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$150 million air and naval base on
the country's Atlantic coast- an
ominous parallel, sorne believe, to
the former U.S. base at Cam Ranh
Bay in South Vietnam.
Meanwhile , U.S. pressure
agaínst Nicaragua is pushíng that
tíoned could tell whích síde the
Reagan admínistration supports in
El Salvador.
Mr. Reagan ís aware that a mere
show of force may not be enough to
moderate the views of eíther the
Nícaraguan government or of the
guerrillas in El Salvador
who insist in a "share of
power " in government
before elections- a view
totally opposed by Wash–
ington.
Moscow will do al! in its
power to "preserve social–
ism" in its newly gained
possession, Nicaragua.
U.S. special envoy to Central America,
Richard B. Stone, right, visits wi th Honduran
President Roberto Suazo Cordova, center.
"The Soviets, the Cu–
bans, the Sandinistas,"
said journalist Patrick
J.
Buchanan, employing
card-game terminology,
"have shoved their stack
in. T hey have accepted the
risks inherent in estab–
lishing a Communist
beachhead deep inside the
hemispheric defense pe-
rimeter of the United
S tates."
Unlike in Vietnam, it is
country increasingly into the arms
of Moscow and H avana. War
between Nicaragua and Honduras
is a greater likelihood than ever–
with the possibility, some believe,
of pulling the United States right
along with it.
lnching in t o Disast e r ?
President Reagan has tried to alle–
viate congressional and public anxi–
ety over his Central America policy
with the appointment of a bipartis–
an commission headed by former
Secretary of State Henry Kissin–
ger, to help shape a national con–
sensus on Central America. At the
same time, as in Vietnam, the
United States is moving ahead mil–
itarily, step by step.
What is involved, noted one
observer, is a big stakes gamble.
In this grim game, Mr. Reagan
does not hold a strong hand,
because of a Congress still shell–
shocked over the Vietnam war, a
skeptical press and an American
public that, accordi ng to one poli,
still knows precious little of the
enormous implications of the strug–
gle. Only 25 percent of those ques-
4
the Soviets and Cubans
who are overextended and overex–
posed. The strategic advantage líes
with the United States- were the
nation to employ its power wisely.
That the United States possesses
the raw military power to win in
Central America is questioned by
nobody, not even Moscow, Havana
or Managua. lt 's the
will
to commit
that power to achieve a swift and
sure result that is missing. America's
will to win was lacking in Korea and
Vietnam and is still lacking today.
Norman Podhoretz, editor of
Commentary
magazine, has
warned that if the United States
fails to use its power in Central
Amer ica, or uses it ineffectively,
..we will have revealed ourselves as
a spent and impotent force."
If
the United States is defeated,
or abandons its allies in Central
America after fruitless negotia–
tions-as it did with its South Viet–
namese ally in 1973-it will indeed
be revealed as a "spent force."
The ramifications are grave. A
t roubled President Reagan in an
interview said that rebel leaders in
Central America frankly told
visiting U.S. Congressmen, "Make
no mistake about it. Wc'Jl be at thc
Arizona-New Mexico. Mcxico bor–
der sooner than you think..,
In advance of revolution. mil–
lions of refugees wil l be driven
northward.
At stake too are America's far–
ftung alliance commitments.
The Soviets see a great advantage
in tying down U.S. military forces
close to home. l n the long run this
would entail a drawdown of Ameri–
can troops from Europe and Asia as a
nervous American public would
demand security along the porous
southern U.S. border.
What, for example, will happen to
the 40,000 U.S. troops still on con–
stant alert in South Korea? The
North Koreans have been undergo–
ing a major buildup of ground and
naval assault forces. The Pyongyang
regime now has the world's largest
commando force, l 00,000 strong.
There is absolutely no chance for
a peaceful solution of the conftict in
Korea. The only factor that keeps
the North from renewing the war is
the certainty that the 40,000 U .S.
troops would fight along with the
Soutb, triggering an expected
larger U.S. response.
Take the American troops out
and war is a certainty- with mil–
lions of Korean boat people clam–
oring to come to the United States
and possibly Australia.
A weakened America would be
tempted to run down its military
commitment to Western Europe, in
order to meet threats closer to
home.
Such a possibility could give
Europeans the ímpetus they've long
lacked to fuse a biblically prophe–
sied United Europe with its own
nuclear defense capability.
Why America Flounders
There is a reason
why
the United
States failed to defeat the enemy in
Korea, Iost ignominiously in Viet–
nam and gives all indications of
repeating the same mistakes in
Central America.
In his book
The United States
and Britain in Prophecy,
Herbert
W. Armstrong, editor in chief of
The Plain Truth,
writes: " . . . the
United States, even still possessing
unmatched power, is afraid–
fears-to use it, just as God said: 'I
(Continued on page 41)
The PLAIN TRUTH