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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, APRIL 6, 1984
PAGE 11
nuclear artillery; when the Russians did the same, they would
then conquer Europe, and � would pull the biggest Dunkirk
history ��·
Maybe some American . President � ould launch an
all-out nuclear war to punish the Russians for taking Europe (and
it is useful for the Russians to consider that as a possibility)
but maybe he would not.
One way to avoid blowing up the world is for the Europeans to have
the tanks, planes and troops needed to stop the Russians without
resorting to nuclear artillery and the ensuing escalation.
But
such conventional self-reliance costs money.
"Would the shift
towards more conventional defense," asked British Foreign Secre
tary Sir Geoffrey Howe last week, speaking in the hand-wringing
interrogative, "demand increased resources and an increase in the
number of men?
If so, where are they going to come from •..?"
Not from Uncle Sam, that's for sure.
The winds of change are
blowing, in Harold Macmillan's phrase, and will blow� forces
homeward.
The Europeans will have to choose:
to come up with
their own conventional defense, or to risk their birthright.
Here's what is coming through on the screen of my stereo-VCR
crystal ball:
In the coming decade, West Germany
(politically
weak, economically strong, with a pool of military manpower) and
France
(politically strong, economically debilitated, with 1ts
force de frappe) will form�� axis of power.
The postwar notion of a United States of Europe, prospering under
a cost-free American nuclear umbrella, will give way to this al
liance between historic enemies.
In the past, leaders of France
and West Germany have quietly explored close cooperation.
As I
see it, Paris-Bonn--the Central European power--with loose ties
to London and Rome, will join with the U.S. when its strategic
interests are parallel, and will play economic footsie with the
Soviet bloc when that suits Paris-Bonn.
Our policy should be to treat Central European independence as a
development of multipolar strength and not as a "breakup of the
alliance."
We should not bring our troops back in a huff, cold
turkey, but in a phased, consultative way that will encourage
self-reliance in our allies.
Needed now are some Frenchmen and
Germans � � assert their new GauITis'ntwTtFiout a tinge of
ant1-Amer1can1sm.
That last sentence contains the biggest "if" of all:
that a new national
ism--or supranationalism--in Western Europe would not become anti-American
in tone.
In the Spring 1984 edition of FOREIGN POLICY, there appears an
article entitled "Europe's American Pacifier."
It is written by Josef
Joffe, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, publishers of FOREIGN POLICY. Mr. Joffe, who formerly was an editor
with DIE ZEIT of Hamburg, has consistently argued against the breakup of
the security bonds tying both sides of the Atlantic.
In this article he
poignantly shows how important America's post-war presence in Europe has
been to the continent's peace and prosperity--and what the likely outcome
of a European-only defense system would be.