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SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER
Kiev ,
pictured here on its maiden voyage, is the
first of a scheduled six of its kínd to be deployed. lts appearance has signifi–
cantly bolstered the strength of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet.
ab le to administer a fa tal counter–
blow to the " imperialist
bloc."
Barnett quotes. as an example of
this reasoning, the translation of a
radio broadcast in Ukrania: "Our
goal is for a ll workers, collective
farmers, and employees to be able
to
build new or renova te present
refuges and shelters. In particular.
civil defense statfs pay attenti on to
teaching th e inh abitants of vi ll ages
and suburbs how to convert base–
ments and cellars into shelters.
" Much atten tion goes to th e tra in–
ing of youths, school children, tech–
nical and tradc school pupils. and
stud ents. They are our young gener–
ations and our future. They must be
ca refull y prepared for defense from
mass destructive weapons."
From many reports ava il.ablc in
the Soviet press it is obvious that the
Soviets are shifting emphasis from
mass evacuat ion of cities to the con–
stru ction of shelters in urban areas
to protect key gove rnment and in–
dustrial personnel in a nuclear at–
tack. If the U.S.S.R.' es tima ted
billion-dollar-a-year CD program is
effect ive. Russian st ra tegists ca lcu–
la te that casualties in the Soviet
Union could be limited to between 7
and 12 million in a nuclea r ex–
change with the U.S. That is fa r
below wha t American defense plan–
ners define as "unacceptable" dam-
The
PLAIN TRUTH November 1976
age - the leve! of " a ss ured
destruction " that is considered nec–
essary to deter the Soviets from con–
templa ti ng nuclear war.
Barnett summarized hi s fi ndi ngs
by saying: "The conclusion th at So–
viet doctrine remains essent ia lly
unaltered by political détente and
by SALT
J
may be difficult
!O
ac–
cept. The implications of a Sovi et
rejec tion of Western theories of de–
terrence. stability, parity, and arms
races are serious and disquieting.
Fa r more congenia! is an adversary
created in one's own image. Con-
equent ly. the urge
to
trea t Soviet
claims as unreprcsentat ive of actual
doctrine or as merely unsophist i–
ca ted is almost overwheJming. But
rejection of what the Soviets say on
such grounds should not precede
close examination of their state–
ments. Those who would discount
Soviet declara tory policy must bear
the burden of producing evidence to
support their case."
Challenges Lie Ahead
There is no doubt that the Soviets,
st rivi ng for dominance on the seas
and goi ng all out for nuclear superi–
ority. all the while comforting them–
se lves with an elaborare civil
defense infrastruc ture a t home, will
be tempted to take bolder risks in
world arenas in the months ahead.
America and her allies will be put
to
more and more severe tests of
will , if not of strength.
Only time will tell the reaction of
America to each test. If America
continually backs down. as in the
case of Angola. what will be th e
reaction among America 's a Uies?
The United States is by no means
weak - militari ly, that is. But raw
military strength alone is only one
fac tor in a ny nati on's complex
power equation.
1
n a review of the overall U.S.–
Soviet balance, published in the lat–
est (volume 8-9, 1976) edition of
New Lugano Review,
Sir Robert
Thompson writes; "These are the
ha rd ma teria l facts in the rise of
Russia as a military power since
World War
II
and the decline of the
United States. Clearly that position
is made much worse when the factor
of will is introduced into the equa–
tion of power.
"No one would suggest that, in
respect of Russia, the factor of will
is as high as
lOO%
in any given situ–
ation, but, on the other hand , it ap–
pears compara ti vely to be much
highe r than that of th e United
States. Quite obviously the Ameri–
can fac tor of will in Indochina de–
creased over the last two or three
yea rs to less than
lO%,
if not nil,
thereby reducing the influence of
American power to zero, whereas
the Russian wi ll to support Nort h
Vietnam remained constant. lt was
close to 100% to ensure th e surviva l
of North Vietnam as a sepa rate
communist sta te and it rose steadily,
as American will declined, to ensure
the North's takeover ofthe South ."
This noted authority on commu–
nist strategy and tactics then adds:
"Jt has been my thes is for some time
th at we have been in World War IIl
for the past 25 yea rs and that th e
long-range Soviet goal is to win it
without a nuclear exchange. This
goa l requires that eventually there
should be a strategic surrender by
the United States, brought about ei–
ther politically or psychologica lly by
a loss of will and purpose, or poli ti–
ca lly and militarily by maneuvering
the United States into a vulnerable
and untenable global situat ion, or a
bit of both."
Time and momen tum are not in
America's favor.
O
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