav repub–
lic of Macedonia with apparent Soviet
approval.
In short, the Soviets are showing their
disapproval of President Tito's policies
in virtually any manner, short of inva–
sion, and there is no. guarantee they
wiU not attempt that.
Tito's Response
Marshal Tito has not beeo takiog this
threat
to his
regime and couotry lightly.
In receot years he has been quietly