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PAGE 10
PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, AUGUST 2, 1985
know that the first priority of many of these leaders is to main
tain themselves in power, and they, not we, offer the most effec
tive "foreign aid" for this purpose••••
The Soviet Union seldom acts without a pur ?, ose, � its pur t oses
are always strategic, never moral. Thus its persistent ef o � ts
to stir further the already troubled waters of southern Africa
have to be viewed against the backdrop of the resources to the
West•••• The Soviets� not in Africa to "liberate." They are
there to dominate, control and exploit.
So the primary Soviet goal in southern Africa is to bring a very vital piece
of geography and geology under its control. The example of Ethiopia shows
that lives are expendable to achieve the communists' political goals. So
were millio�of Ukranians in the 1930s, even more millions in the communi
zation of China.
Moscow, however, realizes it can't bring about South Africa's collapse
through its own efforts. The armed forces of South Africa are too strongi
those whom the Soviets support, such as the African National Congress
(ANC), are too weak by comparison, as noted in the August 5 NEWSWEEK:
Would-be guerrillas in·South Africa face enormous difficulties.
Where the Viet Cong could operate from jungle cover, for example,
South African militants are exposed on open plains and mountains.
Within the townships, the streets are straight and easily
patrolled by armored car or helicopter. The townships themselves
are isolated, and government troops can co.ntrol the long roads
leading to them,. cutting off electricity, telephone service and
even supplies of food and wate·r.
Most importantly, Moscow had to somehow derail the U.S. policy toward South
Africa called "constructive engagement." Under the Reagan administration's
encouragement, the South African government was willing to take risks on
internal reform. Equally, it was encouraged to establish stronger ties
toward its neighbors. Moscow was stunned when Pretoria was able to engi
neer a non-aggre.ssion pact with Marxist Mozaml::>ique. The Communist-backed
ANC guerrilla camps were shut down.in Mozambique and other areas adjoining
South Africa. Soviet supported forces were on the run. Something had to be
done•
.
--=::) Because of these political facts of life, the Soviets recognized more than
� / ·ev�r that t�ey needed :the help of the West to bring South Africa down--in
order to bring down the �1 This Western help--again wittingly and un
witti.
ngly--comes _from two quarters, white liberals, and a new and increas
ing!�- significant force allied with it, the black civil rights leadership
in the United States (and also, increasingly, in Britain).
It must be understood that to the white liberals, South Africa is anathema.
The fact
.
that· South Africa_
is still a prosperous, viable society while
almost all of independent black Africa has collapsed· into economic despair,
political dictatorship and corruption is acutely embarrassin � to the
liberals. It offends their egalitarian concepts. The post-colonial break-
. up of Africa wasn't supposed to turn out the way it has. Concepts of liber
al democracy haven't taken root. (For proof, should more be needed, look at
the
_
latest coup in Uganda. For three days hell broke loose, with soldiers