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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, FEBRUARY 17, 1984
PAGE 9
disturbing parallel to past U.S. crises, especially in Iran.
Syria has
shown America up for what it is in the Middle East--a paper tiger!
President Reagan's decision to move U.S. Marines from Beirut to
ships off the Lebanese coast is a stunning defeat for his Lebanon
policy and a haunting reminder-of the Carter admTnfstration's
failure-rn -Iran....
At stake i�far more than Lebanon.
President-Reagan, who boasts that he hasn't "lost" a single
country during his presidency, has made Lebanon the major test of
his administration's ability to contain Soviet-backed forces. He
raised the stakes just last week, when he said in an interview
with The Wall Street Journal that an American retreat in Lebanon
would have "a pretty disastrous result" for U.S. foreign policy
around the world.
Mr. Reagan, in the face of growing election-year criticism of his
Lebanon policy, apparently decided to cut his losses now. He
said the U.S. will continue its training of the Lebanese army and
will step up that assistance "when the government of Lebanon is
able to reconstitute itself into a broadly based representative
government."
The American withdrawal� the Beirut airport� will have
enormous consequences--� the Mideast,
in other forei � n
countries, and 1n domestic U.S. politics. In the Mideast, S � ria
is already� big winner. By waging a ruthless campaign against
the Gemayel government and the U.S., Syria has reasserted its
traditional power in Lebanon ....
Syria's gains in Lebanon complicate U.S. policy elsewhere in the
Middle East. Moderate Arab regimes, such as Jordan and Saudi
Arabia, will be more likely to knuckle under to the radical
demands of a victorious Syria rather than seek accommodation with
Israel.... The broader diplomatic consequences are harder to
gauge. Some European allies, convinced that the U.S. has been
making a mistake in Lebanon, might be relieved that the Marines
will be moved out of Beirut.
Nevertheless, there could be a
lasting perception of U.S. weakness and a judgment that-the
Reagan administration,
tor
all its tough talk, was unable to
succeed in its most visible foreign-policy venture....
The trauma in Lebanon, like the Carter administration's failure
in Iran, raises questions about the ability of the U.S. to carry
out a coherent policy in the Middle East. Though the two cases
obviously have many differences, foreign-policy experts in and
out of government note some common problems:
-- The U.S. in both instances found itself with a weak and
vacillating client who was a prisoner of his own indecision.
Like the shah in Iran, President Gemayel could never decide
whether to open his government to the opposition or to subdue
foes with military force....
The U.S. compounded the leadership problem in both countries
by sending confusing signals.
Just as in Iran, American