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even for Hanoi . North Vietnam did not
want its elusive ally, the NLF, to be–
come too independent.
Seating Arr angement Decided
With the four teams talking, a new
matter of importance had to be re–
solved:
the seating am:mgement.
It
took an unbelievable
77
days to de–
cide on the shape of the table. As the
diplomats from the four delegations
haggled, thousaods of Americans, Viet
Cong, North Vietnamese and South
Vietnamese
died
in the struggle.
Even the issue of whether to sit on
wooden stools or foldíng metal chairs
was raised. One suggestion brought up
the possibi lity of not sitting at all.
If
that suggestion had been adopted,
it
would have been a (Ough conference for
all concerned. That was over three years
ago, and the París Peace Talks are still
in session.
After studying nearly two dozen table
designs, a dramatic breakthrough carne
during a series of secret meetings. The
shape
of
the table was to be . .. round !
It
was a masterpiece of diplomatic
compromise.
Hanoi had originally proposed a
four-sided or square table. The reason
for this table shape was clear. Hanoi
had to have the NLF as an equal
partner at the talks. Since Saigon would
never admit to the NLF's political
existence, that design was totally un–
acceptable.
Washington carne up with an "our
side-your side" table configuratioo -
two opposing rectangular tables placed
so that the delegations would face one
another. Then it would not be necessary
to recognize the NLF.
Hanoi objected.
Finally, a solution was hammered
out. A round table would mean that
both
could claim a victory. Hanoi could
claim that the four delegations were
equal at a round table. The United
States and South Vietnam could insist
that it was "your side" versus "our
side."
The Case of the Impossible
Solution
Regardless of how you choose to look
at the talks - "your side-our side" or
equality for all - one inescapable fact
The
PLAIN TRUTH
january
1972
The Korean Peace Talks
K
OR..EA
was an education for
America - both on the
battlefield and at the negotiation
table.
The United States invited the
Communists to peace talks in 1951.
A Dauish hospital ship in Koreau
waters was suggested as a neutral lo–
cation. On July 1, 1951, Radio
Peking accepted, but in the no-man's
land of Kaesong, North Korea.
The United States then agreed for
liaison officers to arrange the talks.
When American officers arrived,
North Korean troops moved into the
area, and forced the officers to accept
a
Comrmmist
military escort. The
American negotiator, Vice Admira!
C.
Turner Joy, was "advised" to ride
in a jeep flying a large white flag -
the symbol of surrender. Of course,
he was photographed riding into
Communist held territory in symbolic
surrender.
Meanwhile, the chief Communist
stands out: There have been few agree–
ments among the four delegations.
Today there is not even agreement on
objectives at the Paris talks.
The Saigon government, headed by
President Tlúeu, will not accept a coali–
tion government and views such a gov–
ernment as the "kiss of death" for
an independent South Vietnam. Thieu
vows to oust the Communists even after
a peace settlement.
Upon the arrival of Mrs. Nguyen Thi
Binh in Paris, who heads the Revolu–
tionary Provisional Government delega–
tion, a call for
complete
victory in
South Vietnam was proclaimed to the
world .
Such bellicose statements from both
sides certainly do not tend to create an
atmosphere of cordiality, and will not
lead to handshaking between the two.
Their "big brother" counterparts aren't
seeing eye to eye either.
In October of 1970, President Nixon
went before a national television au–
dience to propase a standstill ceasefire
throughout all Indochina "without pre–
conditions." He appealed to the North
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, which is
negotiator, General Nam Il, had his
chair built about a foot higher thao
Joy's. Also, the Communists would
refuse to answer questions. They
would stare toward tbe wall for
hours, going without lunch. During
the talks, the North Koreans accused
the United $tates of germ warfare,
bombing prisoners, and even of
training monkeys to throw hand gre–
nades. Perhaps the United States
should have sent monkeys to nego–
tiate with the Communists.
At this rate, it took two years and
575 meetings after the talks first
started, to bring about a ceasefire -
not a peace! During those years, the
United States spent over ten billiou
dollars and 20,620 American lives.
And after 16 years there is still no
negotiated peace treaty for Korea.
Two U. S. Army divisions remain to
patrol an uneasy armistice line where
the potential for another conflict still
exists.
the military wing of the NLF, to break
the logjam at the Paris Peace Talks.
A week later the Hanoi and the NLF
delegations declared their "firm, total
and categorical" rejection of the peace
proposals for Indochina.
With such pervading discordaucy,
not much can be accomplished at the
meetings. The five-hour weekly sessions
are mostly diplomatic ritual. Much of
the time is taken up by the robot-like
reading of prepared denunciations and
countercharges. Americans ignore the
Viet Cong. The Communists and Saigon
ignore one another. About the only new
element being added to the París Peace
Talks is the increased number of tour–
ists who watch the delegations arrive
and depart from the Jnternational Con–
ference Center.
With vituperative statements and atti–
tudes dominating the talks, it raises the
basíc question as to whether there can
be lasting agreement on anything, much
less peace, among the delegates.
Imagine what could be accomplished
at the París Peace Talks if all parties
were genuinely concerned about achiev–
ing a just and equitable peace. Unfortu-