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end to the war. The delegates talked
about the talks. After months of bicker–
ing and debate, both delegations sat
clown to lind out whether or not there
was anytbing that either side was will–
iug to talk about. Certainly, neither side
was willing to give very much.
To Bomb or N ot to Bomb?
The talks finally settled on a dis–
cussion of the bombing halt. This occu–
pied much of the first six months of the
talks. Hanoi adamantly insisted the
bombing halt had to be unconditional.
Al! American requests for reciproca! ac–
tion on the part of Hanoi were rejected.
Washington feared that once the
bombing was stopped, it would be dif–
ficult to begin again. Hanoi, on the
other hand, felt that reciprocity on its
part would be a tacit agreement that
such bombing might be "legal" in sorne
instances. Since Hanoi's object was to
get world opinion on its side by de–
nouncing the bombing as illegal, it
made little sense for them to give in on
this vital issue. Also, Hanoi did not
want a formula by which the United
States could resume bombing "legally"
by charging violations of an under–
standing.
If
the United States stopped the
bombing unconditionally, it would be
interpreted as a sign of imminent Com–
munist victory. Finally, on October 31,
Toda
y
there is not
even agreement on
objectives at the
Paris Talks.
1968, President Johnson conceded, and
ca!Jed for an end to all bombing of
North Vietnam.
Tt had taken thirteen months from
the time President Johnson announced
a desire for peace talks to hammer out
a tenuous, one sided and only partía!
cessation of military activities.
Saigon Government and
NLF
Admitted
Hanoi agreed to admit the Saigon
government to the París talks - a con–
cession that Hanoi had formerly refused
to make. Along with Saigon, the Com–
munist National Liberation Front
(NLF) carne into the talks.
Now the United States had to wrestle
with its ally, the Saigon government. lt
Rlght .. Widt' World; Abow. RoMrt Ellison. 8/«k SrM.
took 26 days of cajoling for Washing–
ton to convince a recalcitrant Saigon to
agree to appear at the talks. The rea–
son
?
Saigon waoted victory, not talk.
They had vowed never to negotiate with
the NLF.
If
there were to be any nego–
tiations, Saigon wanted to handle them
alone. This meant leaving out both the
NLF and the United States, and dealing
directly
with
Hanoi.
Saigon finally conceded, but not until
they had wruog out an assurance from
the United States that they would be
able to pJay a major role i.n the talks.
Saigon was also assured on other points:
The United States would not force them
into a coalition government with the
Communists, and Saigon would speak
for the Allies concerning the political
future of South Vietnam.
While Saigon had been reluctant to
JOin
the talks, the Revolutionary
Provisional Government, which repre–
sented the Communist NLF, jumped at
the opportunity. This not only pre–
sented a chance for the Communists
to be officially recognized as spokes–
men of the people in South Vietnam,
but it put them in a worldwide political
spotlight.
This action complicated the issue,