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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, MARCH 23, 1984
PAGE 11
was signed, MNR's radio propaganda transmitter, located inside South
Africa, was silenced.
In their respective speeches, both leaders underlined the political,
economic and social differences in their two countries, but stressed that
these differences would not impede cooperation. Declared Mr. Botha: "In
signing this agreement today, we have opted for the road of peace.... Our
task now is to...do all we can to ensure that historians will rank today as
a major turning point in the destiny of our subcontinent.'*
"The agreement we have concluded,
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said President Machel, "enables the
region to concentrate its efforts on the prime stru � gle of the continent
and humanity--the struggle against hunger, disease, ignorance, povert r and
underdevelopment":-" He also said:
"We shall continue to be aware o the
remaining contradictions but we recognize that we are indissolubly linked
by geography and proximity. We do not want southern Africa and our two
countries in particular, to be the theater for a generalized conflict."
Mozambique, to be sure, needs all the help it can get. It is in desperate
economic straits, compounded by the drought and floods afflicting southern
Africa--which, according to one estimate, resulted in more than 100,000
Mozambicans dying from starvation in 1983. The Soviet Union simply can't
give the aid Machel's government must have. (As one observer commented:
"Bullets and hand grenades do not fill hungry stomachs.") The keys to aid
were two countries: the United States and South Africa. In the article
"Pax Pretoriana" in the April 2 issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC, author John St.
Jorre writes:
WHAT HAPPENED? The short answer is that Machel had no alterna
tive. Virtually every known natural and man-made disaster has
struck Mozambique:
droughts, cyclones, floodsi botched social
and economic policies r a chronic shortage of skilled manpower
{ever since the Portuguese left en masse at independence); a drop
in world prices for the country's agricultural exports; and the
cancerous armed rebellion, backed by South Africa, that
threatened the survival of the government.
Machel first tried to get help from everyone but the South
Africans. He went to Moscow to solicit his Soviet friends. They
replied that they could afford no more than they were already
giving him (arms, heavy machinery, food, and fuel). A tour of
Western Europe produced little of substance.
Portugal, the
former colonial power, was ready to provide technical assistance,
but had no cash to spare....
That left the Americans. Relations had risen from rock bottom
early in the Reagan period.•.. But the United States had a price:
Mozambique would have to mend its fences with South Africa first
and then American aid could follow. (There is speculation that a
$200 million aid package, plus food aid,
over
a four-year period
was dangled in front of the Mozambican government.)
Machel• s
revolutionary party, FRELIMO, debated and agonized over its
limited choices. Finally Machel agreed to do what the Americans
and the South Africans asked of him.