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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, APRIL 16, 1982
PAGE 7
The other side of the coin is the sense of humiliation so often
felt by the Spanish-speaking culture, outmatched
force of arms} first in 1588 and ever since in
social development in the New World.
(at least by
material and
In other words, the outcome of that first armada's defeat led to the
eventual conferring of the birthright. This was in accordance with God's
plan--even though Pope Alexander VI, in 1493, had given Spain the New world
(with a smaller portion reserved for the Portuguese the following year}.
The publication, LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORTS (April 9, 1982}, showed
that the dispute, as always, really boils down to a struggle for power.
When Britain was strong, Argentina never dared to attack:
The legal argument has of course never existed in a vacuum, but
has been inextricably linked to diplomatic and political rela
tions between the two countries, and the balance of power. On
this approach it is clear that from 1833 to (at least} the out
break of World War II, Britain was overwhelmingly more powerful
than Argentina. This explains why no Argentine government could,
iA realistic terms, do anything more than keep the claim alive.
In this long period Argentina routinely appended its reservations
to whatever international treaty or convention was around at the
time and seemed relevant.
The change in the fundamental relationships between the two
countries was a post-war phenomenon.
It cannot be pinned to a
particular date, but to a series of events and trends. These
include the decline and gradual disappearance of the British
Empire; [and] the loosening of the ties of British economic
dominance on the Argentine mainland (expressed through the
control of beef, agricultural exports, railways, ports and
banking} ••••
Another CSM reporter, Joseph C. Harsch, on April 15, discussed the dan
gerous precedent to the world caused by the Argentine invasion and why the
U.S. should support the British position rather than trying to appear
"evenhanded":
The Argentine seizure of the Falkland Islands by armed force was
a simple
™
of � land grab
.e,y
military aggression which, if
allowed to stand, would have disastrously unsettling implications
all over the world••••International law and an enormous mass of
supplementary treaties and documents, including the charter of
the United Nations, condemn military aggression and the subjuga
tion of a population by force of arms.
The British are under no obligation even to negotiate over the
future sovereignty of the islands.
They could give them up
voluntarily and would like to do so since the protection of them
costs more than any return. But for the British to surrender
their rights and their obligations to the 1,800 British subjects
on the islands would establish an enormously dangerous precedent.
An yone who covets his neighbor's land could take inspiration from
the Argentine act of larceny.