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poücy." This is because of its histo–
rie ties to the East and - going back
to the Bismarckian period - the no–
tion of Germany as a bridge be–
tween the East and the West.
The French approach encourages
these forces in Germany which could
be incredíbly dangerous, not only for
Western Europe itself but for Euro–
pean and world security. There had
been a hope that after the recent
French elections, Pompídou would
have felt tha t he did not need tocater
to the ultra-nationalistic Gaullists
any longer. This has not turned out to
be the case. The present sítuation
between France and her partners is
as bad as it was five or six years ago,
during the low point at the end ofthe
Gaullist regime.
Germany' s Dilemma
Q .
You mentioned " incredibly dan–
gerous" forces that could become a
serious problem in West Germany.
Could you clarify what you mean?
SCHAETZEL:
First, there are certain
elements within the SPD [the Social
Democrats, the party of Chancellor
Willy Brandt] who were never en–
thusiastic about Western European
union. They believe that Germany
should devote itself to arrangements
with Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, that this policy would make
more sense in terms of Germany's
national interests.
There is another force which sug–
gests a dangerous forro of German
nationalism. lt comes from people
who are poüticaUy right of center.
They believe Germany shouldn't
get itself tied to poor countries like
Great Britain, or traditionally mis–
managed countries like Italy or
im–
possible countries like France. "We
will be a national Germany looking
after our own interests on the inter–
national stage, making arrange–
ments with whatever country or
group of countries as are in the im-
10
mediate self-interest of Germany"
- this is their concept. These are all
disintegrating conceptions, and they
could wea ken Germany's com–
mitment to the Westem Alliance
and cause it to turn away from the
European Community.
Where Does Jopan Fit In?
Q.
It
was interesting to note that in
Dr. Kissinger's address to the editors
of the Associated Press on April 23,
in which he caUed for a new Atlantic
charter, be mentioned that accom–
modations have to
be
made for Ja–
pan; tbat Japan, thougb not an
Atlantic power, is nevertheless a very
powerful , dynamic force in tbe world
today. How do the Japanese com–
plicate tbe matter we've been dis–
cussing?
SCHAETZEL:
They've introduced an
element which none of us antici–
pated ten years ago, and that is the
vitality of their economic system,
their capacity to compete - and not
primarily by any discriminatory or
unfair measures. We dangerously
fool ourselves if we think the Japa–
nese miracle has been arrived at un–
derhandedly.
T
would argue that it
stems from the remarkable cultural
and social pattern of the Japanese.
An
American-Japanese scholar said
that, in a sense, these may be almost
the only people who are completely
at borne in an advanced industrial
society. In other words, they are
people whose mores allow them to
live in congested areas and in a
highly complicated industrial so–
ciety. Their social system allows
them to live happily in this environ–
ment, which is not true of people as
deeply rooted in the freedom of the
individual as is the case of our own
and European societies.
But to get back to the first part of
your comment, there
is
no question
now among the most thoughtful
people that any stable world order is
going to have to be based on a new
relationship among Japan, the Eu–
ropean Community and the United
States.
lt
needs to be emphasized
that to accomplish this will involve
very hard work. The Europeans,
who have a lesser fund of knowl–
edge a bout Japan than do the
Americans, have an even longer
road to travel than the U. S. Yet the
disturbing thing is that in Kiss–
inger's speech, the one you men–
tioned, the Japanese reference was a
kind of after-thought. He talked
about many things and then said, in
effect, "Oh yes, we must involve the
Japanese too." I feel that either Ja–
pan should not have been dealt with
at all in this speech, or else it ought
to have been done in a much more
thoughtful and subtle manner. All it
did was íncrease the alarms among
the Europeans. And even the Japa–
nese didn' t like it. In short, the "refer–
ence to Japan seemed remarkably
inept and ill-conceived.
Europeans Fear Washington–
Moscow Collusion
Q.
Moving into this complex rela–
tionsbip is the Soviet Union. The
U. S. is developing a better relation–
ship witb the Soviets, and the Ger–
mans bave been doing the same for
their own reasons. Wbat impact does
this bave on tbe Western Alliance?
SCHAETZEL:
lt introduces diffi–
culties. The United States has had a
very close and special relationship
with Western Europe both during
the war and in the post-war period.
The Europeans began tbe process of
attempting to work out arrange–
ments with the Soviet Union to ease
East-West tensions. We in the
United States stood back from this,
and in many cases, took a very hard
line. So it's quite easy for Americans
to say now, "Well look, wbat's so
odd about what we're doing? We' re
only belatedly doing wbat you Eu-
PLAIN TRUTH October 1973