Basic HTML Version
The
Two
Germanys
(Continued frorn page 6)
have been reinforced by German
thoroughness."
The Communist dissenters leveled
telling salvos against the "ruling
class" in the supposed classless socie–
ty, stating that "no ruling class in
Germany has ever so mooched from
or secured itself against the people
than the two dozen families that use
our country as sorne sort of self-ser–
vice store. None has ever built itself
such opulent golden ghettos in the
woods, guarded like fortresses. No
caste has ever enriched itself so
shamelessly with special stores, prí–
vate imports from the West, subsi–
dies on top of subsidies."
T he dissenters, while still profess–
ing allegiance to Marxist-Leninism,
nevertheless questioned the very
foundation of the East German state:
"Why is the disparity between the
productive capacity of the GDR and
West Germany growing ever wider,"
they asked, "even though a decisive
element .in Lenin's thesis is the supe–
riority of Communism over capital–
ism? Why is there no letup of the
petitions to emigrate from the GDR
or the risking of lives in attempts to
escape from the Republic? Why do
94 percent of all GDR citizens seek
daily flight from the Republic each
evening by watching West German
TV? Because the ideological psycho–
terror of the State is unbearable....
Never before in the GDR has there
been such a gap between expecta–
tions and reality."
Harking back toa demand by Karl
Marx during the Revolution of 1848
("all of Germany is proclaimed as a
unified indivisible republic"), the un–
derground manifesto called for the
restorat ion of basic fre-edoms and the
reunification of Germany after the
East withdraws from the Warsaw
Pact and the West from NATO.
T he East German government
naturally denounced the authenticity
óf the manifesto, but the impact of its
strident demands and the obvious
depth of dissatisfaction it reftected in
the GDR was heard loud and clear in
the West.
"These problems are no cause for
The PLAIN TRUTH April 1979
rejoicing," editorialized the
London
Times
of May 6, 1978. "Most Euro–
peans feel happier with two German
states and hope only that they can
live together in peace. But unless this
arrangement is fully accepted by the
peoples as well as the governments of
both German states it will remain a
running sore across the heart of Eu–
rope, demanding the continuing pres–
ence of large numbers of foreign
troops on both sides. And then at
sorne point people will start wonder–
ing whether a different arrangement
might not be preferable."
Germany's Dlvlslon Artificial
T he growing disparity between the two
Germanys is causing sorne people to
question long-held assumptions con–
cerning the "German problem."
The division of the German nation
into two separate states-the one al–
lied with the U.S.-Ied West and the
other incorporated into the Soviet-led
Eastern Bloc- has come to be taken
for granted by most of the world.
Nevertheless, this division is an artifi–
cial and unnatural one and, by its very
nature, inherently unstable.
T he division is kept in fo_rce only
by two factors: 1) the most forbid–
ding physical barrier betwe.en hu–
mans since the Great Wall of China:
a long barbed-wire fence paralleled
by a mined "death strip" which is
policed by fierce Alaskan dogs and
thousands of guards in watchtowers,
and which is fitted with ftoodlights
and hidden trip-wires that set off au–
tomatic machine guns. Another wall
surrounds free West Berlin, isolated
inside East Germany. And 2) the sta–
tioning of mass ive numbers of for–
eign troops on the soil of both
states.
Most of America's 300,000-strong
NATO land force is positioned in
West Germany, having under its con–
trol thousands of tactical nuclear
weapons. Backing up this commit–
ment is the very sizable military con–
tribution from West Germany it–
self-at 489,000, by far the largest
conventional force among Europe's
NATO partners.
Across the l ron Curtain, which
slices Germany in half, 17 million
East Germans are kept in line largely
by the presence of 22 divisions of
Soviet troops. A huge East German
"People's Army' ' of about 400,000
troops, including reserves, plus an
even larger militia, secures Moscow's
stake in Germany's future.
These foreign sentries, perpetuat–
ing Germany's partition, have been
around so long that it is forgotten
that the original intent after World
War
11
was to keep Germany united
- but neutralized and demilitar–
ized-under the joint control of the
four victorious powers (Russia,
France, Britain and the United
States).
Even after the country was split by
the cold war, the Soviets continued
until about 1955 to talk about sorne
sort of reunification within the
framework of an East-West Euro–
pean security system. Nothing carne
of this proposal, and the rift between
the two Germanys widened.
lt was not until 1972 that Bonn
agreed to formally recognize the East
German regime. Even then the main
hope on the part of West Germans
was to trade political recognition for
a more normal relationship in their
desire to open up the frozen zone to
greater human contact.
Reunlficatlon Talk Surfacing
The reunification of Germany is not
just around the corner, but the cer–
tain-ty of its occurrence is drawing
closer all the time.
Dramatic shifts on the world
scene- especially the opening to the
West of Communist China, and the
paranoia this trend produces in Mos–
cow-will have a great bearing on
the German situation. Note this re–
port from the " International Out–
look" section of the J anuary 8, 1979
issue of
Business Week:
" Is Moscow
flirting with the idea of allowing
more normal relations between the
two Germanys in exchange for a
loosening of Bonn's ties with the
Western alliance? In short, are the
Soviets about to play their German
card? The standard diplomatic an–
swer, from Bonn to Washington, is
that both the Russians and West
Germans are locked into positions
held for 30 years-the Russians fear
a reunited Germany and the West
Germans depend for protection on
the U.S . nuclear shield.
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