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tumed from a trip to Japan. What do
you believe is the current Japanese
thinking on relations witb the United
States, China and tbe Soviet Union?
A.
Ever since July
15, 197 1,
when
Nixon announced wi thout prior
warning to Tokyo that he would
travel to Peking, the Japanese have
been in a quandary. They are not
sure where they stand. Up until
then, their whole foreign policy was
based on the fact that the United
States took care of foreign atfairs,
and they completely trusted and fol–
lowed the American lead. They had
almost no foreign policy of their
own, certainly none that was in any
contrast to the policy of the United
States.
They relied on the American mi li–
tary umbrella and concentrated, as
the world knows only too well , on
economic development and trade
and economic expansion. But the
statement of the President on the
evening of July
15, 1971
changed all
of this.
It
had been agreed earlier that
neither of the two countries would
do anything with regard to China
without previously informing or
consulting the other. And this was
not done. So the Japanese Prime
Minister lost face, and
if
the Prime
Minister loses face, the nation loses
fa ce.
Q .
Wha t are the altematives for
Japan?
A.
The Japanese live where the dy–
namic influences of the three world
powers - the Soviet Union, China
and the United States - meet. The–
oretically, of course, after having
been close to the United States for a
long time, they could now move
closer to the Soviet Union or China.
The Soviet Union is trying very
hard to win over Japan. They have
offered the oil of Siberia and the gas
of the Soviet Far East if the Japa–
nese will furnish the pipes. The Rus–
sians would thus supply the oil and
gas which the Japanese can pick up
nearby on the Pacific coast of the
Soviet Union. The Japanese are in
16
great need of oil and have to get it
mainly from the Middle East. That
is from very far way.
Jt
would be a considerable advan–
tage for them to obtain their energy
needs from nearby Siberia.
But if they do it, then these pipes
would run through territories which
the Chinese say the Russians stole
from them, so that would be consid–
ered an unfriendly act by the Chi–
nese. It is difficult for Japan to move
close to the Soviet Union without
thereby endaogering its relationship
with China.
Q.
Wbat about closer ties, tben,
with China, rather than tbe Soviet
Union?
A.
1 think that is, at the moment,
the general trend in Japan. There is
a tendency to think very much aod
very highly of China now. Also,
there is the feeling that Japao had
mistreated China during the Second
World War and that one has to
make up for this, as well as the io–
debtedness of Japan to the great
heritage that Japan has received
from China. So
1
think the Japanese
interest
in
China is probably at its
post-war peak at the moment.
Q .
Tbe Japanese still do not enjoy
very good public relatioos with many
of their trading partners in Soutb–
east Asia because of what bappeoed
in tbe Secood World War. What are
tbey doiog to overcome this?
A.
lt's more difficult for them to
overcome this than 1 had expected,
and it may well be that they can't
overcome
it
very well. The Japanese
have created a great deal of appre–
hension in these countries that they
might want to achieve by economic
means what they failed to accom–
plish during the war by military
means. The tremendous economic
advantages that Japan opens to
these countries are not as readily
appreciated by them as 1 had ex–
pected.
The enormous numbers of Japa–
nese businessmen with portfolios all
over Southeast Asia make people
think of a Japanese economic in-
vasion. 1 find the negative reaction
in these countries overdone, but
that's the way it is.
Q .
The United States has, for a
number of years now, been slowly
encouraging tbe conveotional mili–
tary buildup of Japan aod its so–
called "self-defense" forces. There
has not been too much negative re–
action within the U. S. to such a pro–
gram, but some Japanese have
sbown apprehens ion.
A.
1
carne back from Japan with the
impression that there would not be
a great Japanese military bui ldup,
nothing that will bring the Japanese
in the foreseeable future into the big
league. What will happen someday,
1
don ' t know. But as of now, they
are thinking of only defending their
islands and even that only against
conventional attack oo a limited
scale.
I
do not beJjeve they intend to
build up a defense force that would
even prevent, for example, the Rus–
sians from attacking Japan. They
are thinking in terms of making it
tough for the invader after he gets
in, that is, by guerrilla warfare. But
1
am satisfied that they neither think
of an a tomic buildup nor of a big
navy. For example, sorne of the
people who are concerned in the
military planning in Tokyo were
asked in my presence what they
would do if something happened in
the Indian Ocean or sorne power
hostile to them cut their oil supply
ünes. Would they fight? The answer
was "no." They would tell al! their
ships to go into the nearest ports
and stay, or they would use Liberian
flag vessels.
We are living in an era where
people are more inclined to think in
terms of détente than
in
terms of
fighting. We are witnessing détentes
between the U.S.A. and China, be–
tween the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.,
between Germany and the U.S.S.R,
as well as Eastern Europe, and the
Japanese are quite pleased that they
bave their détente with China. 1
hope all this will last.
D
PLAIN TRUTH November 1973