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118
The beginning
of
a
dramatic realignment
in East-West relations
could take place this
year. But a few criti–
ca/ obstacles to de–
tente,
or
a relaxation
of
tensions, sti/1 stand
in the way.
by
Gene H. Hogberg
W
ITH UNCHARACTERISTIC
speed,
the Soviet Union is urging
that positive steps be taken
quickly to "relax tensions" between
capitalist West and Communist East
Europe.
Appeals by Moscow for a
detente,
especially within the confines of a
Soviet-inspired "European Security Con–
ference," have been broadcast so fre–
quently of late that leaders of the
Western powers are finding it extremely
difficult not to reply positively. As one
U. S. military expert puts it, "lt's a little
difficult not to respond to things which
seem to be directed toward more detente
and cooperation."
Exactly
how
the response is made,
however, could very likely determine
Europe's destiny - and with it, that
of the United States, free Europe's
guarantor.
Why
the
Rush?
Experts in intecnational relations are
~till
attempting to analyze all the pos-
sible reasons for the greatly intensified
efforts on the part of Soviet foreign pol–
icy framers to induce a thaw in the 27-
year-old Cold War in Europe. But a
few pieces of Moscow's new
W
est–
politik
-
as distinguished from West
German Chancellor Brandt's
Ostpolitik
-
are nevertheless becoming quite
clear.
It is now obvious that the roen in the
Kremlin are deeply concerned over
developing trends in both Western Eu–
rope and Asia. In the West, Britain has
at last opted for membership in the
Common Market, presenting the proba–
bility of a vastly expanded West Euro–
pean combine. Even though the Com–
mon Market is still only an economic
grouping the Soviets have an overriding
fear it could eventually become a power–
ful anti-Soviet política! and military
force.
Moscow officialdom is well aware that
Britain's nuclear capability could be
combined with that of France's nuclear
force de f1·appe,
developed during the
De Gaulle years.
It
must not be for–
gotten that many Russian leaders suf–
fered tragic personal losses at the hands
of Hitler'
S
blitzing
W ehrmacht
during
the Second World War.
According to the infiuential West
German daily,
Die
W
e/1,
an expanded
Common Market combine would "tend
to develop into a politically effective
center of power emerging on its (Rus–
sia's) fianks, no matter how peaceful its
aims may be, as a rival." The Soviet
government, continued
Die W elt,
"has
made no bones about its opposition to
British membership ·in the Common
Market and will do its best to under-
mine the trend ( of EEC growth] and
nip it in the bud."
And
In the
East ...
Sharing the stage of principal Soviet
foreign concern is Moscow's continued
confrontation - so far only verbal -
with its giant neighbor to the East,
Communist China.
Hardly a day goes by without a sting–
ing condemnation of the Chinese lead–
ership in the Soviet press. Moscow's
hostility has been heightened over two
recent developments. First it was China's
admittance into the United Nations and
subsequent Chinese opposition to sorne
Russian policies in the U.N.
Afterwards carne Peking's open sup–
port of Pakistan in the recent Indo–
Pakistani war. The USSR of course,
champions India's cause.
Lashing out bitterly at Peking, the
official Soviet newspaper,
Pravda,
ac–
cused China's leaders of "bearing an
enormous share of responsibility'' for
the conflict on the Indian subcontinent.
Peking, scorned
Pravda,
was "pursuing
a great-power, social chauvinist course
which not infrequently unites them
with American imperialism."
The Russians considered the denun–
ciation critica! enough to provide a
full English translation for foreign
subscribers.
Growing Military Might
The overriding Soviet concern now,
as always, is to avoid having problems
on both fronts, East and West, at the
same time. The vastness of Russian
geography dictates this strategy, which
long antedates the days of the Coro-