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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, SEPTEMBER 4, 1981
PAGE 9
It is now obvious that Pretoria had two equally important objectives in mind
when it launched its four-pronged armored attack: (1) to search out Soviet
supplied radar and surface-to-air (SAM) missile bases which threatened South
Africa's Air Force, and, (2) to catch Soviet and other East block "advisers"
in the act. Not much is known about the first objective yet, but it is
believed that the air defenses were wiped out in a 90-mile-wide east to west
swath north of the border. Regarding the second objective, latest reports
are that at least four Soviet miliary advisers and military personnel were
killed and one, a sergeant major, was captured.
The South Africans had been warning the West for years that Soviets, East
Germans, Cubans and others were in Angola not just to prop up that country's
pro-Marxist regime, but to give military assistance and training to SWAPO
units.
At Xangongo, 60 miles north of the Namibian border, journalists
flown in by Pretoria authorities were shown evidence of direct Soviet in
volvement: a house from which, shortly before the attack, 27 Russians had
hastily fled, leaving behind a mess of empty wine, beer and vodka bottles.
Viewers of South African television were treated to pictures of burning
Soviet tanks and tales of Soviet advisers fleeing for their lives.
Captured booty included massive quantities of weapons and propaganda. A
complete 70-vehicle, Soviet-made SWAPO supply convoy was taken intact--part
of a cache of 100 vehicles and fifteen tanks plus 200 tons of small arms and
ammunitions.
And an enormous amount of Russian propaganda material was
found in SWAPO headquarters camp.
South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan, reported to be personally in
charge of "Operation Protea," said that the mission provided "undeniable
evidence indicating Soviet Russia's involvement in the terrorist onslaught
against South West Africa."
The United Nations General Assembly, to be expected, condemned the South
African "attack in Angola"--not SWAPO's 15-year long campaign of political
intimidation, brutal assassinations of chiefs and village headmen in Ovam
boland and the abducting across the border of thousands of Ovambo youths for
forced indoctrination and military training. All of this is just dandy with
the UN General Assembly--a body which even the liberal WASHINGTON POST once
described as "an institutional outrage" and "a moral swamp." (The General
Assembly cheered when SWAPO chief San Nujoma pledged to them in 1973 that he
would intensify the "armed liberation struggle.")
The UN recognizes SWAPO as being the "sole and authentic representative" of
the Namibian people. Three UN bodies channel aid directly to SWAPO. Since
the U.S. supplies 25% of the UN's constantly expanding budget, many American
tax dollars flow into SWAPO coffers.
Experts are convinced that it is the Reagan Administration's supposed "tilt"
toward South Africa (which Reagan officials instead termed "even-handed
ness") that emboldened Pretoria to launch the raid, their most extensive
cross-border missions to date. Mr. Reagan and his top aides have made a big
issue of challenging what they call Moscow's primary role in the global
terrorist network. That is why the South Africans were determined to catch
the Russians on the scene.
The Reagan Administration cast the lone veto in a UN Security Council reso
lution condemning the South African raid (Britain abstained). The reason