can serve a useful purpose, at least in
the role of an "intermediary," if not
as an outright mediator.
Look at it this way: China and
Russia are not on speaking terms. Pe–
kiog refuses to deal with the present
Japanese government. Japan and thc
Soviet Union havc yet to sign a peace
treaty tcrmioating World War IT.
Yet since the 01ina trip, aii thrce
Asían powers can deal, in reasonably
cordial terms, with the United States.
Furthermore, there is definite reason
to believe that neither the USSR nor
China wishes to see thc United States
pul! out completely from the Western
Pacific.
The reason? U. S. prcsence in Japan
virtually guarantces, under terms of
the
U.
S.-Japanese Security Trcaty,
that Tokyo will never feel the need to
develop its own nuclear force.
Moscow has been silent of late on
its once-stridcnt demands for scrap–
ping that Security Treaty.
Pcking is in much more of a di–
lemma over this issuc. U. S. presence in
Japan also entails continued American
support for client states South Korca
and Taiwan - an anathema situation
to Peking.
But the Chinese leadership on the
mainland may come to sce that keep–
ing the nuclear lid on Tokyo may be
worth suffering even the indeíinite
separation of Taiwan. And friendship
with the United States is certainly
worth its weight in gold as Peking's
counterbalance to the Soviet Union.
Critics Speak Out
Opponents of the Nixon
1
Kissinger
Ir/
eltamrhammg
(
world outlook) have
been quick to declare that the simple
conditions for the 19th century, largely
European balance-of-power equation,
cannot be applied to the highly com–
plex
uJoddu•ide
situation today.
Harvard professor of government,
Stanley Hoffman, points out: "Today's
nations act not merely on the classical
stage- of diplomacy and strategy -
for which the balance of power was
devised but on other stages - eco–
nomic, monetary, technological. ..."
4
"To apply traditional rules toso dif–
ferent a game is a mistake," asserts
Hoffman, "because we too will be the
losers if our partners, shockcd by our
behavior, retaliate in kind both on the
new and on the old stage."
Europe a Key Factor
It is precisely in the field of econom–
ic and monetarr matters that thc new
balance could collapse.
It
is also the
field in which "balancee" America is
" What we see a s we look
ahead, 5, 10, and per–
haps 15 years, we see
five great economic
superpowers: The United
States, Western Europe,
the Soviet Union, Main–
land China, and, of
course, Japan
...
these
are the five that will
determine the economic
future, and because eco–
nomic power will be the
key to other kinds of
power, the future of the
world .
.. ."
From o speech
by
Ptesíd en l Ríchotd
M.
Nixon,
d elive re d in Konso s Cily,
Missouri,
Jul y
6, 1971.
weakest. In fact, the baltered dollar
could be Amer ica's "Achilles' heel."
Western Europe - the oftcn over–
looked fifth partner in the new cgua–
tion- is extremely disturbed over the
dismal performance of the U. S.
economy.
As of August 15, 1971, the dollar is
no longer convertible. This has left
52,000,000,000
non·redeemable green–
backs- that's
52
billion dollars
in the hands of the Western European
nations and Japan.
What is worse is that heavy Ameri–
can balance-of-payments deficits are
expected for at least two more years.
This will rcsult in additional billions
of unwanted dollars piling up in
foreign coffers.
Already, some newspapers in France
are making the shocking suggestions
that the Europeans and the Japanese
use their unwanted billions to "buy
up" U. S. business subsidiaries in their
countries. In short this v:ould mean
expropriation of American assets.
Of course, such a course would only
lcad to retaliation agaiost foreign–
owned propert}' in the United States.
Trade war wouJd be an ugly reality.
"Peace, Peace ..."
Despite the frailty of the emerging
new world order, some analysts are
pred icting that it offers more hope for
world peace than any other solution
that has bcen offered at any time in
recent world history.
As such they may be only echoing
the Biblical prediction that some would
proclaim, in our danger-filled end
time, a message of " ... Peace, peace;
when there is no peace" (Jeremiah
6: 14).
The realitr of the situation is that
history pro,·es that all balance-ot–
po,ver relationships ultimately break
clown. Wars inevitablr result.
A balance-of·power arrangement is
called upon to achieve an end it can–
not reach - intemational stability -
the ironícal reasoo being that a
balance-of-power equation is in itself
inherently unstable and dynamic. The
most it can achieve is a temporary
prolongation of "peace" - or more
correctly, "non-war."
In a world of five actual or potential
nuclear powers, the way to permanent
peace must be sought in a different
world - a world of God's making
and not man's. •
I<IGHT:
Soriety in China is strictly
reg11lated acrordi11g lo the philo.wph)
of Comm1111ÍJI Par!)' Chairmau Mao
1"1e-ttmg.
/11
classroom srene al t·ight.
banner rmdemeath pirt11re of Mao
read1, "/1111 a1 a 1hip 011 the .rea
depend1
011
the heimsman. the t'ez•olll·
tion depend1 011 the th01tght1 of Mao
T.re·fllllf!,." Photograph1 on the s/lrceed–
ing page1 ret 'et11 life in China toda)'.
The raptiom are artflal fJIIOiations
f
rom u
ritings and 1peeches of Mt10
Tse·ltmg. as given in the o!Jirial Eng–
lish tran.rlation of
1
he famOIIS "lillle
red book.,
Ri9hr,
Anne
Keorley- Block Srar