been discussing ways to strengthen
the "European pillar" of the NATO
alliance-to make up for what they
see as the inevitable diminution of
Amer ica's commitment.
More than Economics Needed
In his book
The Europeans,
pub–
lished in 1983 by Simon and
Schuster , the late Luigi Barzini
stressed the difficulties ahead for
Europeans as they strive for unity.
The urgency of unity is recog–
nized, but the wi ll to unite still is
lacking. " A unified Europe could,"
he noted, " ... prepare itself in time·
for the dangerous, turbulent, and
violent decades ahead, possibly the
most t reacherous times since the
fall of the Roman Empire."
Yet, Mr. Barzini observed, con–
fticting national prides and interests
remain major stumbling blocks. Fur–
thermore, he stressed, eco–
nomics ·has its limits as a
unifying agent. "European
unification, " he wrote,
" has been really retarded
and possibly prevented
forever by the delusion
that a customs union
would one day sponta–
neously generate a políti–
ca) and defense union....
"The reason why the
economic union is a dead–
end street is that it is
based on a limited,
oversimplified, and inade–
quate philosopby that be–
carne predominant in Eu–
rope after the Second
World W a r. l t was
believed to be the final
solution of all problems.
lt
holds these truths to be
self-evident: one, that the
economy is the principal
motor of history; two,
that an increasingly big–
ger GNP was the only
and sufficient condition
for progress."
Much more is needed, insisted
this well-known expert on Euro–
pean cul ture. " There cannot be a
really united Europe without a
common currency and a common
foreign policy, but above all, a com–
mon defense policy. This, in the
twentieth centu ry, means nuclear
weapons and space defenses."
All of these aspects leading
October 1984
Europeans realize they must have.
Since 1978 an embryonic European
currency- the European Currency
Uni t, or ECU-has been in opera–
tion. However, it is essentially a
compute r computation , repre–
senting a "basket" of individual
European monetary values.
It
is not
yet a full-fledged currency.
The French now are talking of
beginning a common foreign policy
d irectorate. And, this past summer,
botb the French and the West Ger–
mans agreed to the need for devel–
oping a joint satellite intelligence
network.
Fu r thermore, among sorne
French officials, wrote Sam Da–
vidson· in the March
5
Financia/
Times
of London, "it is now
becoming acceptable to raise the
long-taboo notion that there needs
to be a cbange in the relationship
between West Ge r ma n y and
nuclear weapons.
" l t is Jacques Chirac, no less, the
leader of the Gaullist party, who has
said that this problem needs to be
addressed; how he does not claim to
know, but somehow or other, he
believes, it must be addressed. And
quite recently a French Socialist
deputy, wr iting in
Le Monde,
argued
that, as part of a move towards a
more united European defense pos–
ture, the Germans should have dual–
key cont rol of sorne of the French
nuclear weapons."
Dangerous Trend?
That Europe should come to a
g reater sense of unity, economically
and even mil itarily, seems logical to
many, even in the United States.
T he U.S. government has long offi–
cially s upported such a goal,
thougb pr imarily mostly out of lip
serv ice. A more i ndependent
Europe could be a far more chal–
lenging economic competitor. And,
in matters of defense, who knows
what would happen.
An editorial in tbe
Los Angeles
Times
early in the year stated, cau–
tiously: ' 'There is a danger that the
movement for 'Europeanization' of
European defense could become a
veh icle for anti-Americanism in
Europe and isolationism in Ameri–
ca."
And in the Spring 1983 edition
of
Atlantic Quarterly,
in an article
entitled "European Self-Reliance
and the Reform of NATO," author
Healey Bu ll wrote that a more
independent Europe "is likely to
d isappoint sorne of the expectations
tbat Americans commonly have
5