Page 1100 - 1970S

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4
missars. But there is more to the story
than mere defensive maneuvering.
Soviet bloc armed forces have never
been stronger. In many military areas
the Soviet Union is quickly surpassing
the United States, including sorne areas
of traditional U.S. dominaoce, such as
nuclear missile armed submarines.
The authoritative military publica·
tion, "Jane's Weapons Systems," re–
ported in 1971 that the Soviet Union
has taken the initiative in research and
development of soph isticated weaponry,
rather than following the American
lead.
Most Western experts have predicted
Soviet mperiority in neariy every major
category by 1975,
from missiles and
submarines to more conventional weap–
ons and manpower.
Working to Soviet advantage is
growing sentiment in the United States
for a cutback in mil itary spending and
a pullback of American troops from
Indochina and elsewhere. The Soviets
are fully aware of pressures in the U. S.
Senate to reduce troop commitments to
Western Europe.
The United States - the world's
only other superpower - still repre–
sents the primary obstacle to long–
range Soviet goals of world supremacy
and the eventual victory of Communism
over Capitalism.
Security Conference
It is only in this overall perspective
that the Soviet foreign policy toward
Western Europe can be viewed. The
vehicle to carry out the plan is the so–
called European Security Conference,
a
project that Moscow has been calling
for, off and on, since 1954. Moscow
would like to see such a broad-based
conference, to which al! European states,
and initially even the United $tates and
Canada, would be invited to be con–
vened sorne time this year - or early
1973 at the latest. (North American
participation is not desired but is con–
ceded only in hopes of launching the
project.)
Both the Soviet regime and the vari–
ous Westeen governments have laid
clown specific prior conditions which
they respectively insist upon being met
before such a wide-ranging conference
on European security matters is held.
The
PLAIN TRUTH
February 1972
WiJe WO<IJ
KEY BISCAYNE SUMMIT -
President Nixon and West Germen Chancel–
lor Brandt reached common consensus on European affairs in year-end talks
al the Florida Wh ite House.
The Westecn Allies insist upon com–
pletion of the Berlín Treaty, which now
awaits only the final signing by the four
victorious World War Two powers -
Great Britain, France, the United $tates
and the Soviet Union. The Treaty guar·
antees West German access to Berlin
and provides new privileges for West
Berliners in the eastern half of the
divided city. The long-sought-for pact is
a cornerstone of West German Chan–
cellor Willy Brandt's
0Jtpolitik,
or
policy toward the eastern Communist
bloc. Opinion inside West Germany,
however, appears divided as to the real
effectiveness of Herr Brandt's program,
which incidentally earned him the 1971
Nobel Peace Prize.
The Russians are insisting that befare
their signature is affixed to the Berlín
agreement the West German parlia–
ment ratify its government's nonaggres–
sion treaties with Poland and the Soviet
Union, negotiated in 1970. Experts pre–
dict tough going on that score in the
Btmdestag,
or lower house. Critics of
the pacts, mostly opposition Christian
Democrats, decry them as "sell-outs" to
the Communists.
If
Chancellor Brandt can garner
enough support, one way out of the
apparent logjam could be to arrange to
have the Berlín Treaty and both nonag–
gression pacts signed on the same pre–
viously determined day.
Soviets Want No Repeat
of H istory
To the Russians, a mutual pledge of
nonaggression between them and the
Federal Republic of Germany is the
foundation point of the whole question
of future political relationships
m
Europe.
The least of Moscow's concerns in
pressing new European security propos–
als is anxíety about its ímmediate secur–
ity posture. "On the whole, our
positions in Europe are secure," ob–
served Foreign Minister Andrei Gromy–
ko in 1969.
The concern instead is a future one.
Certain mistakes and miscalculations of
the past are to be avoided at aJl costs.
As one ranking Soviet commentator
phrased it: "Unlike the Thirties, today
it is a matter not of military and políti–
ca! measures to eliminate the threat of