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Panama had a righl, according lo
lhe reasoning, lo reap the maximum
possi ble financia! benefit from lhis
"resource."
U. S. officials have often stressed
lhat, as a matter of policy, they re–
gard lhe Canal as ao inlernational
public utility. As a weallhy coun'try,
lhe United States has not needed to
maximize profits from the Canal -
although by federal law the Canal
must not operare al a loss.
Panama's fundamental outlook
regarding the Canal, however. is en–
tirely opposite. Panama protests
that by keeping tolls low, the United
States has been subsidizing its own
and world commerce.
According lo one Panamanian
source: "Panama doesn't want to be
the subsidizing agent for the world's
merchant fteet. If the United States
wants to be the great white father,
fine, but Panama cannot afford to
be."
Jorge lllueca, inHuential foreign
policy advisor to the Panamanian
govemment, made his nation's cur–
ren! thinking perfectly clear in a
speech at Panama University last
December. He told an aroused stu–
dent body that it must eventually be
Panama's decision on "how the Ca–
nal will be run, how lhe fees will be
changed, how the benefits will be
distributed."
"This means," demanded Illueca,
"a Panamanian canal ... operaled
by Panamanians, for Panamanians,
Jor rhe benefit of Panamanians."
Wi ll a Compromise Work?
lt is almost certain that when the
dust over the current canal crisis set–
tles, sorne form of compromise
highly favorable to Panama will be
recommended by American officials
anxious to cool inflamed Pan–
amanian passions.
In any new treaty proposal, four
faclors would most certainly be in–
cluded:
(1)
The recognition of Panama's
24
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THE TOKYO BAY,
shown here and on page 21 at left, the largest ship ever to tran·
sit the Panama Canal. The giant container·carrier had only two feet to spare on
each side within the 11O·foot-wide chambers.
Panama
Canal
Campany
sovereignty over both the area of
the Zone and the Canal.
(2) The release of all land within
lhe present
1
0-mile-wide Zone not
used directly for the operation of
the Canal to Panama, with present
U. S. governmental, judicial, and
commercial interests in the Zone
phased out over a specified period.
(3) Transferring ownershíp and
operation of the Canal itself to a
dual Panama-United States admin–
istration for a specified number of
years, after which the Canal would
become Panama's entirely.
(4) A reduction of the formidable
U. S. military presence in the Zone
with its functions and mobility
limited.. Remaining U. S. forces
would likely be stationed under a
"status of forces" treaty with Pan–
ama, subject to Panama's good will.
Would such an arrangemenl
work? Would such a one-sided
"compromise" salisfy the most radi–
cal of Panamanian demands?
The most knowledgeable canal
experts in the United States realize
the answer can only be "No" to
both questions. They stress that con–
tinued U. S. operation and defense
of the Canal would be impossible
should the United States relinquish
sovereign control over the Zone it–
self, with its 5 miles of defensive
buffer on either side of the water–
way. The January
1964
riots demon-
strated the value of the "fall-back"
area of tJ1e Zone. While chaos was
erupting during lhe three days of ri–
oting, ships continued to transit the
Canal behind the lines of tire as if
nothing were happeníng.
" In my judgment," says U. S.
Senator Strom Thurmond, "it is a
semantíc trick to maintain that the
U. S. can keep control of the Canal
and the capability to defend it if
ever we give up our sovereign
rights. .. .
"It
is for this reason," he warns,
"that the sovereignty of the Canal
Zone is the key issue which must
never be compromised."
U. S. Congressman Daniel Flood
raised the same issue in the House
of Representatives in
1967
when he
asked : "If we cannot control the
Panama Canal and Canal Zone
over which we hold sovereignty in
perpetuity under treaty grant ...
how can we hold any canal over
which we do not have such author–
ity and ownership?
And what is to
prevent our country from being
driven altogetherJrom the isthmus?"
" Fina l Liberation"
The fact must be faced squarely
that once complete sovereignty in
the Zone area belongs to Panama,
expropriation or nationalization of
the waterway itself would only be a
matter of time - treaty or no trealy!
PLAIN TRUTH Moy 1973