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The Canal could be taken over as
easily as have previously American–
owned industries in Chile and Peru.
And what
if
American military
personnel are no longer present be–
cause of future treaty limitations?
What would prevent a mob, sup–
ported by Panama 's National
Guard, from marching into the
Zone to accomplish what Jorge
Illueca calls " the final liberation of
Panamanian territory"?
None other than Panama's Gen–
eral T orr ijos himself ha s pro–
claimed: "Without a satisfactory
accord, Panama's National Guard
will have two altematives: either to
crush the patriotic rebellion of the
people orto lead it." And Panama's
st rongman gave the answer in the
next breath : " l am not going to
crush it."
Greatest Danger
It is with this background that the
most recent and generally unre–
ported developments on the lsthmus
assume great significance.
The first is a budding relationship
between Panama's revolutíonary
government and that of communist
Cuba.
The two regimes share one com–
mon major concern. The Canal
Zone to Torrijos is what the bíg
U. S. naval base at Guantanamo is
to Cuba's Fidel Castro. But the sim–
ilarities between the two revolution–
ary regimes go deeper than the mere
presence of U. S. enclaves.
Panama City, in a display similar
to Havana, has blossomed with por–
traits ofTorrijos, together with ban–
ners spelling out his revolutionary
declarations. General T orrijos '
handpicked assembly has officially
proclaimed him the nation's "Líder
Máximo" (Supreme Leader), a title
long ago assumed by Castro.
Moreover, technícal and cultural
missions have traveled regularly be–
tween Cuba and Panama, despite ·
the absence of formal diplomatic
recognition.
PLAIN TRUTH Moy 1973
And in November
1971,
at the
close of Soviet Premier Aleksei Ko–
sygin's official call on Castro, a joint
Soviet-Cuban sta tement referred to
the Panamanian revolution m un–
commonly warm tones.
Suitcases of Propaganda
It is no secret that Communist in–
fluence
is
strong and is getting
stronger within Panama, although
the nation's revolutionary govern–
ment is primarily a home-grown na–
tionalistic product.
The Communist infiuence is par–
ticularly formidable among the na–
tion's high school and university
students.
This point was well impressed
upon my memory during a tl ight 1
made ' to Panama in August
1968,
shortly before the military coup. En
route to Panama from Los Angeles,
our plane made a scheduled stop in
Guatemala . Transferring to the
plane at this point were a group of
17
Panamanian teen-agers. Once
aloft, I asked the gentleman seated
next to me - a wealthy Panamanian
cattle breeder - if he had any idea
from where the young people were
returning borne.
After overhearing severa! of their
conversations, he said they were
all honor-roll high school up–
perclassmen returning from an in–
ternational Communist youth
conference held in Sofia, Bulgaria.
My curiosity was aroused. After
the plane landed at Panama's Tocu–
men Airport,
l
purposely lingered at
the customs counter. Student after
student opened bulging suitcases
filled to capacity with Communíst
books, pamphlets and phonograph
albums, all in Spanish.
A major thrust of the "World
Youth Conference," 1 later learned,
was to spread the ideals of Marxist–
Leninism among the present gener–
ation of Latín Americans.
Soviet " Chokepoints"
What if the nationalistic revolu–
tion in Panama gets out of hand and
the " revolutionary republic" slips
into the hands of outright Commu–
nist control, as in Cuba - sub–
ject to much closer Soviet direc–
tion?
Most Americans do not real ize
that it has long been the aim of So–
viet military strategists to wrest
from, or pick up by default , the
strategic "sea gates" of world com–
merce from Great Britain and the
United States.
The increased might of the Soviet
navy in the ludian Ocean is in direct
response to Great Britain's virtual
abandonment of the line of empire
from Gibraltar, through the Medi–
terranean, Suez, the Red Sea, past
Aden and on to Singapore. Ships
flying the "hammer and sickle" are
moving into the vacuum.
The Soviets are making steady
in–
roads in Latín America as well. Says
an American military attaché sta–
tioned in a primary Latín American
country: "It doesn't take too mucb
sophistication to see how things are
going. The Russians now have sub–
marines in Cuba, and they' re roam–
ing the Caribbean around the
Canal. The port at Cienfuegos
[Cuba], if it is not already a sub–
marine port, could easily become
one.
"Then you look at the Strai ts of
Magellan, which would be the only
way around South America if the
Canal were closed. The Russians are
helping Chile's Marxist government
build a port in the south of Chile
that could be transformed into a
submarine base within 24
hours...."
There is one very interesting as–
pect of Soviet foreign policy. Its
planners do not refer to these nar–
row passageways of commerce as
"sea gates" or "seaways" which
open up trade to the world. In So–
viet terminology, such passages are
"chokepoints" to be wrested from
the Western powers and denied to
their continued use.
Time is short and is running out
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