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"The Soviet Union is wresting nu–
clear weapons superiority from the
United States and endangering the
effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic
mi ssi le deterrent." the respected
weekly magazine said.
It
quoted an unidentified U.S. of–
ficial as complaining: "The trea ties
we have signed with the U.S.S.R. for
nuclear detonations. strategic arms
limitation, and antiball istic missile
limitations should be called the
world's first series of unilateral
agreements...."
A viation Week
said the Soviets
are operating a transportable missi le
defense radar known as the X3 sys–
tem. l f deployed around major pop–
ulation centers, the X3 is capable,
when used in conjunctio n with
ABM missiles, "of re nd e r–
ing ... ineffective" U.S. land-based
Minutemen intercontinental mis–
si les a nd Polaris Posei don sub–
marine-launched ballistic missiles, it
said .
At the same time. th e Soviets are
beefing up their civil defense pro–
gram - spending about 12 times
more per yea r on it than th e U.S. –
and dispersing industria l compl exes
and popula tions. "Soviet au thoriti es
believe that by proper civil defense
prepa rations, losses will be as little
as lO% o f the population," the
magazine reported .
Russians Don't "Think American"
All three pursuits of Soviet strategic
plann ing - naval dominance. nu–
clear superiority. and effective civil
defense measures - add up to one
conclusion: The Soviets are clearly
opting for world dominance.
And
if
there must be a World War
rii -
a
nuclear
World War III - to achieve
such an aim the Soviet Union in–
tends not only
to
fight and to sur–
vive, but to win.
To nearly a ll America ns. a nu–
clear war has long been held to be
"unthinkable. " or, as it has often
been expressed: " In a nuclear war
there will be no winners - only los–
ers." Bu t it is a dangerou mi stake to
think that the Soviets view a nuclear
wa r in the same light.
In a thorough analysis of Soviet
strategic th inking, published in the
Summer 1975 edition of
Orbis.
ar–
ticle entitled . "Tra ns-Salt : Soviet
Strategic Doctrine." author Roger
W. Ba rnett points ou t: "There can
be no ga insaying th at Soviet authors
ex hibit concern about prevent ing an
all-out nuclear war. Unlike sorn e of
th eir Western coun terparts, how–
ever. th e i r concern co ntinues
beyond th e point of deterring a ma–
j or war. Soviet military leader
make it amply clear tha t should war
break out , they have every inten tion
SOVIET M/G-25
fighter plane, one of the most advanced warplanes in the
world, was flown to Japan by
a
defecting Soviet pilot. The opportunity for
Western specia/ists to examine the aircraft is considered
a
majar intelligence coup.
....
-
4
of devoting suffici ent resources and
armaments to it to ensure a Soviet
victory."
In nea rly every avenu e of ap–
proach to military doctrine and
strategic concepts, Ba rnen found
that the views of Soviet authors
were totally opposed to commonly
held viewpoints in the West.
He found that Soviet military
writers even from before the days of
the first SALT agreement wit h the
U.S. have rejected Western concepts
such as "deterrence" and "mutu ally
assured destruction" (the belief that
either side would fear to initiate at–
tack because retaliation and mutual
destru ction would be so great).
Soviet a nal ys ts. accord ing to
Ba rnett , find no virtue in the con–
cept of "strategic stability" in the
relationship of Soviet nuclea r forces
to those of the U.S. The concept of
" nuclear parity" with the U.S. was
not even alluded to in the nearly
three yea rs' worth of literature he
perused. In its place he found inn u–
merable reference to either th e
actua lity of, or the need for. ·• uperi–
ority.'' Notes Barnett: "Soviet mil i–
tary writers declare tha t adva ntages
are t o be found in s uperi o r–
ity.... Predominance on the part of
th e imperi a li sts. in th eir view.
mea ns war. But Sovi et supcriority
stands as a bu lwark ofpeace ."
Barne ll also discovered tha t th e
SALT 1 agreements - widely hailed
in the Wes tern world as the fi
r~t
step
toward ha lting the arms race - had
littlc impact on Sov iet military writ–
in gs. "They precipitated no debates
in military journals. nor did they
in spire widcspread commenta ry:·
he found. "The few allusions ap–
pearing in the sou rce materi a ls . . .
in va riably included the reminder
that the nat ure of aggressive impe–
ri alism had not changed. the agree–
ments notwithstanding.''
Great Stresses on Civil Defense
On the question also of civil de–
fen se. Barnell could nowhcre fi nd
thc common ly held Ame rican view
th at civil defense is an csscnti ally
fruitless endeavor. lnstead he found
that " Soviet writ ings are rich in civil
defense inst ructi ons" - showing in
the event of a nuclear wa r. the
U.S.S.R. clearly aims to emerge as
un sca thed as possible, while being
The
PLAIN TRUTH November 1976