Basic HTML Version
During the late l970s officials of
the Carter administration ex–
pressed the hope that the conten–
tious region could be "depoliti–
cized." Despite frictions between
Washington and Cuba-which rep–
resents Moscow's interests in the
Western Hemisphere- the hope
was expressed that regional trouble
could be kept "outside the context
of the superpower relationship."
Moscow and Havana read the
U.S. hands-off policy differently.
Now was the time, they believed,
for them to intervene in perennially
troubled waters to pursue
their
long-range interests.
The first opportunity presented
was in Nicaragua where, in the late
1970s, widespread resentment built
rapidly against the 50-year-long
rule of the Somoza family (whjch
had close ti es to the U nited
S tates) .
A popular-front revolution suc–
ceeded in 1979. Marxists within
the front ultimately captured the
major spoils of the revolution,
deposing democratic moderates of
power and influence.
1t wasn 't long before trouble
erupted in neighboring El Salva–
dor, inspired and eventually sup–
ported by Nicaragua's revolu–
tionary leadership. One of El Sal–
vador's communist leaders, the late
Cayetano Carpio, asserted that
after El Salvador falls, it and Nica–
ragua would be "arm-in-arm and
struggling for the total liberation of
Central America."
Conflicting Latin and U.S. Views
In recent months, foreign ministers
of severa) Latín American nations
have appealed-so far unsuccess–
fully- for an end to the East-West
conflict in Central America and for
the removal of all foreign forces.
Ironically, the United States has
but a handful of advisers in El Sal–
vador and Honduras, whereas in
Nicaragua alone there are 8,000
Cubans, including 3,000 military
"advisers," plus specialists from the
Soviet Union, East Germany, Bul–
garia and North Korea.
Just as English-speakjng
norte–
americanos
have often been insen–
sitive to concerns of Latín Ameri–
cans, so Latins sometimes fail to
understand deeply held concerns of
the U.S. with regard to deteriorat-
July
1
August 1983
ing conditions immediately south
of its border.
"1 know a good many people
wonder," President Ronald Reagan
said earlier this year, "why we
should care about whether Com–
munist governments come into
power in Nicaragua, El Salvador or
other . .. countries ... of the Ca-
ribbean... .
"People who make these argu–
ments," continued the President,
"haven't taken a good look ata map
lately... . It isn' t nutmeg that's at
stake in the Caribbean and Central
America; it is the United States'
national security."
The future well-being of U.S.
aiiies, too, is involved, the President
maintained. At stake, in the Presi–
dent's view, are the vital sea-lanes of
the Panama Canal- no Ionger under
sole U.S. control- the Caribbean
and tbe Gulf of Mexico. Through
these waterways pass half of U.S.
imports, including large quantities
of oil. The region, tbe President
believes, constitutes the country's
" fourth border" and is of strategic
importance in resupplying Western
Europe in case of an emergency.
In the event of war, tbe bulk–
up to 85 percerit-of the U.S.
Army's combat logistics would
have to be shipped from ports on
the Gulf of Mexico.
Echoing the President's concern
is Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger. To bring revolution
right up to the southern border of
the United States would cause the
U .S., Mr. Weinberger says, to
bring military forces back from
Western Europe and Asia to
defend tbe national integrity of the
United States. Europe and Asia
would then be exposed to the full
military and political leverage of
the Eastern bloc.
Vietnam Haunts Amerlca
The talk of "dominoes" falling one
after another in Central America
and the Caribbean also haunts the
memory of many in the United
S tates.
Such language is painfully rem–
iniscent of traumatic experiences in
Southeast Asia where the United
States suffered its first defeat in
war and where indeed dominoes did
fall-South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia.
The urge in the U.S. Congress
not
to intervene directly in Central
America, even though the stakes
are so mucb higher, is strong.
Make no mistake. America's
"pride in its power" was shattered
in Vietnam. The tragic experience
of Vietnam stalks the halls of Con–
gress and the corridors of editorial
offices throughout tbe land . Viet–
nam, editorialized the March 28,
1983, issue of
The New Republic,
"will continue for many years to
weigh like a nightmare upon the
foreign policy of the living... . "
The fact is, there are parallels
between the disaster in Southeast
Asia and the way in which the U.S.
is approaching the crisis in Central
America.
First of all, the United States
today
has no overa/1 regional strat–
egy
for meeting the challenge-or,
at least one that has a broad con–
sensus of support. Second, Wash–
ington, as in the 1960s and 1970s,
is neglecting to deal with the real
opponent. And finally, as in Viet–
nam, the U.S. is seeking not to win
but merely "not to lose" the strug–
gle.
Regarding the first parallel,
retired U .S . Air Force General
T.R. Milton wrote in the March
1983 issue of
Air Force
magazine
that in Southeast Asia, "we were
concentrating on a place called
South Vietnam, and there were
maps to prove its borders existed.
In real life the borders did not exist
and Ho Chi Minh [North Viet–
nam's leader] knew it. He, unlike
our intellectuals, did have a strate–
gy, one designed to . . . [consoli–
date] all of Indo-china- Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos-under Hanoi's
rule. He must have had trouble
believing hi s luck when we
declared North Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia out of bounds. "
Similarly today, many insist that
each insurrection in Central Amer–
ica arises spontaneously from local
conditions and is nonrelated to
other eruptions in the region.
The insurgents themselves say
otherwise. Earlier this year, El Sal–
vador's guerrillas declared, via tbeir
Radio Venceremos stat io n in
Managua, Nicaragua, that they
were part of a regional struggle.
"We are and will continue to be
(Continued on page 41)
3