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both of these two top men are gone,
1 am unable to see clearly what will
happen.
1 assume that when they pass
from the scene, sorne kind of coUec–
tive leadership would take over. 1
would also assume that that collec–
tive leadership
will
for sorne time
carry the flag of Mao. But the ques–
tion is: How long will tha t be the
case? Will other forces which have
been pushed back by Mao in the
last years assert themselves? Will
they say, "Why should we continue
to have bad relations with the coun–
try with which we have the longest
border in the world - the Soviet
Union? Wouldn't it be better to im–
prove our relations?"
Q.
Are the Soviets anxious for a
détente with China?
A.
The Russians are very anxious to
improve relations with the Chinese
if only they would accept Moscow's
Jeadership in the communist world.
But the Chinese, I'm sure, will never
return to the subservient position of
the "little brother" vis-a-vis the "big
brother," as it had been up to about
1957. That makes the reconciliation
difficult.
There will continue to be two
power centers
in
tbe communist
world with divergent views on many
issues. Maybe not quite as divergent
as now, but the retum to one center
of the communist world - this I
cannot envision.
It
will be a two–
center communist world, with addi–
tional centers perhaps developing
gradually elsewhere.
Q .
Would you say that China today
ought to be classified and looked
upon by the Westero world as a su–
perpower, or is she really in many
respects still an underdeveloped na–
tion?
A.
The Chinese classify the United
States and the Soviet Union as su–
perpowers, and always say that it
[China] is nota superpower. In their
vocabulary, the term "superpower"
is bad. lt means sometbing like a
highway robber who exploits otber
PLAIN TRUTH November 1973
people. That is, they don't consider
themselves to be in that category. It
reaJly is a semantic question, a ques–
tion of words.
lf we use the word "superpower"
without any negative or positive
qualifications to it, then 1 would
rank China in this group. In talking
with them, 1 wouldn't use the word
"superpower" because of the con–
notations that it has for them. But if
you use another term, they would
say, "Yes, indeed we are 750 or 800
miJlion people, and our country is
united as never befare, and our
ideological inftuence in the world is
a fact," and so on. They do not deny
tbat, as far as power is concerned,
they are in a class with the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Q.
Why did the Chioese open their
doors to President Nixoo?
A.
My answer is very simple. It is
the fear of the Soviet Union. That is
something that 1 confronted very
often while 1 was in China two years
ago. Tbey wou ld speak of one mil–
lion Soviet soldiers with all the most
modero equipment of destruction
along their border encircling them.
They would speak of the Soviet
buildup of relations with other
countries all around the periphery
of China.
The fear of the Soviet Union grew
particularly after the invasion of
Czecboslovakia by the U.S.S.R. The
Chinese said that on the same basis,
they (the U.S.S.R.] could invade us,
if they take upon themselves the
right to invade a country that has a
different type of communism.
Maoism is much more different
from Moscow communism than
Dubcek's "commun ism with a
human face," as he caJled it, ever
was. So the fear of sorne Soviet mili–
tary action, whether an invasion, or
whether destruction by air strikes on
Chinese industry, was and is very
strong.
To break out of this encirclement,
the only sensible thing was to go to
the other superpower (the U.S.A.].
That was the purpose of the rap-
prochement between Peking and
Washington.
Q .
Do you think tbis rapprochemeot
betweeo t he Uoi ted Stat es aod
China willlead toward a real thaw in
their mutual relationship, or is it
merely superficial?
A.
It is being taken seriously by
both sides. By the Chinese, because
this neutralizes to a certain extent
the Soviet threat which they fea r.
And on the part of the United
States, because it gives Washington
more and better possibil ities in
world affairs if it has good relations
with China.
1 don't think that this will make
America Maoist, nor do 1 think that
it will make China capitalist. There
are no indications of such devel–
opments in eithe r of the two
countries. So there will be two fun–
damentally different systems, differ–
ent ideologies, different values. But
there would probably be more than
just coexistence (which only means
that they don't sboot at each other).
It might be a political play in which
Washington and Peking consider
each other's interests in order to off–
set the Russians.
Q .
But oot a significant ecooomic
ioterplay?
A.
I don't expect much economi–
cally. I know tha t many Americans
think in terms of ... 750 mi Ilion
Chinese customers. But Mao is not
thinking in terms of developing the
economy as priority number one.
Priority number one for hirn is the
"new roan'' as Mao wants hirn to
emerge, and for this 1 don't believe
he feels that super-industrialization
along Soviet lines is necessary or
desirable.
Perhaps trade will pick up, but
the wbole foreign trade cake of
China is small, and more nations
want to participate in it as more of
them establish relations with China.
So even if the cake grows, 1 stiU
don't see any spectacular growth
for U.S.-Chinese economic relations.
Q .
Dr. Mebnert, you receotly re-
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