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31
MIDDLE EAST
a Russian vessel; a permanent exhibition
of Russian handicraft in Port Said; the
establishment of a committee for the
development of Russian trade in Caico
in October 1914.
ORDESIGN?
Military Motives
But the Kremlin has continued pri–
marily to play a
direct militar¡
king-of·
the-mountain game.
de Lesseps of France paid a rapid visit
to Russia in 1858 in search of support
and possible fiscal aid for his Suez canal
project.
Sponsored by De Lesseps, a promi–
nent Russian financier became a member
of the executive board of the Suez Canal
Company. The Suez Canal continued to
be a very importaut auxiliary route for
Russian communication to the Far East
even after the building of the Trans
Siberian Railway in 1891. During the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Rus–
sian warships made use of the canal,
violating the then existing rules regard–
ing coaling by belligerent warships.
Today, the Soviets consider the
reopening of the Suez Canal essential. It
is a vital arterial umbilical cord con–
necting Black Sea and Mediterranean
naval forces with their Indian Ocean
units.
Russia Trades With Egypt
Next to political, military and strate–
gic considerations, Russia has had a
centuries-long interest in Egypt as a
trade partner. In 1699, Peter the Great
had insisted on free trade corrunu–
nications with Egypt in his negotiations
with Turkey.
At the beginning of the twentieth
century, Russia occupied second place in
Egyptian exports, principally cotton,
and was sixth in imports, primarily
kerosene, flour, coro, cattle, sugar and
timber. Other steps taken with the
blessing of the Czar's government
strengthened even more the commercial
ties between the two countries.
A few such measures were: The
founding of a Russian chamber of com·
merce in Alexandria in 1.903; a floating
exhibit of Russian goods on the deck of
After World War I, there was an
attempt for about a decade-and-a-half to
promote underground Communist activ–
ity in the Arab World. But this effort
ran into stiff local opposition. Moscow
changed its tactics and shifted in 1935
to cooperation with nationalist and reli–
gious groups. All this was done under
the benign banner of "anti-colonialism."
These tactics were continued after
World War Il . The apparent airo was
to create an anti-Western climate in the
region. Stalin specified, through Molo–
tov, that the area "in the general direc–
tion of the Persian Gulf" should be
recognized as the main area of Soviet
aspirations.
In the late forties and early fifties the
Kremlin renewed its subversion tactics
against various conservative Arab re–
gimes, wíth Iraq and Egypt being
among the main targets. In this period,
despite both Stalin's anti-Semitism and
long standing Communist opposition to
THE SOVIET NAVY
Muse/es in on a Vitallifeline
G=
Russ ia n n avy
port of
call
1
1
1
1
1
Dots show location of various
Soviet port facilities
ranging
from fishing services to submarine
bases.
All
are as tride of or near
the vital trading artery stretching
1
from Gibraltar to Singapore.
INDIAN OCEAN
o
fD Seycholles