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NAMIBIA
(Continued f rom page 6)
the latter; and, tragically last, the
moderate political leaders repre–
senting the vast majority of the
people of Namibia, whose wishes
have largely fallen on deaf ears at the
United Nations.
The preference of the Third–
World and Communist-dominated
United Nations is well known; it un–
reservedly supports SWAPO, having
declared it the "sole and authentic
representative" of the Namibian
people, to the- exclusion ef. all other
polít ica! parties in South West Afri–
ca. This affirmation was made years
ago, despite the fact that SWAPO is
predominantly an Ovambo-based
group (and enjoys less than half of the
support of the Ovambo population at
that). Still, the U.N.'s Council for
Namibia funds a SWAPO office in
NewYorkCity to the t uneof$185,000
ayear. And when the Namibia ques–
tion is discussed at the United Nations
Security Council, a SWAPO repre–
sentative is automatically invited. Not
invited and notably absent a re repre–
sentatives of the " Democratic Turn–
halle Alliance," the multi-ethnic par–
ty which overwhelmingly swept Na–
mibia's interna! (non-U.N. super–
vised) elections last December.
(Knowingitcould not win the battleof
the ballot, SWAPO boycotted the
election.)
Given this bias on the East R iver,
it is little wonder that responsible
leaders inside Namibia seriously
doubt that either the U.N. or the
Western powers have the will to
bring SWAPO to contest an election
fa ir and square-Qr that U.N.-super–
vised elections in Namibia can ever
be conducted impartially.
Bullets Over Ballots
The SWAPO leadership has repeat–
edly professed its preference for
shooting its way to power in Namib–
ia. This was reiterated in January by
its representative at the U.N., Mr.
T heo Ben Gunrab. SWAPO, he
stressed, remained "totally and reso–
lutely" committed to the belief that
"armed struggle" was the only way
to settle the future of Namibia.
40
In the past seven months SWAPO
"freedom fighters" have backed up
their resolve with over 350 separate
acts of violence- from assassinations
of chiefs and village headmen to ab–
ductions of schoolchildren, to the
first-ever bombings in Windhóek.
As for SWAPO's regard for elec–
tions, the democratic process, and the
principie of one-man-one-vote,
SWAPO president Sam N ujoma
said in New York in 1978: "The
question of black majority rule is out.
We are not fighting even for black
majority rule. We are fighting to
seize power in Namibia for the bene–
fit of the Namibian people. We are
revolutionaries."
Though SWAPO disdains the
democratic process, the fact that it is
permitted to operate as a legitimate
political party inside Namibia (rep–
resented by its interna! wing) shows
the remarkable extent to which per–
sonal liberties are enjoyed in the ter–
ri tory.
"There is, in fact," report Duignan
and Gano, "a good deal more person–
alliberty in Namibia than in Angola
or under any Communist regime.
SWAPO is allowed to operate in Na–
mibia in a way not tolerated in any
African one-party dictatorship or
military regime. l ndeed no Commu–
nist regime in the world would permit
what the South African government
has allowed in Namibia: the organi–
zation and political activity of a par–
ty whose purpose is to overthrow the
regime."
But the wide freedoms now allowed
Namibia's diverse peoples would be
radically and tragically reduced if
SWAPO were ever to cometo power.
Continue Duignan and Gann: "The
future of Namibia under a SWAPO
regime is not hard to predict. The
Europeans presumably would leave of
their own accord, or they would be
driven out. ... The party seeks to
create a unified Namibian nation,
based on one nationalism and one cul–
ture. In practice, SWAPO rule would
entail Ovambo supremacy and would
therefore lea.d to widespread resist–
ance on the part of other ethnic com–
munities. Namibia would then require
a vast amount ofmilitary and econom–
icaid from the Eastern bloc to consoli–
dateitsrule.
' 'This would gain enormous advan–
tages for the Communists. SWAPO is
not in a position to effectively govern
Namibia. Dependent as a SWAPO
government would be on foreign mili–
taryand economic help, such a govern–
ment might well become a Soviet
client, as is the MPLA in Angola....
"The position of the Western
powers in the Southern Atianticwould
be fur ther weakened, a serious matter
in view of its strategic importance in
the worldwidc pattern of Western
maritime trade. If Namibia's enor–
mous potential mineral wealth, in–
cluding its vast resources in uranium,
did not pass into the Soviet orbit, these
resources at least could be denied to
the West in case of need.
"There is no bétter hope for Na–
mibia and for the world at large than
the ascendancy of the moderates.
Wherever radicals have come to
power in recent years, bloodshed, ex–
pulsions, forced labor camps, confis–
cation, and 'reeducation programs'
have resulted. The record of the radi–
cals in Angola and Mozambique is
disastrous; in Ethiopia it is barbarie,
and elsewhere it has been inept–
even if more humane."
Weak-WIIIed West
Despite this appallingly grim picture
of what a SWAPO-ruled Namibia
tied to Moscow would be like, the
Western nations seem to be unable to
take a firm stand for a solution to the
budding Namibia crisis that would
keep the territory from passing into
the Communist orbit.
This has been amply demonstrated
in the position of the "Western Five"
Security Council members who have
attempted to mediate the dispute be–
tween Pretoria and SWAPO.
Time and time again the Western
powers have backed away from firm–
ly negotiated "final" positions, cav–
ing in to a succession of SWAPO
demands.
ln 1977, responding to U.N. pres–
sure, South Africa gave up on its own
"interna!" formula for independence
of the territory.
After months of extremely diffi–
cult negotiations, South Africa, on
April 25, 1978, agreed toa proposal,
as put forth by the Western powers,
for a plan for Namibian indepen-
The
PLAIN TRUTH June·July 1979