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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, May 2, 1980
Page 8
ON THE WORLD SCENE
IRAN DEBACLE EXPOSED: More evidence is coming to light on America's
disastrous rescue mission in Iran. Officials in the White House and the
Defense Department decry the ''very bad luck" of the mission. There is
no doubt the very worst imaginable happened: three normally reliable
helicopters went down, two of them flying, curiously, into unexpected,
fierce desert sandstorms.
But it can also be said unequivocably that the operation was flawed from
the very beginning. It undoubtedly would have run into trouble at any
one of a number of spots. Simply put, the mission was not bold enough
in strategy. Why? Because President Carter is unwilling to use force in
the conduct of foreign affairs. He considers himself first and foremost
a "humanitarian."
When the operation was first conceived, the plans called for a much larger
strike force involving 350 men conveyed by many helicopters and backed up
by carrier-based fighter bombers. Mr. Carte� however,wanted the mission
to be understood around the world as a "humanitarian rescue operation," not
as a military assault. In attempting to exert the minimum of military
power, with as little ''violence" and potential loss of life as possible,
the President scaled the project down to 90 men. The operation also
strained the mechanical limits of the few aircraft chosen.
"The President," noted columnist William Safire, "wanted so much to make
his surgical strike bloodless that he could not make the incision... By
convincing himself of the 'humanitarian' side of the operation, the
President ... narrowed the danger of casualties but lowered the chance of
success. This was surely humanitarian but tragically ineffective; beware
the daring of a cautious man."
In addition, for too much emphasis was placed on "abort" or "turn back"
points--instead of assuring enough power in the first place to guarantee
success. Military strategist Edward Luttwak calls such planning "decid
ing to get married and concentrating on divorce arrangements." Thus the
predetermined decision of "no sixth helicopter, no mission."
The mission could have proceeded even with the five remaining helicopters.
But the commander in charge on the ground knew that if real trouble
developed at the heart of the operation at the embassy, no further air
support would be forthcoming--just as had happened in the equally disas
trous Bay of Pigs fiasco along the Cuban coast in 1961.
It seems that American leadership refuses to learn the real lesson of
Vietnam (and Korea, and Bay of Pigs and...): if you go to battle, be pre
pared to commit enough force to get the job done! Perhaps our leaders
should have read the sound advice contained in Luke 14:31-32 before
planning such half-hearted measures.
And, with regard to religion and the presidency, Hugh Sidey, writing in
the April 21 issue of TIME notes: "The Bible is, of course, President
Carter's basic manual. Were he more inclined to the thunder of the Old
Testament, the U.S. might have a better global position. But Carter runs
to the New Testament, wherein the meek inherit the world, turn the other
cheek, love enemies, are first by being last, and find strength made