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PRESIDENT GERALD FORO tel/s delegstes to the European Security Conference thst
détente omust be a
tWo.way
street...
4
SOVIET COMMUNIST Psrty
Chief Leonid Brezhnev lesns
forward in his chair (CENTER
lEFT PHOTO) while listening
to speeches during a conference
working session. To his left is
Soviet Foreign Mínister Andrei
Gromyko.
Yugoslavia 's venerable Presí·
dent
8
Tito
(CENTER RI GHT)
takes e stro/1 during a break in
the conference. Tito told al/
present rhat Yugoslavia demanded
Huncondítional respect for the
sovereignty snd territorial integ·
rity of our
country•~"
- a not·
BI•BII•subtle warning to the
Soviets not to meddle in Yugo–
slavia's interna/ affairs after he
leaves the scene.
In BOTTOM PHOTO, Presi·
dent Ford Jsys wreath at the
memorial dedicated to the tour
mil/ion vicüms who perished at
the Nazi concentration csmp in
Auschwítz, Poland. Mr. Ford,
visíbly shsken at whsl he saw,
vísíted the camp while on a
state visil lo Poland prior lo
attending the Europesn Security
Conference. Mr. Ford also visited
Yugoslavia and Romanía after
the Summit in Helsinki.
Red Army moved west witll the
collapse of Hitler's Reich and
acquired hundreds of thousands
of miles of buffer zone area -
sorne under direct .control, some
under tbe jurisdiction of satel·
lite communist governments.
The fact tbat neither tb.e
Uoited States nor its Atlantic
alliance partners lifted a finger
to
mate~ally
support opposition
uprisings in Hungary in
1956
and Czechoslovakia in
1968
was
proof of their intention to. ac–
cept tb.e
deJacto
division of'Eu·
rope and not issue a challenge
to tb.e Soviets whicb could have
resulted in a hot war - witli the
prospect of tbe use of nuclear
weapons.
But
10
Moscow tb.e undetlned
status quo has never been
enough. 1t had to be made more
certain, given more of a formal·
iz.ed
legal nature. •
Since a peace treaty ending
World War
ll
has never been
signed - and is unlikely to be
as
long as Germany is divided -
the Soviets have long been
plumpiog for ao altero.ative
- a
European security conference -
to acbieve virtuaUy the same re·
sult.
An.d it ha<;! to be a big affair.
witb. beads of state in atten·
dance (not jusi foreign mínis·
ters). with the signing of a
formal documeot by
aU
of
th~m
in
fuU
public view, for aU the
people -of tb.e world to see on
television; with every signatory
pleágiog' such key prinCipies as
"inviolability of bordees,"
"peaceful selllement of dis·
putes," " refraining from tb.e
Lhreat or use of force." ..non–
intervention in interoal affairs."
With this oow accomplished
at Helsink.i - even though the
"Final Act" is a legally nOn·
binding document - the Soviets
at last
feel
a sense of security
they have sought for decades.
Overriding Fear
ples.
lt
was here, io Europe, that
claims lo world domination
raised 10 the leve[ of political
doctrine ended in tbe collapse
of states whose resources had
beeo made to serve criminal
and misanthropic purposes.
That is why the hour has struck
for the inevitable collective con·
clusions to be drawn from the
experience of history."
Many observers believe that
the European Security Confer·
ence
witb
its "securi ty in our
time" proviso, may be the cap·
stooe of Mr. Brezhoev's politi–
cal career. With it, plus another
summít confereoce with Mr.
Ford and a successful Soviet
Party Congress next year, tb.e
General Secretary will be able
to step down voluntarily from
office, the lirst leader in póst–
revolutionary Russia to be able
todo so.
There is also every reason to
believe that the Security
Con·
fcrence serves vital purposes
within the hierarchy of Soviet
political power as well.
lnstinctively. Mr. Brezhnev is
a cautious man, not unaware of
the awesome military might
both his country and tbe United
·States possess. By presentiog to
his couotrymen the "fact" of a
secure borderland
in
Europe,
Mr. Brezhnev is boping to fore–
stal! tb.e reckless use of brute
military power on tbe pait of
those who might succeed him.
Se<:urity
for a Price
Moscow's principal aims at
Helsinki were not achieved
without a price, although for
.a
long time it looked as if its oe·
gotiators. during two long,
tough years of deliberation (first
in Helsinki, lastly
in
Geoeva).
were not willing to pay ooe
ko–
pek
for the rewards they e)(·
pected lo reap.
Finally. when it looked as if
the entire affair were going to
lt is oflen difficult for West be scrubbed, the Eastern bloc
Europeans to comprehend the yielded on two major fronts.
Soviet apprehension - in fact ,
First they agree(! to a lengthy
near obsession - with the fear list of human rights issues,
ofmilitary threats arising in the lmówn as tbe "Basket Three"
often unpredictable political measures. Secoodly, tbey be·
soil of Western Europe. But tbe grudgingly acceded to Westem
memories ofNapoleon arfd Hit· demands to hold a follow-up
Ler are etched deep in the Rus- conference in tbe summer of
sian psyche.
1977 in Belgrade. Yugoslavia.
The fact that there is no Atthat time aU
'35
signatory na·
threat now is no guarantee ¡bat tions to the Helsinki pact will
there could not
be
one
in
the come togetber once again. Of.
future. The auitude of the Rus· course, each flalion's high rep·
sians, according to a political resentative
will
profess his own
observer at Helsinki, is easily nation's faithful adhereni:e
10
summed up as "One never the terms of the "Final Act," to
knows, so one must be careful."
tbe very jot and tb.e tinte of it,
Tbis apprehension was voiced and probably its spirit and in·
by Mr. Brezhnev in his address ten1 as well - while con·
when he reminded bis feUow
demniog the infidelity of others.
beads of state that "it was here, • In añy regard, tb.e West was
in
Europe. that aggressors time not about to recogoize the final
and again adorned themselves consolidation of the Eastem
witb notorious laurels, later bloc without auempting lo con·
only
10
be cursed by
th~
peo· struct a few links to the captive
WEEK ENDINO AUGÍJST 23, 19'75