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earned economic gains. But no
champion has risen above local politics
to achieve it.
But the view of the wodd from
Washington cncompasses more than
the emergence of the three new com–
petitors. Mr. Nixon and his advisors
are confronted with two additional fac–
tors of extreme importance.
Soviet Threat Unaba ted
First is the continued growth of
Soviet militacy power. In his major
foreign policy speech in february, Mr.
Nixon declared that "in virtually every
category of strategic offensive and
defensive weapons the Soviet Union
has continued to improve its capabil–
ity." Moscow's unabated arms build–
up, the President continued, raises
·~serious
questions concerning Soviet
objectives."
The President well understands the
ultimate Soviet objective - a final
knockout blow against the West.
Compounding the factor of the con–
tinued Soviet threat is the prevailing
mood in America today. Sickencd by
the Vietnam experience, public senti–
ment clearly is behincJ. a diminished
U. S. role in world affairs.
Exact!y how to accomplish this de–
sired retrenchment
tuitho111 eroding
American in{l11ence and prestige lo
the
dt~~rger
leve/
has become the pri–
macy aim of U.
S.
foreign policy.
"Classic' ' Balance of Power
Many historians have noted a
marked parallel between today's five–
sided world and conditions preva–
lent in Europe during the 19th cen–
tury, when the five powers of Britain,
France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia
vied for power and influence.
Five major powecs, it so happens,
comprise the ideal number of con–
testants for the "classic" balance-of–
power re!ationship according to poli–
tical scientists. With only two players,
one tends to domínate the other and
thereforc win unless a precarious stale–
mate can be managed. This type of ar–
rangement aptly describes the very
PLAIN TRUTH Moy 1972
nature of thc Russo-American Cold
War - a "man-to-rnan" standoff, stale–
mated by a nuclear "balance·of-terror"
arms race.
Much more inherently unstable is
a balance-of-power situation involving
three players where the ultimate result
is victory for thc side whcre two
powers find mutual interests against
the third party. A four-player situation
can easily become a stalemated two·
against-two and therefore very much
like one against one, or it can become
an unstoppable three against one.
Thc real difference comes with five
players of roughly cqual capabi lities.
In this arrangement one power can
play the role of "the balancee'' by
throwing its diplomatic weight and
influence to whatever side may appear
to be weakening at the moment, thus
maintaining the balance. In Europe,
Britain has traditionally played this
role, earning her the dubious title of
"Perfidious Albion."
All of this explanation may sound
somewhat unrealistic, even childish, to
the average person not schooled in
intcrnational relations.
Y
et the concept
of balance of powcr, in whatever form
it takes in any given situation, is as
real as life itself and as old as history.
U.
S.
the New "Balancer"?
There is ample evidence to suggest
that Mr. Nixon is attempting to re–
create a classic balance-of-power situa–
tion in which the United States, hope–
fully, can occupy the role of the
balancee.
This is not to say that the U. S. is
actively encouraging the development
of additional superpowers. Tt is quite
clear that Washington does not want
to see either a nuclear Japan or a
united Western Europe in possession
of its own integrated nuclear force.
Reality, however, dictates that Europe,
Japan and also China, regardless of
how their separate developments take
them, are looming power centers that
must be dealt with on more or less
equal planes with the Soviet Union.
Architect of the New Balance
Chief architect of the new Nixon
game-plan is said to be top Presiden–
tia! advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger. The
former Harvard professor is well
known in academic circles for his eru–
dite books on intcrnational affairs,
among them
A World Restored,
a re–
fined version of his doctoral thesis at
Harvard.
The book essentially deals with Aus·
tria's Pri nce Mettern ich and Britain's
Lord Castlereagh and their efforts at
the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to re–
balance the European continent after
its disruption by France's Napoleon.
They attempted to construct a balanced
international system whereby no single
power would become strong enough to
dictate its will to the others. Their
concept succeeded, more or less, for
almost a century until 1914, when war
suddenly engulfed all Europe.
From Dr. Kissinger's treatise, it is
clear that the role of the "balancee"
involved essentially an unsentimental
approach. Little regard can afford to be
paid to previous alliances, haloed ideo–
logical stands or past attitudes toward
powers on either side of the scale.
Despite the outcries from conser–
vatives that he has "sold out to the
Communists," Mr. Nixon believed il
is in the interest of both the nation
and the overall cause of world peace
to open dialogue with Peking. "Com–
munist" China is now recognized in
Washington for what it is officially –
"The People's Republic of China."
This is all part of what has been
described as the "decline of ideology
and the rise of pragmatism" in U. S.
foreign affairs.
Will
it
Work?
Can Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger
"pull it off" - to use the vernacular?
A lot, of course, depends upon the
attitudes of the other four powers in
the equation. After all, none of them
is asking the United States to assume
the role of holder-of-the-balance.
But thcre are indications that in
sorne circumstances, the United States
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