Basic HTML Version
February 1972
aggression, but of
political steps to
exciude the ver)' emergence of such a
th1'eat."
(V. Matveyev, "Lessons of His–
tory and European Security,"
lnter–
national Affairs,
Moscow, June 1970.
Italics in the original.)
The 1939 nonaggression pact be–
tween Nazi Germany and the USSR
merely bought precious time for the
Soviets to prepare for the eventual
attack from the west. Twenty million
Soviet citizens eventually lost their lives
in the war that the 1939 "nonaggres–
sion" treaty could not prevent.
Such a situation, in Soviet eyes, must
never be allowed to develop again.
Russ Goals
Main Russian objectives of a security
conference, more accurately called by
the Soviets the "All-European Confer–
ence on Security and Cooperation,"
would be to cement forever Soviet con–
trol over Eastern Europe, and at the
same time allow Moscow to expand its
influence in the Western half of the
continent, in order to better "supervise"
political developments there.
Broadly speaking, the conference,
according to arms expert John New–
house, "would create a framework in
which the Soviet Union would be the
dominant influence in settling European
problems."
Sweetening this otherwise unpala–
table situation for the West European
states would be the promise of vastly
increased trade opportunities with the
Communist world.
With peace on the continent assured,
and the "myth of Soviet expansionism"
removed, there would be no further
need for American military forces to
remain on European soil.
At least that would be the Soviet
argument.
As mentioned above, one speciiic
Russian goal at the security conference
- once it is convened - would be to
establish once and for all its complete
supremacy over the entire socialist bloc
in Easteru Europe. This, of course,
would include the Soviet puppet gov–
ernment in East Germany. Western
powers must "give up the hope of
splitting the socialist bloc and restor–
ing capitalism." The boundaries of the
various nations in Europe as a result of
The
PLAIN TRUTH
5
What Soviets Want
in Europe
Overall Soviet goals in Europe, as
seen by Western "Kremlin watchers"
are:
1)
Cementing forever Moscow's
control over its East European
empire, including East Germany,
through final recognition of post–
World War II borders. To this end,
ratification of "nonaggression" pacts
between West Germany and both the
USSR and Poland are paramount.
2)
Gaining enough influence in
Western Europe in order to at least
be able to "supervise" events there
and become dominant infiuence over
the whole continent. "Undesirable
trends" must be nipped in the bud,
such as a too-powerful United Europe
- especially with nuclear-power
Britain on the verge of entry. As
moch as possible, West 'Germany -
free Europe's most powerful nation
- must be "extracted" from its
Western partners and "neutralized."
A trouble-free Europe on its
Westetn fiank will enable Moscow to
deal freely with rising "China prob–
lem" on the East, and compete from
strength in ultimate contest with
U. S. for world preeminency.
Method to achieve these goals
is a "European Security Conference"
likely to be held in late 1972 or early
1973 if the Soviets get their way. In
the conference - or a series of con–
ferences - the Soviet Union will
likely propose:
1)
The abolition of the Common
the Second World War must be consid–
ered "absolutely inviolable."
Neutralize Bonn
In the West, Moscow hopes to put
the brakes on further economic and
political unification of the European
Community, or Common Market. The
Soviets are loathe to deal with the Com–
mon Market as a unified bloc. Hence
Mr. Brezhnev's bilateral talks with West
Germany's Willy Brandt in September,
1971, and France's Georges Pompidou
the following month.
West Germany, above all, is the focal
point of Kremlin strategy in the West.
Free Europe's heftiest nation must be
Market and its East European count·
erpart, COMECON, or Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance.
In their places, the USSR will pro–
pose a "Pan-Europe" scheme of
massive cross-tie of East-West coop–
eration in trade and technological
development. This would aid slug–
gish Eastern economies, calm their
restless populations hungering for
more necessities and luxuries. Also
would hold out carrot-stick of vastly
increased trade to West European
industries, struggling with economic
slowdown and fiscal policy differ–
ences with the United States.
The USSR will attempt to prove
it is a "good European" - more
interested in European development
than "monopolistic capitalistic Amer–
ica" accused of being interested only
in taking over West European in–
dustry.
2)
The ''dismantling" of the two
military blocs - NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. (The latter would not
be dismantled at all in substance,
because contradictory Kremlin goal
calls for complete dominance of East
Europe in all aspects.) Soviets might
consider Red Army troop with–
drawals back home as long as U. S.
troops are shifted back across the
Atlantic - assuredly taking nuclear
weapons with them, not leaving
them behind in West German hands.
"Yankee go home" is still a major
objective.
"neutralized" and "isolated" from its
Western partners.
The Communists in Moscow are much
more inclined to deal with Herr Brandt's
Socialists - a party with original Marx–
ist roots - than they are with the op–
position Christian Democrats who ruled
Bonn from 1949 until the Socialist
victory in 1969.
Instead of a "Little Europe" of the
Common Market, Moscow is holding
out the vision of a "Pan-Europe" based
on "peaceful coexistence" of all Euro–
pean states, regardless of their economic
and social structure.
Thus, the Russians are proposing a
Europe from the "Urals to the Atlantic"