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PRESIOE.NT FORO puts his signaturs on the docvment simply
ce/led s "Finsl Act," officially sndfng ths Evropesn Secvrity
Conference.
peoples who, by fate, bave been
so unfortunate as to live in tbat
yeat zone of conquest between
Teuton and Slav.
The
~Final
Acf' calls for in–
creased movement across tbe
tdeological barrier of both meo
and ideas.
lt
involves pledges
to
permit wider circulation of oews
material a.nd ot:her literature.
as
well as expansion of oontacts in
11
the ecqñomic, scientific,
tecb–
nologlcal, social. cultural and
humanitarian fields."
or
course. the terms of the
provisions are coucbed with
protective clauses such as "will
lake mea.sures to," ''wi.IJ en·
deavor
lo;•
~ill
encourage."
"will facilitate" - rarely just
plain
~will."
Nevertheless. despite the
vague wording many experts
see the
~Basket
Three"
issues as
very important concessions.
And the Belgrade cooference.
, two years hence will. certainly
act
as
son of
a
monitoring de,
vice to ensure at least minimal
compliance ' witli the lofty ter–
minology of the "Final Act."
What is certain beyond any
doubt, however, is that commu–
nist authorities are not going to
open the floodgates
to
what
they consider objectionable
ideas from the West. Material
containing either anti-Commu–
nist diatribes or espousing the
hbenine views on morality ex·
tant
m
tbe West
will
not stand a
ghost of
a
chance of circulation
in the politically and morally
austere societies of the East.
Only individuals and organiza–
tions which represent no threat
to thc política! and social order
built up there over tbe last tbree
decades wiU be allowed access.
The upshot of"Basket Three"
1.5
that the lron Curtain remains
as strong, if not stronger. tban
ever - but now there are
a
fcw
windows, and perhaps a door or
IWO,
in
it.
All
Not
Quiet
on
Easterll Front
Whtle the avowed aim
of
the
secunty conference
was
to
en–
sute
that Europe might become
a "continent of peace;• the
speeches of the
35
individual
beads of state showed that true
peace - other than merely tbe
eurrcnt suuc of
non~war
-
was
a di.stánt goal. dimly perce[ved.
And the ttoubles are·not only,
centered along the great ideo- .
logical divide.
'Two of the strongest speeches
were directed at Mr. Brezhnév
from Eastern Europe. the first
from Josip BrozTito of commu–
nis~
but independent, Yugo–
slavia. and lhe sccond from
Nicolae Ceausescu. supremc–
everything of higbly índepen–
dent Romarua.
Tito, now
83
and tbe grand
old roan of
Euro~n
politlcs.
len nobody in Ftnlandia
Hall
wondering about who be had
in
mind, when he invoked thc
principies
o(
the "Final Act" in
defending hjs counuy agaios1
any future outside meddlin§
in
Yugoslav a6'airs after bis •de·
pa{ture" (nobody talks about
Tito's "death" in Yugoslavia).
With great emphasis Tito
said. "We demand uncoo–
ditional respect for the sover–
eignty and territorial integrity
of our own counuy.... Now
lhat lhis conferenee
is
adopting
lhe inviolability of froiltiers as
one of the baste principies of
European security and coopera–
tion.
1
sbould like solemnly to
declare here that my country
considers this principie as biod–
ing both on itself and on
aU
its
neighbors.''
Romanla a Test
Case?
Mr. Brezhnew got that mes–
sage loud and clear. But l'm not
sure he was quite prepared for
lhe even stronger words of Ro–
mania's Ceausescu tbe follow–
ingday.
WEEK END!NG AUGUST 23, 197l
Firmly clutehing tbe principie
of "non·iotervencjon in internal
affairs" to his breast. Ceausescu
time and again in bis 2Q-minute
speech asserted the right of his
or any otber nation present 10
develop its own economic and
social order along its own lines,
"to become fully masters of
their own destwies.'•
Romanía has s toutly de–
fended Íts right
to
develop its
own cconomy. apart from the
heavy dictates of the Moscow–
dominatcd Comccon bloc.
Ceausescu also callcd for the
withdrawal each 10 its .own
counuy of all foreign troops
based on foreign soil. Romanta,
while
a
member of the Warsaw
Pact, is the only East bloc coun–
try oot to have Russian troops
encamped on its sotl.
1t
is
very possible that in the .
near future, the Romanian situ·
ation could provide an ex–
cruciatingly tough test case for
lhe Soviets. who have promised
to abide by lhe conference prin–
cipies of "non-tntervention in
interna! affain." "tnviolability
of border$," and "refraining
from
use
of force."
What if Ce.auseseu "pulls
a
Tito" and decides 10 make bis
counuy a completely indepen–
dent communist state1 He al–
ready appears headed in tbat
direction. .fle has buill what the
Soviets would
call
a
~cult
of
personality" around him. He
has consolidated in bis own per·
son the offices of president and
prime minister. and
ís
supreme
head of bis nation's milita.ry de–
fense plaoning ageney.
Jf Romanía
does
pull out, will
tbe Soviet Uruon adbere
10
the
Hélsioki paet - or 10 the
kBrezhnev doctrine" which jus–
tifies
lhe sending of Russian
ttoops.
a
la
Prague
1968.
tnto
a
oeighboring state to "preserve
socialism"?
Al
Best -
a
Breather
fromWar
Olher delegates stresscd othe¡
problems tbat could drag che
European nations into connicts
even against thcir will.
The Mediterranean remains
á
source of potential conftict.
Malta's representative seored
the presence of the compeling
U.S. and Soviet fteets in the
waters lapping his island na–
tion's shores. And lhe Middle
East
was on many rrunds as
a
source
of
big power meddling.
Another Mediterranean bead
of state, Archbishop Makarios
of Cyptii.S, perhaps summcd up
the problems affeaing Europfs
fu1ure - whether it will be one.
of peace. or one of war which
could break out in any one of a
number of arcas:
"Aitbough the Confcrence
deals with security and coopera–
tion in Europe, its implicalions
and repercussions extend far
beyond lbc geographical con–
fines of Europe. For peace and
security
in
Europe
is
essential 10
peace and security in the world.
Particularly
Ibis
is so ltaving
re–
gard
to
the fact that lhe Euro–
pean continent has been the
sparking point of two world
wars. Any developments in
Eu·
rope inevitably alfect the rest of
lhe world."
Perbaps, al best. thc Confer·
ence on European Sccurity and
Cooperatioo bas
temporarlly
brougbt the world back anotl;ler
Slep from lhe brink of a global
war that everyone shudders
even 10 think about occurring.
Perhaps, as sorne have said, we
have now moyed from the Cold
War to the Cold Peace.
Perhaps there may be
progress in olher arcas of inter–
national cooperation. sucb as
token
symboli~
troop pullbacks
in Europe at lhe log-jammcd
force rcductioo talles- Perhaps
tbere
will
be
a breaklhrough tn
SALT - albeit preserving lhe
art and deployment of nuclear
weapons at a frighlfully btgh
leve
l.
Pcrhaps.
But
this is
hatdly a comfortablc
way for ¡nanlc:ihd
i~
livc.
o
Next Detente Stop:
Vie~na
In
1973,
as
phase one of the
now-coneluded European Secu–
rity CooJerence began in Hel–
sinki,
tbe Un.itcd States and its
nonh Atlantie allies made one
thing elea.r to the Warsaw Pact:
Progress in tbe Soviet-initiated
security conference would hinge
upon progress in parallel
Vienna-based talks on East–
West troop reductions in Cen–
tral Europe.
Today tbc European Seeurity
Cooference is history. Moscow
has acbieved her goal of forma l
ratification of her control over
Eastern Europe. But the Vienna
talks on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions (MBFR) re–
main stalematcd without even
lhe beginnings of an aveement
after
21
mooths of frutdess nc–
gotiation.
Somewhere along the line, in
tbe interests of "dttente," the
West permittcd the linkage be–
tw~n
tbe two sets of talk.s to be
broken.
"Europe's S lowest
Conferen<~e''
From tbeir inception, the
MBFR talks have been viewed
by tbe U.S.. in 1he face of Sen–
ate pressure for U.S. troop cut–
backs in Europe. as the best
meaos of achieving the desircd
U.S. troop reduction >Nitbout
upsetting the East-West balance
of power tbere.
But since lhe opening session
in October
1973.
in Vieooa's
historie
Hofburg Palace. the
19
participating nations (12 from
NATO 'and
7
from tbe Warsaw
Pact) bave remained in constant
deadloclc, each bloc aCC\Uing
lhe otber of "inftexibility." 'The
series of talks. dubbed by news–
men "Europe's slowest c:onfer–
ence.·' are now in recess until
September.
The United States is attempt·
ing to limit a first-stage troop
reduction ayeemenl to Soviet
and American ground forees
only, .leaving negotiations on
cuts by other national forttS on
eacb side of the Central Euro–
pean
dividing line untillater. '
The Soviet Union. on t.he
other hand, wants cuts by other
participating national forces
included in lhe first-stage agree–
ment package, as weU
as
reduo–
tions in air force units and
tactical nuclear weapons.
Because of the Eastern bloc's
geographical advantage and
current manpower supe.riority
(925,000 troops to NATO's
n1
,000), NATO is a
!so
presslng
for oumerically larger . troop
cuts by lhe Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact countries - called
"asymmetrical reductions" - lo
compensare for lhe disparity.
The NATO plan is 10 evcn–
tually reach parity at a common
ceilingof700,000 ground troops
on eacb side - effectively end–
ing communist superionty.
The Warsaw Pact. however,
has tbus far refuscd to make
bigger cutbacks tban NATO. lts
goal is not parity, butthe main·
tenance of lhe existing cot'rcla–
t ion of forces - meaning
communis1 superiority - at a
lower leve!.
In addition. tbe Kremlin
hopes lo use tbe Vienna talks as
a means of cbecking efforts
toward military integration in
Western Europe and preventing
increascs in West German mili–
tary forces.
Wilh lhe Unitcd States now
having losl lhe bargaining chtp
of its signature on lhe European
security document. diplomatic
observers are nol expecting any
grea t concessions in Vienna
from 1he Eastern bloc. At best,
tHe Soviet Uruon may intensify
efforts to achieve a
token
accord
for the salte of appearances and
to maintain the momentum of
"détente." But with the security
conference behind ber, the So–
viet Union has little reason
10
depart significantly from her
eurrent hardline negotiating
StanCe.
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