Basic HTML Version
December 1971
change of spirit might well precipi–
tate the necessary change in lead–
ership and governrnent.
The main human ingredients in
rnaking life livable in today's cities
are human understanding, economic
equality, tolerance, cooperation, a
desire to work, a livable borne, a city
with character, and most irnportant,
citizens with character.
On the other hand, perhaps a
courageous change in governrnent
and leadership could instill a change
in Ameríca's spirit. All three changes
are needed if our cities are to be
saved.
lt
has been argued that our cities
are "unsavable." But this is only true
if present trends continue.
City planner H. Wentworth El–
dridge summed up the view of over
50 of his colleagues when he wrote,
"Al!
serious students of the urban
sceoe by now agree that there are not
going to be any new and shining
cities without
new and shining
people in some as yet not mtirely
clear reciproca/ relationship
."
Streets, buildings and factories
are not the primary ingredients of a
city. People are the primary inputs
deterrnining whether a city is livable
or not. This has been proveo by
America's housing project disaster.
New buildings to live in did
NOT
guarantee new patterns of behavior
for the inhabitants. Thus, "high rise
slums" were created.
The physical configuration of cities
is important. But the mental, emo–
tional and spiritual configuration of
people is more important. Arnerica
must choose to do something with
its government and people. There is
no other way to rescue our cities.
The
PLAIN TRUTH
(Contimted from page 26)
prospect of being hired last and fired
fust.
What was gradually forrning in cen–
tral Newark was the worst racial and
economic ghetto in the nation.
As crime, venereal disease and other
social evils multiplied, rniddle-class
Negroes- those who could afford to–
fled. Those who remained - white or
black - were those who could not get
out by any means.
By the mid-Sixties, Newark had be–
come the only other city in the nation
besides Washington, D.
C.
with a rna–
jority black population. As recently
as 1950, blacks had cornprised only
17% of the city's total racial makeup.
By 1960, the figure had risen to 35%.
In 1970, it stood at 60% of the
city's
375,000 inhabitants.
It
is expected to
becorne 75% by 1975.
The cate at which the whites fied the
city was dramat ic. In the two decades
since 1950, the city lost nearly 200,000
whites, or about 100,000 per decade.
Newark's once-flourishing Irish and
Jewish communities had fled en masse.
Only the Italians stayed on.
What forrned was two racially sepa–
cate and economically distinct "New–
arks." The first was white-dominated,
business "Newark." The second was
densely populated, inner-gbetto, black
"Newark." As ranks of irnpoverished
blacks poured into the second "New–
ark," the gap between it and the first
"Newark" widened.
Soon the city had more of its work
force commuting from the suburbs than
living within the city limits. During
the daylight business hours, the popu–
lation of the city doubled with the
in.Aux of workers. At night the
population halved with the exodus of
commuters.
Holocaust '67
As the two "Newarks" grew wider
apart, the racial tensions between them
mounted. The whites were prospering
in business "Newark" but living in the
surrounding environs that ringed the
city. The blacks were trapped in ghetto
"Newark" and were nnding themselves
ever more deeply eomeshed in a tangle
of social and economic woes.
.H
By the surnmer of 1967, the racial
polarization in central Newark had
reached flashpoint.
As July began, there were sorne
24,000 unemployed blacks within the
city limits. Their ranks had been swelled
by an estimated 20,000 teens with no
place to go, nothing to do. Tensions
mounted.
The second "Newark" had become
volatile in every way. Only a small
spark was needed to touch off a major
conflagration. On the evening of July
12, that small spark was struck when
police arrested a Negro cab driver on a
minor violation. Soon a crowd gathered
and rumors spread that he was being
viciously beaten by the white officers.
One rumor went so far as to say the
black cabbie had died at their hands.
Before long, Molotov cocktails were
being tossed everywhere and the long–
feared racial outburst was under way.
Before it was all over five days later,
vast sections of Newark's inner core lay
in blackened ruins. The final toll : 26
dead, 1200 injured, 1300 arrested, $10-
15 million in property damage, and
thousands of businesses and dwellings
gutted. Newark had experienced the
nation's worst race disorder since
Watts.
Newark then began attempts at re–
building and patching up the feelings
of racial hatred that had led to the vio–
lence. Soon it became apparent that the
psychological and emotional scars of
racial bate had become permanently
etched on the city. The riot had done
nothing more than leave many homeless
and without jobs ( since many busi–
nesses in the riot area were forced to
el
ose permanently).
Post-Riot Conditions Worsen
In the wake of the riot, a new
phenomenon began to develop on both
sides of the racial fence. Organized
movements began gearing up in prepa–
ration for the next outbreak.
Sizeable elements among the white
minority began to recruit vigilantes to
protect themselves from possible black
invasion. Hundreds were being trained
in the techniques of guerrilla warfare,
including the use of automatic weapons
and Molotov cocktails. One vigilante
leader was reported to have access to at