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from the Soviet presidency a nd as–
sumed the office himself.
Mo reover, Brezhnev has suc–
ceeded in gathering to himself more
personal power than any previous
Kremlin boss except Josef Stalin.
Consequently. his death o r ous ter
cou ld be greatly di ru ptive to the
Soviet nation, a nd potentially to the
whole world.
For the time being, however, in–
telligence sources say Brezhnev-de–
spi te his medica! problems-is sti ll
very much in charge in the Kremlin,
where he holds the dual position of
Soviet president and chairman ofthe
Communist party. No major policy
decisions are reached without his ap–
proval. And, ifanything, public adu–
lation o f Brezhnev is on the upswing.
In short, Brezhnev remains the
undisputed captain of the Kremlin
team.
Few Clues to Successor
lf Brezhnev, nevertheless, were to
suddenly become incapacitated or
die, who would most likely succeed
him? And. more importantly, how
might that person's foreign and do–
mestic policies dilfer from Brezh–
nev's?
Despi te their long experience, vet–
era n Kremlinologis ts admitthat they
can do no more than speculate over
such questions. Kremlin politics are
steeped in mys tery. Clues a re few.
Thc inner workings of the Soviet
leadership remain , borrowing a
phrase from Ch urchill , "a riddle
wrapped in a mys tery inside an
enigma."
Much ofthe problem lies in the fact
tha t in a system which rewa rds rigid
confo rmity, such as tha t ofthe Soviet
Un ion, officials often do not publicly
show their true colors until after they
cometo power. Open debate is taboo
even within the top eche lons of gov–
er n ment. Boat-rockers do not
progress very far. Whether the appar–
ent consensus in !he exclusive 14-man
Communist party Politburo is genu-
TOP CONTENDERS
for Leonid
Brezhnev's position include (from
top): Andrei P. Kirilenko, Grigory V.
Romanov, V/adimir V. Shcherbitsky,
Yuri V. Andropov. and Kiri/ T. Mazu–
rov.
The
PLAIN TRUTH September 1978
ine or whether it masks a n underlying
diversity ofopinion is wholly a matter
of conjecture. The Kremlin does not
permit Western officials to meet o r
ta lk with any members of the power
elite other tha n Brezhnev, Premier
Kosygin, and Foreign Minister Gro–
myko-and even these only under
carefully controlled circumstances.
Given these limita tions, what do
the expertssay about thesuccession?
Aging Hierarchy
As we near the end of 1978, the
inescapable fact remains that the
top Soviet leadership is aging no–
ticeably. The average age of the 14
members of the ruling Politburo, the
Soviet "supercabinet," is 67 (com–
pared to 52 for President Carter,
Vice-Presiden! Mondale, and the
United States Cabinet). The five
most powerful men of tha t elite So–
viet group are all in their 70s. The
two men immmedia tely below
Brezhnev in rank are Prem ier
Aleksei Kosygin, 74, a nd chief ide–
o logist Mikhail Suslov, 75. Because
of their age and declining health.
they are considered unlikely to
move up. That also goes for 79-year–
o ld Arvid Y. Pelshe, head of the
party Control Commission and the
oldest member ofthe Politburo.
Veteran Foreign Minister Andre i
A. Gromyko, 68, is not seriously
considered a candidate because of
his longtime absence from party. as
opposed to governmenta l, affairs.
Defense Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov,
69, has spent his entire career in the
defense sector, a nd is also ruled o ut.
Through this process of elimina–
tion. a few names finall y begin to
emerge. Though Brezhnev has thus
far not publicly endorsed an heir
apparent- nor is he thought to be
secretly grooming a protégé to take
over the reins of power- the closes t
thing to a front-runner for th e
Kremlin 's top job is widely believed
to be 7 1-year-old Andrei P. K iri–
lenko. A ve tera n party official who
often fills in for Brezhnev at party
functions , Kirile nko is a longtime
friend and associate of Brezhnev,
a nd is considered fourth in rank af–
ter Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Suslov.
Like Brezhnev, Kirilenko is a
Ukrainia n. He is a member of the
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