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Zionism, Soviet diplomacy also sided
with the creation of an independent
Jewish State.
It was their belief that: "Such a state
:r, the midst of the Arab World would
be a continuous source of conflict
between the West and the Arabs, offer–
ing Russia some interesting opportu–
nities in an area from which she has
been virtually excluded." (Adam B.
Ulan,
Expansion and Coexistence: The
History of Soviet Foreign Policy,
1917-
1967, New York, Fredrick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1969, p. 584.)
Soviet Policy Shift
Once Israel was established, Soviet
policy toward the new state cooled per–
ceptibly. The Kremlin shifted its sym–
pathy toward the Arab World. By
1955, the U.S.S.R. began a substantial
program of arms aid to the Nasser re–
gime and certain other Arab countries.
The Soviet role in the Suez crisis of
1956 helped consolidate relations with
Egypt, and shortly thereafter Syria be–
came the next client state which Mos–
cow undertook to shield from alleged
" Imperialist'' aggression - in this case,
from Turkey.
In 1958, the Soviet Union assumed
the role of self-proclaimed "Protector"
of Arab interests during the lebanon
crisis.
It
asserted among other things,
that Soviet warnings to the West and
military maneuvers in the Caucasus had
saved the new revolutionary government
in nearby Iraq from being crushed.
Meanwhile, the Soviets began to
heavily arm Egypt. The pivota! event
that brought further substantial changes
in the Soviet Union's relationship with
the Arab states was the six-day Arab–
Israeli war in June 1967. Despite Soviet
approval of the November 1967 Security
Council resolution to restrict a "ruinous
arms race" in the Middle East, large
shipments were dispatched, along with
additional Soviet military advisors.
Their numbers are estimated to have
increased from around 3,000 in 1968 to
10,000 or 15,000 today. Coupled with
military aid to Egypt, the U.S.S.R. also
stepped up its military and technical
assistance to other Arab states, includ–
ing Iraq, Algeria, the republican re–
gime of Yemen, and the new South
Yemen government in Aden.
The
PLAIN TRUTH
In early 1971, Presidents Podgorny
of the U.S.S.R. and Sadat of Egypt
signed a .fifteeo-year "Friendship and
cooperation treaty." It appeared to
extend what is known as the ''Breshnev
doctrine." This involves the Soviet
Union's claim to intervene militarily in
the event of a threat to a socialist
state. The doctrine was applied in
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
If
applied in
Egypt, it could bring Soviet forces into
the next round of the Arab-Israeli con–
flict, should it occur.
The pact ended the fiction of an
Egyptian non-alignment stance in world
politics. This treaty, of course, is in–
tended to safeguard Russian investments
to the tune of an estimated 4.5 billion
dollars in military and economic aid.
Few realize that the aid and treaty are
part of a centuries-long,
CALCULATED
maneuver by the Kremlin. lt has contin–
ued Russia's Middle East interests since
the first "fact finding'' mission was dis–
patched to Egypt in the year 1001 A.D.
The United States, Europe and Japan
must face the fact that the Soviet Union
is involved in Egypt, the Middle East
and the Persian Gulfjlndian Ocean area
by
DESIGN,
not accident. She is there to
stay unless forcibly dislodged.
Persian Gulf Power Stream
The British are, for al! practica!
purposes, implementing . their "east of
Suez" policy. That is, they are leaving
the Persian Gulf/ Indian Ocean area -
at one time a "British lake."
A token force will remain in the area.
But the latest announcement of the
Heath government that the East of Suez
policy is to be partially reversed cannot
be seen as having any meaningful long–
term implications for the area as a
whole. (Although it is reported that the
U.S. and Britain are quietly providing
Iran with land, air and sea power to
compensate for the Gulf area pullout.)
If
Britain appears somewhat dis–
interested about having the Persian Gulf
area as her sphere of infl.uence, the
Soviets are not. They realize that the
Gulf is of vital strategic importance
in many ways - including the control
of oil fl.owing out of the area.
The Soviet Union realizes that Iran
itself
is of utmost strategic importance.
It is the gateway to remote Afghanis-
September 197 l
tan, divided Pakistan and teeming India
on the East. On the West it is the
bridge to Iraq and a dagger pointed to
the Mediterranean. lran links the Soviet
Union with the Indian Ocean by land
and is the axe that splits East and West.
The Russians would like to plant
their feet in Iran - whether they act
Jike it or not. The Soviet Union's ulti–
mate goal of domination over Iran is
time honored and has
NOT
changed.
The Soviet Union and Persia
Soviet attempts to domínate the area
of the Caspian Sea and lean ( then called
Persia) date back to the days of Ivan
the Terrible, 1560.
later, Czar Peter the Great's interest
. in the region of Persia was well nigh ad–
dictive. He ordered one of
bis
younger
officers by the name of Volynskii to spy
out the land of Persia. After searching
out the area, Volynskii told the Czar,
"Conquer Persia." Peter, always willing
to add to the domestic domains,
launched an attack on Persia. He met
little resistance.
But bis territorial gains were lost or
given away by successors.
Still later, after many decades involv–
ing a see-saw of successes and · failures,
Georgia, immediately north of present–
day lran and Turkey was annexed to the
U.S.S.R. Persia, ruling the area, went to
war. But her forces were badly man·
gled. She was obligated to sign a treaty
with Russia. One of the forced agree–
ments barred Persia from maintaining a
navy on the Caspian Sea. It was now a
Russian lake. For all practica! purposes
lran became a satellite of the Russian
empire. In one generation Russia had
pole vaulted the Caucasus and was a
definite threat to Turkey, the Middle
East, Iran, Afghanistan and India.
Only one power kept the Russian
bear from overrunníng further geopo–
litically important stretches of real es–
tate and pushing to the Indian Ocean.
That one element was the mighty power
of Her Majesty's Fleet - the British
Navy. Nonetheless, Russia continued to
eye the territory of lean.
Persia a Special Place
In 1918, prominent communist K.
M. Troianovskii summed up the Soviet
Union's feeling toward Persia: "The