Basic HTML Version
dence. The proposal-which Pretoria
was assured was "final and defi–
nite"- embraced the principie of
free elections, under U.N. supervi–
sion, geared toward an independence
date of December 31, 1978- ob–
viously long since passed. (Septem–
ber 30, 1979 is the new deadline.)
The groundwork of a cease-fire be–
fore elections was established. The
South Africans agreed to scale down
their forces in the territory to 1,500
men, provided SWAPO would cease
its terrorist activities.
The proposal also unequivocally
stated that the future of the coastal
port. enclave of Walvis Bay-South
African territory never a part of thc
former German South West Afri–
ca- was to be treated as an entirely
separate matter, "subject to discus–
sion between the South African gov–
ernment and the elected government
of Namibia."
Although the Western "Big Five"
claimed to have gotten SWAPO's
approval of the same "final" pro–
posa!, it wasn't long before the
agreement began to break down
due to new demands made by the
SWAPO high command, acting
under instructions from the Soviet
Union. (Once asked during an
American television interview what
direction SWAPO would next take,
South Africa's Prime Minister
P. W. Botha answered: "That de–
pends on what SWAPO's 'boss'
says- and SWAPO's boss is in
Moscow.")
The first serious breach of the "fi–
nal " proposal carne in July 1978,
when the "Big Five" not only voted
for, but actually sponsored, a resolu–
tion in the Security Council which
declared that Walvis Bay must be
"reintegrated" into Namibia.
The most serious rupture of the
original accord, however, occurred in
February 1979. This rift is still unre–
solved and the situation as it stands
now is so precarious that the entire
independence process is on the verge
of a complete breakdown.
SWAPO has presented two specif–
ic new demands: l) that its base
camps in the neighboring "Front
Line" states not be subjected to U.N.
monitoring, and 2) that SWAPO
troops be permitted during the cease-
The
PLAIN TAUTH June-July 1979
fire period to set up five military
bases within Namibia itself!
Incredible though it may seem, the
United Nations Security-General,
Dr. Kurt Waldheim, has more or less
bought the SWAPO idea, although
the U.N. plan is worded much more
cleverly.
With regard to the first point, the
U.N. proposes to hand over the job of
monitoring SWAPO's bases to the
"host" countries. Secondly, the U.N.
proposal states that any SWAPQ
forces who happen to be inside Namib–
ia during the timeofthe cease-fire will
be "restricted to base" there.
The U.N. plan simply ushers the
fox into the hen house. Neither "host
country," Angola or Zambia, is in
complete control of its own territory.
Even if they wanted to, they couldn't
monitor the SWAPO forces. And on
the second point, SWAPO guerrillas
presently have no bases in Namibia
proper. Thus the U.N. plan would
give them on a silver platter what
they have been unable to achieve
through years of fighting. During the
cease-fire, with South African troops
confined to their bases, the SWAPO
command would effect a massive in–
filtration of all of its externally based
troops across the border into its
U.N.-provided bases.
It simply boggles the mind that the
Western democratic powers would be
party to such an arrangement.
And to make certain that the U.N.
task force monitoring the cease-fire
is more to his liking, SWAPO chief
Nujoma is insisting that no soldiers
from NATO countries be repre–
sented. Instead, Nujoma says he
prefers the participation of African
and Scandinavian countries who
"showed sympathy with SWAPO."
Says Willie le Roux of the lnsti–
tute for Africa Studies at the Univer–
sity of Potchefstroom (South Afri–
ca): "The present crisis in SWA
stems from SWAPO' s refusal to take
part in the democratic process. It will
prevent elections for as long as it
possibly can, and for this reason
makes impossible demands on South
Africa in order to make South Africa
out lo be the culprit. ...
"Nujoma is regularly advised from
Moscow and this latest demand is
part of the strategy of continually
showing up Western inability to take
a firm stand." ·
Realignment of Southern Africa
As things stand at the moment,
there appears to be little or no
chance that the South African gov–
ernment will accept the latest gross
deviations from the original propos–
al. Moderate leaders inside Namib–
ia, constituting the majority of the
assembly e lected last December,
have already asked Pretoria to take
the first steps toward implementing
an interim government.
All a long, Pretoria has said it
would respect the wishes of the ma–
jority of the Namibian people.
It
has
also repeatedly said it would not run
away from its responsibility to guar–
antee the safety of SWA's diverse
and scattered peoples.
The stage, therefore, could be set
for an "interna!' ' settlement of the
political crisis similar to the one
which now bedevils Rhodesia. Ironi–
cally, this is what the men in the
Kremlin would prefer as well.
An interna! sett lement would not
receive international recognition.
SWAPO, excluded from power,
would be portrayed as the injured
party. The guerrilla war would heat
up more than ever, with South Afri–
can defense forces-"the bad
guys"-drawn into the conftict deep–
er than ever.
At the United Nations, the West–
ern members of the Security Council
would probably no longer resist de–
mands for economic sanctions
against South Africa- sanctions
which if imposed would seriously
harm their own economies.
South Africa is now reconciled to
the likelihood of sanctions. Unless
the U.N. and the West cometo rea–
son, Pretoria has no choice but to
stay in Namibia and defend its 750-
mile-long border with radi ca l
Angola.
South Africa also intends to work
closely with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's
newly elected black majority govern–
ment. In turn, Prime Minister Bishop
Abel Muzorewa advocates continued
close commercial and military ties
with South Africa and the creation of
an economic community embracing
severa! countries in the subcontinent.
41