Basic HTML Version
6
respected no particular roads, canals,
bridges or villages.
It
was, in short,
utterly devoid of any essential military
characteristics.
It
was, then, completely
impractical from a military point of
view -
since it ignored militarily
defensible territory, or strategic political
or topographical features.
In each case, they fought against
an enemy granted safe sanctuary. In
Korea, it was the Yalu River and Man–
churia. In Vietnam, it is H aiphong
Harbor, and the multi-colored maps
illustrating "off limits" to the pilots of
the jet fighter-bombers who fly the tire–
sorne, hideously dangerous missions
against tiresome, heavily defended,
oftentimes comparatively unimportant
targets.
In Korea, Air Force and Navy pilots
flew missions against bridges, roads,
tunnels, trains, ox carts, trucks, columns
of troops, and hamlets. They were not
allowed to carry the war
to
the enemy
by bombing his airfields, or his rear
supply bases, since these were carefully
hoarded in Manchuria.
In Vietnam, pilots
By
missions
against carefully specifi.ed targets cho–
sen, as often as not, by officers thou–
sands of
miles
from the battles. A
pilot of an American fighter bombee
based in Cambodia might fly a typical
mission like the one now described.
Flying the "Thuds"
Weather, briefing, and a careful
description of the target for the morn·
ing mission were given the pilot after
bis quick visit to the mess for breakfast
and coffee, probably at 4:00 a.m. He
would fly his "Thunderchief" (labeled
"Thuds" by the men who
Ry
them),
heavily ladeo with bombs and rockets,
along a carefully prescribed route,
which induded certain política! consid–
erations. (A sweep over Hanoi could
lead, if a pilot made a tuca too wide, to
intrusion over sorne one of the many,
many "restricted" areas, and bring
about a worldwide política! and diplo–
matic crisis - so the Thud pilots are
not merely asked to bomb military tar–
gets, they are asked to be students of
the delicate manipulations and machin–
ations of international geopolitics as
well.)
Takeoff was always a chancy thing -
The
PLAIN TRUTH
with the frequent violent rain squalls,
puddles of water on the strip, and a very
heavy, stubby-winged fighter bombee,
roaring into the thick murky skies to
dimb on course for his refueling tanker,
orbiting in a predetermined area high
over the eastern bordee area of Cam–
bodia. Hís Thud didn't have enough
fue! to make it all the way to North
Vietnam, and back to his base - so he
had to accomplish the delicate and
demanding task of in-air refueling
going each way. Refueling is not
any lead-pipe cinch, either. Many an
unfortunate Thud jockey found his air–
plane bathed in kerosene from a faulty
connection, or sorne sudden turbulence
cluring bis in-flight refueling.
The refueling was done one at a
time. And so was much of the bombing,
and many entire missions. The big B-
52's could sti ll fly World War
JI
type
bombee formations, although lack of
enemy fighter power made the forma–
tions nowhere near so necessary. But the
Thud pilots went singly, in pairs, oc in
threes or slightly larger groups.
After filling up, the pilot pointed his
flying arsenal along the long, winding
mountains labeled "Thud Ridge" by
those who carne
to
know it so well (and
it gave title to the book written by an
American Thud pilot who carne home
to tell about it).
The enemy knew it well, too.
Assume the weather was bad over the
target. The Thuds had orders to pene–
trate as far as possible, and to remain
over the target area as long as they
could, hoping for a break in the douds
to make pinpoint accuracy possible for
them.
If
the weather persisted, they had
to turn around and go home. That
meant another ín-flight refueling and a
long day.
Bombiog and Air Defenses
Sometimes, weather might prevent
anything more tban snooping for holes
in tbe douds for up to four or more
days at a time.
All
this was not lost on
the enemy. It gave him sufficíent time to
dismantle, and cart off the target, or, fail–
ing this, to quickly set up sorne portable
SAM sites around it, and to reinforce
the target with every conceivable type of
February 1971
anti-aircraft weapon. (Pilots have been
shot clown flying over heavily populated
Hanoi by the huge army of civilians
and military personnel alike who would
be seen lying clown on their backs,
pointing whatever kind of weapon,
even pistols, up into the sky. Pilots
brought back aircraft struck with every
conceivable calibre of bullet.)
Few Americans realize that the air
defenses around Hanoi were far more
intensified, and far more sophisticated,
than any of those around the big
industrial cities of Germany during
World War JI.
Finally, when weather permitted, the
target was attacked. That meant using
the capability of the Thud ( induding
anti-SAM radar, which could detect the
rocket as it fired preparatory to launch)
to the full, taxing the pilot to the limit
of his ability to keep an eye out for the
hated telephone-pole-like SAMs flying
at him, or for bursts of flak, or being
careful not to over.fly one of the many
restricted areas, and trying to place his
bombs and rockets squarely on target.
He knew, too, that the North Vietnam–
ese would deliberately park military
equipment in hospital compounds, and
in and among civilian populated areas.
His job was an impossible one - but
not quite.
He usually
did
get his "impossible"
job done. But not always without great
sacrifice as the "guests" at the "Hanoi
Hilton" (American prisoners of war in
Hanoi) can testify.
And so the tortuous, seemingly
impossible missions continued to be car–
ried out, month after month, year after
year, until the halting of the bombing
in the North.
At best, the bombing was an exercise
in attrition, and an attempt at inter–
diction of supply routes. At no time did
it succeed in
HALTING
enemy military
activity, but only in keeping tbe enemy
.flow of manpower and supplies within
certain limits. With the cessation of the
bombing over the North, the former
targets are far more heavily fortified ,
meaning that, for all practica! purposes,
if bombing were to begin once more, it
would al! be there to do over again,
only much, much more difficult than
( Contintted
011
page 46)