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ropeans have done and in many
cases what you've urged us to do.' '
But there's probably more than a
quantitative difference
in
the vary–
ing approaches of the Americans
and the Europeans to East-West dé–
tente. There's a qualitative dilfer–
ence as well, in that the American
superpower is developing very close
and continuing ties with the Soviet
superpower in a whole range of
relationships: defense, politics and
economics. It's bound to make the
Western Europeans nervous. "Do
we know everything that's going
on?" they seem to be asking. "Have
we been consulted, or are we merely
being informed? Are we being told
only about the top of the iceberg?"
They sense - and they certainly say
this in the European press - that
President Nixon seems to find a dia–
logue witb the Kremlin easier, more
productive and more interesting
than relations with Western Euro–
peans. Then there was the unfortu–
nate idea floated first by Kissinger
and then by Nixon: the pentagonal
balance-of-power system.
Q.
You mean tbe view that tbe
U. S., tbe Soviet Union, Japan,
China and Westem Europe repre–
sent the "Big Five" more-or-less–
equal power centers?
SCHAETZEL:
Yes, and this vision of
PlAIN TRUTH October 1973
the world order really worries most
responsible, thougbtful Europeans. I
was asked about it again and again
on my most recent trip. Jt suggests
to them a system resting on inter–
national amorality - as De Gaulle
said, countries have interests, not
friends. What Europeans extract
from all this is that the U. S. is mov–
ing in the direction of a kind of
balance-of-power system in wbich it
looks at Western Europe, tbe Soviet
Union, Japan and China all as
being equal components of sorne
kind ofvast international game. Eu–
ropeans would argue that if this is
really the direction of American
policy, then
it
represents a most fun–
damental change and ignores what
they had thought was crucial. That
is, that there is something distinct in
the Western culture; that we have
been involved in an Atlantic rela–
tionship not for purely security or
economic reasons , but because there
was a shared cultural tradition
which goes back to the Greeks -
that in democratic society, govern–
ments exist to protect certain indi–
vidual rights and cultural values.
In
short, Europeans have thought the
link between Western Europe and
America is a common interest
in
Western civilization. Worried Euro–
peans extract from this balance-of-
power idea the notion that the
U.
S.
appears to be rejecting this funda–
mental viewpoint. These are sorne of the
tbings which make them uneasy and
ftow from tbe mysterious relation–
ship, as they see it, which seems to be
evolving between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
Q.
You are presently engaged in
writing a book based largely on your
years of service as U. S. Ambassador
to tbe European Community. Wbat
will
be tbe tbeme?
SCHAETZEL:
The objective of the
book is to suggest what American
policy should be, let's say over the
next ten years, toward a changing
Europe, particularly the European
Community. The major plea is that
Americans must rekindle their inter–
est in Western Europe and its search
for unity because it is very much
in
the most profound American interest.
This doesn't mean that we should
design the new Europe or we should
take a number of overt actions.
1 asked one European after an–
other, "What would you like the
United States to do
if
you had it
within your authority to dictate to
us?" The message from every one of
them was: "We would like to have
again your interest in this process
which we don' t think we now have."
That really is my central theme.
o
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