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tion with Soviet authori t ies.
l ronically, the 1979 missile deci–
sion was the brainchild, not of the
United States, but of fo rmer
Social Democratic Chancellor Hel–
mut Schmidt. Schmidt, wor ried
over the growth of Soviet missiles
targeted on Western Europe, pro–
posed the stationing of new U.S.–
made and -cont rolled intermediate–
range missiles in Western Europe
to bind European and American
defense ties even closer together.
F rench, Ameri cans Campa lgn Too
Almost immediately after Mr.
Gromyko left Bonn, French Pres–
ident Francois Mi tterrand carne to
town. In a su r prising ly fr ank
address to the Bundestag ( lower
house of the West German parlia–
ment), Mr. Mitterra nd warned
agai nst any softening of Bon n's
commitment to the nuclear de–
fense of Europe.
T he French leader cautioned of
lhe grave danger of splitt ing off
("decoupling") the United States
from its European all ies- a distinct
possibility, the French believe, if
the new weapons are not accepted
on the Continent.
France's own independcnt de–
terrent nuclear force would cease
to be credible if NATO fell apart
and the United Slates wi thdrew
its nuclear protection of Europe.
On the heels of Mr. Mitter–
rand's departure arrived Vice
President George Bush of the
United States. Mr. Bush encou r–
aged the Germans to hold firm to
the original NATO " twin track"
decision-new missi les unless the
U.S.-Soviet negotiations succeed
in Geneva.
He also pushed hard for Presi–
dent Reagan's zero-opt ion offer–
again, originally a West German
proposal. (Under the zero-option
plan, the United States wou ld wi th–
hold the new missi les if the Soviets
dismantle all their intermediate–
range weapons.)
The Vice President brought with
him an open letter from Mr. Rea–
gan addressed lo lhe people of
PERSHING
1/
missile lifts off in test ffíght.
Plans to station controversia/ weapon in
West Germany arouse passions in some
~
quarters of Western Europe and real
~
alarm in Moscow.
Europe. In it the President offered
to meet with Soviet Communist
Party Chairman Yuri Andropov
"wherever and whenever he wants' '
in order lo sign a treaty that would
"banish from the face of the earth"
all land-based Amer ican and Soviet
med ium-range missiles.
Mr. And ropov rejected t he
offer.
Rough Seas Ahead
1n the end, the innate conservat ism
of the average West German
played to Mr. Kohl's immediate
advantage. Even sorne of Mr.
Vogel's supporters felt that the
Soviets had overplayed their hand .
Sti ll , there are many signs that
the public opinion batt le in Germa–
ny over East-West relat ions has
only j ust begun.
Surprised by the size of the
defeat of Mr. Vogel, the Soviet
Union warned the new government
in Bonn that any deployment of
new Amer ican missiles on German
territory would "damage the entire
complex of relations"-including
formidable t rade t ies-between
Bonn and Moscow.
The biggest challenge for Mr.
Kohl, however, could be from with–
in the federal parliament in Bonn.
For the firs t t ime in their brief
existence, the antiestablishmen t
you th-orien ted Green par ty has
secured federal representation.
The G reens have vowed not to
compromise on nuclear weapons.
They have promised to figh t the
missiles " in parliament and in the
streets."
"T his is going to be a very hot
year," said J oach im Wern icke,
scientific adviser of the Greens,
shortly after the election. "There
will be blockades of deployment
sites. T here will be blocki ng of
U.S. mi litary transpor ts. There will
be parl iamentary and non-parl ia–
mentary act ion to stop the deploy–
ment. "
T hree West German peace
movements proclaimed support of
the Green cause. T hey promised
hunger strikes and tax strikes in
what one activist ter med "a
peaceful civil war" to block the
missile deployment.
Last year, there were 60 attacks
on U.S. mi litary bases and soldiers
(Continued on page 39)
The
PLAIN TRUTH